At 05:15 AM 9/19/2005, Jan Kok wrote:
On 9/18/05, Abd ulRahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Please don't normalize the Range ballots. There are several reasons
why people might not vote the full range:
Indeed. However, we can't have it both ways. If we don't normalize,
there are going to
On 9/18/05, Abd ulRahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> At 08:36 PM 9/17/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
...
> >My understanding is that FBC is mutually exclusive of the Condorcet
> >winner criteria. As I've stated above, when Condorcet winner is
> >violated, there's a good chance that one person, o
At 08:36 PM 9/17/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
My understanding of the argument made to Condorcet
advocates is that Range has a much higher probability of picking the
Condorcet winner than other methods of equal simplicity (e.g. Cumulative
voting, Plurality, Borda). However, it's difficult to explai
Rob,
--- Rob Lanphier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> I think implicit approval punishes honest voters. You're asking that
> voters opt out of races between candidates that they don't approve of,
> even though they could very well have an opinion.
I'm not asking them to do so. I haven't attempte
Hi Kevin,
Thanks for the response. I've had to cut my response short, because I
want to get back to a project I'm working on. More inline.
On Sun, 2005-09-18 at 23:00 +0200, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> --- Rob Lanphier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > My understanding based on your previous descript
Rob,
--- Rob Lanphier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > ICA satisfies this:
> > "If there is one candidate who doesn't lose to any others after certain
> > losses
> > are disregarded (due to being reversible by voters using equal-top ranking),
> > he must win."
> >
> > ICA scales Condorcet back
On Sun, 2005-09-18 at 03:15 +0200, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> --- Rob Lanphier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > My understanding is that FBC is mutually exclusive of the Condorcet
> > winner criteria. As I've stated above, when Condorcet winner is
> > violated, there's a good chance that one person, o
Rob,
--- Rob Lanphier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> My understanding is that FBC is mutually exclusive of the Condorcet
> winner criteria. As I've stated above, when Condorcet winner is
> violated, there's a good chance that one person, one vote has been
> violated.
> I will be willing to bet
Hi Mike,
I should be really clear here if I haven't stated this already. If I'm
only considering the final outcome (not looking at it with my electoral
reform strategist hat on), my range ballot for voting systems looks
something like this (scale of 0-5):
Condorcet methods*: 5
Range Voting, Appr
I wrote:
And then (or perhaps as we see this approaching) we could proceed
with further reform. As I've stated before, there are better
methods; but when I have described one of them, it has happened that
my posts have been rejected as not being relevant to "Condorcet."
We'll see if this one
At 12:43 AM 9/16/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
It's a matter of degrees. Under Approval, the voter is saying that both
Kerry and Nader are equally acceptable. For that matter, they may even
have to say McCain or Giuliani is just as acceptable if it means beating
Bush.
Something like this is often
Rob--
You wrote:
That's my central objection to Approval when compared to Schulze(wv) and
other Condorcet-compliant methods. In the vast majority of cases, a
simple sincere ranking works in Schulze(wv). It's what I can do, it's
what I can tell others to do.
I reply:
Sure. Because of SFC, GS
Hi Mike,
I'm going to respond a little out of order.
On Fri, 2005-09-16 at 01:23 +, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> But you haven't shown that the way I would vote in a Condorcet election is
> stupid. Saying it isn't enough.
> [...]
> Let's not sling namecalling around unless we can show that it's tr
Big thing I read from this is that if voters fail to rank sincerely, they
need some crash education.
Perhaps plotters can profit from carefully planned insincere votes, but
any other deviation from sincerity is suicide.
DWK
On Thu, 15 Sep 2005 02:38:31 + MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Adam--
Y
Rob--
You wrote:
I'd said:
Nasty enough to make voters bury their favorite?
Nope. That incentive will never exist withApproval or Range Voting.
You replied:
That wasn't what I was referring to. Where do I draw the Approval
line?
I reply:
That's what makes Approval more fun.
You contin
At 07:11 PM 9/14/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Of course, among the things that would happen should an accurate polling be
sufficient to successfully strategically vote would be the creation
of voters who would no longer supply accurate information to the poll takers.
Many of those discussing
Adam--
You wrote:
In my opinion, a method where favorite betrayal scenarios are restricted to
a very narrow range of situations are not a major problem.
I reply:
That's what I believed too. I thought that I, and maybe a few others who
share my opinions of the candidates, would be the only on
Quoting MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
Someone posted a wv failure-example to EM a while back. I'll try to
find another example, but I admit that it's easier said than done.
The important thing is that, as long as there's any chance that
voting Nader instead of Dean in 1st place will let Ch
Rob,
--- Rob Lanphier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Agreed...we're all extrapolating on what we'd do personally. So far, I
> haven't seen a scenario that convinces me I'd make favorite betrayal a
> routine in my voting patterns. Of course, I've been known to "throw
> away" my vote in the past,
On Tue, 2005-09-13 at 22:51 -0600, Adam Tarr wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> There was an FBC failure example posted recently. It arises from a
> cycle with a lot of sincere indifference. It goes like this:
>
> 31% C>A>B
> 9% B>C>A
> 28% B=C>A
> 32% A>B>C
> 68% C > 32% A
> 63% A > 37% B
> 41% B >
[EMAIL PROTECTED]On 9/13/05, MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
I'll start looking for a BeatpathWinner FBC failure example, but I hope
others will too, because it isn't so easy to find one.
There was an FBC failure example posted recently. It arises from
a cycle with a lot of sincere ind
Rob--
You wrote:
can you give an example of your nightmare scenario with a
winning votes method? Since there's a number of us advocating
Schulze(wv), can you use that as a baseline?
I reply:
Someone posted a wv failure-example to EM a while back. I'll try to find
another example, but I admi
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