On Feb 27, 2004, at 10:35 AM, Adam Tarr wrote:
Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
For a longer version, I'd say:
"The optimal strategy for CR is equivalent to that for
Approval,
but in situations with detailed information and large voting
power
the effective strategies might differ
Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
For a longer version, I'd say:
"The optimal strategy for CR is equivalent to that for Approval,
but in situations with detailed information and large voting power
the effective strategies might differ."
It's actually the combination of large voting p
So, I think we have a pretty solid handle on the nature of the
differences between optimal CR and approval strategy. I'm comfortable
with the statement, "CR is strategically equivalent to Approval, for
an individual voter in a large election". Can you sum it up in a more
clever or succinct wa
I wrote and Ernest Prabhakar responded:
(I) 40% chance:
A: 101,000
B: 102,000
C: 104,000
(II) 60% chance:
A: 100,000
B: 104,000
C: 105,000
Then the optimal strategy is to give B 5 points if the preference gap
between C and B is at least twice as big as the preference gap between A
and B, and one
Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
However, it seems like there can well be extreme cases, due to either
detailed information or sub-optimal strategic behavior by opponents, where
a different strategy would actually be more -effective- (optimal doesn't
mean perfect). Thus, in those cases, the most effec
On Feb 26, 2004, at 5:46 AM, Adam Tarr wrote:
Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
However, it seems like there can well be extreme cases, due to either
detailed information or sub-optimal strategic behavior by opponents,
where a different strategy would actually be more -effective-
(optimal doesn't mean per
At 08:55 AM 2/26/2004 -0800, Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
Suppose the election is CR with three candidates (A, B,C) who must be
ranked from 1 to 5. Let us say that based on the information that Voter
X has, the likely ranking by other voters will end up being either:
(I) 40% chance:
A: 101
B: 102
Hi Adam ,
Good work Ernie.
Thanks.
So this would be just such a case, where due to the extremely precise
knowledge and the hair's-breadth nature of the election, the marginal
utility for each additional point for candidate C is not constant. If
we were to make this election have a plausible l
Hi all,
On Feb 25, 2004, at 9:36 PM, Ken Johnson wrote:
CR is strategically equiovalent to Approval: In CR, you maximize your
expectation by giving maximum points to those candidates for whom
you'd vote in Approval, and giving minimum points to the rest.
This statement has always puzzled me. I
Ken Johnson wrote:
Suppose my preference ranking (inferred from my "sincere" CR ratings) is
A > B > C. Naturally, I should strategically give A the highest possible
rating and C the lowest. If I know A will beat C, I should give B the
lowest rating to ensure that A wins over B. If I know C will
Message: 3
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2004 01:15:41 +
From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] There's nothing wrong with Average Rating.
...
CR is strategically equiovalent to Approval: In CR, you maximize your
expectation by giving maximum points to those candidates for whom
you
11 matches
Mail list logo
