>
>An alternative would be to take more of a "proxy approval vote" approach:
>if
>more than one of the proxies on my list actually do vote (or further
>delegate
>my vote to someone who does), then my vote is split evenly between all of
>them.
Okay. Again, I suggest a compromise: when v
I don't think "proxy approval" would be a descriptive name for a method
that splits votes into fractions. "Proxy cumulative voting" would be a
more appropriate title, since all of the fractions add up to one vote.
If it were known that multiple proxy delegates could not vote for the
same candida
In a proxy direct democracy, when a participant sets up their "standing" proxy
lists to indicate who gets to vote on their behalf (either in general or on a
specific topic) when the participant does not vote directly, it seems clear
that the participant should be able to register multiple altern
In his proxy-based direct democracy proposal, James Green-Armytage suggests
that the system be implemented initially on a non-binding, advisory basis,
and used to allow the public to vote on issues "a few times per year". While
I would strongly support such a system, especially if the idea some
First question is to define the task of the actual proxies, so I
will cover a legislature whose members get chosen/unchosen via proxies.
I am covering two thoughts here:
The members will need to attend to the tasks of a traditional body.
Via proxy, voters who think alike can share a mem
Stephane Rouillon wrote:
>I cross-read all your stuff and I did not see anything about my main
>preocupation (not problem) when making a proxy-system.
>How would you remunarate representatives?
Good question. I didn't have a plan for it, but I developed one in
response to your question. I
Hi folks, here's the latest version of my proxy system proposal... web
page version still at
http://fc.antioch.edu/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/voting_methods/proxy.htm
The most recent section which I changed is the one on "issue generation"
and "option generation".
regards,
James
A Proposal for
Here I take a different path from the recent proxy threads. Just as PR
has advantages over single districts, but elected legislators have similar
duties, I involve proxies in selecting legislators, but keep the duties
about the same.
A voter can appoint a proxy to act for them - no secrecy he
On May 17, 2004, at 11:14 PM, James Green-Armytage wrote:
"Dr. Ernie Prabhakar" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
For example, it seems to me that Robert's Rules explicitly require or
assume a one-person/one-vote Plurality type of decision-making, and it
thus (naively) inconsistent with rank-order voting
"Dr. Ernie Prabhakar" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>For example, it seems to me that Robert's Rules explicitly require or
>assume a one-person/one-vote Plurality type of decision-making, and it
>thus (naively) inconsistent with rank-order voting. Is that a fair
>assessment? Further, that sort o
On May 17, 2004, at 2:06 PM, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
On May 17, 2004, at 12:57 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
And if you count on the senate/parliament to set up mutually exclusive
options for a multiple choice vote, they could abuse that and make
exclusive things you might want both or more of. N
On May 17, 2004, at 12:57 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, 17 May 2004, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
My concern is to ensure that the process is friendly to
multiple-choice
options. My fear is that the traditional yes/no vote could easily be
used to hold the assembly 'hostage', by only giving t
On Mon, 17 May 2004, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
> My concern is to ensure that the process is friendly to multiple-choice
> options. My fear is that the traditional yes/no vote could easily be
> used to hold the assembly 'hostage', by only giving them a choice
> between the lesser of two evils.
Hi Adam,
On May 17, 2004, at 11:35 AM, Adam H Tarr wrote:
Right now, decisions are typically a force between options 2 and 3,
excluding the 'radical middle' option.
Some method of allowing the assembly to sort through options easily
would be
nice. But it's not really crucial, since (again) it sho
First, some etymological junk: I don't think "parliament" is a good name for the
proxy assembly, since parliament implies parlay, i.e. debate, and that body will
have lots of members who don't discuss their vote with anyone. Then again,
"house" implies a physical location as well. Perhaps "ass
Hi Adam,
On May 15, 2004, at 6:59 PM, Adam Tarr wrote:
How about this:
- Bicameral legislature. I'll call the two houses "senate" and
"house" but this is just for identification purposes.
- The "senate" is elected by a PR method. The "senate" would act like
a normal legislative body, meeting i
Curt Siffert wrote:
The flaw to other schemes that I keep bumping my head against is that
proportional representation disenfranchises the people below the cutoff
point, even though their views might still be valuable. But DD by itself
isn't good either because it just gets so unwieldy in the dr
The question was:
Who is A's proxy in an A->B->C->A loop?
A is out of luck, if that's all the information there is.
But you suggested that voters might have also indicated a ranking of
proxies.
Yes, I suggested two ways of doing it:
1. The voter V indicates a ranking of proxies, so that if hir 1s
>I've actually spec'd
>up ideas for forming such an online community, where people just simply
>join up and start selecting each other as proxies.
Yes, one of the most logical ways to gain interest in direct democracy is
to create an actual forum for it that is capable of expanding to
James, one thing that strikes me about the idea of starting out with a
nonbinding proxy/direct system that slowly scales up is that
technically,
there's no barrier towards one just starting up. I've actually spec'd
up
ideas for forming such an online community, where people just simply
join up
Adam,
That's really cool. The flaw to other schemes that I keep bumping my
head against is that proportional representation disenfranchises the
people below the cutoff point, even though their views might still be
valuable. But DD by itself isn't good either because it just gets so
unwieldy i
Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
I dunno; perhaps I'm not clear on what problems proxies are supposed to
solve. By making the decision-making process more fine-grained, I can
see how it could generate more proportional representation among the
decision makers, and avoid some the systematic bias of e
Hi, it's James. I haven't been keeping up with the list much lately, but I
just wanted to respond to some of the recent discussion regarding a proxy
direct democracy system.
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
>PR is obsolete. Now Direct Democracy (DD) is easily feasible with today's
>technology. And DD would
I completely agree. I have a very idealized and unrealistic opinion of
how measures should be constructed. If you have a body of 100
representatives, then someone writes a bill or document that will get
someone done. Everyone else reviews it. If even one disagrees with
it, they must registe
Hi Mike,
On May 15, 2004, at 11:51 AM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
So that's 3 reasons why financial disincentive for proxies needn't be
a problem: 1) Rich proxies; 2) Contributions required to be small, or
(better yet) contributions whose sum is required to be below a
specified amount that is just eno
Kurt--
You wrote:
The problem with a pure proxy setup, however, is that there is a
disincentive for anyone to adopt the duties of a super-proxy. Time,
and financial opportunity cost. If it's all purely ad-hoc, then it
means that someone becoming a proxy would not be compensated for it.
The only
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