Hello Ken,
On Jun 10, 2005, at 19:07, Ken Kuhlman wrote:
So, CIBR appears to be less than ideal, which stems from the fact
that the weakest candidate isn't necessarily eliminated first.
I'm not sure what the negative effect of not eliminating the weakest
first are. But I just want to point
Hello Ken,
Nice ideas. Correlation seems like a useful tool that could be applied
also elsewhere than with Borda. It sure is more natural (and wider)
than the normal clone definitions (unfortunately not as simple but of
course so are peoples' opinions).
Borda has some problems with
On 6/9/05, Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ken,Does CIBR(like plain Borda)meet Participation? (a tall order).If not, does it meet Mono-raise (i.e. is it monotonic)?
These are interesting questions, and I'll try to take a look at them in
the future. I'm going to have to give you a rain check
Ken,
Does CIBR (like plain Borda) meet Participation? (a tall order).
If not, does it meet Mono-raise (i.e. is it monotonic)?
And a more general question: why do you think its better or more
important to meet Symmetry than the Condorcet criterion?
Chris Benham
Election-methods mailing
On 5/27/05, Araucaria Araucana [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I've seen this Borda-advocate logic before.
Not surprising. As I stated, it's a summary of an explanation made by Saari.
Eliminating 'symmetric' votes is just eliminating votes.
No vote has been eliminated.. some have cancelled. To again
On 27 May 2005 at 11:46 UTC-0700, Ken Kuhlman wrote:
While your CC failure example is helpful, my favorite is Condorcet's original
critique of Borda:
30:ABC
10:BCA
10:CAB
1:CBA
29:BAC
1:ACB
Condorcet picks A Borda CIBR pick B. Here's the explanation (summarized
from Saari):