Bart,
In response to me writing:
You wrote (Sun.May 9):
Can someone tell me whether the following hypothetical method meets
Mutual Majority?
1. Voters submit ranked ballots.
2. While no surviving candidate has a top-choice majority:
Eliminate the candidate with the greatest plurality of
first
Chris Benham wrote:
>
> Bart Ingles wrote:
> >
> >1. Voters submit ranked ballots.
> >2. While no surviving candidate has a top-choice majority:
> > Eliminate the candidate with the greatest plurality of
> >first-choice votes.
> >(End definition)
> >
> >Example:
> >3 A > B > C
> >49 B > C >
Bart, interested participants,
A correspondent has brought to my attention that I erred when (on
Tue.Apr.27) I wrote:
"IRV meets Mutual Majority (what Woodall calls "Majority"). It implies
Majority Favourite and Condorcet Loser (which of course
implies Majority Loser)."
(M) Majority does impl
Chris Benham wrote:
>
> IRV meets Mutual Majority (what Woodall calls "Majority"). It implies
> Majority Favourite and Condorcet Loser (which of course
> implies Majority Loser).
Can someone tell me whether the following hypothetical method meets
Mutual Majority?
1. Voters submit ranked ball
On Thu, 29 Apr 2004, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Adam Tarr wrote:
>
> > People don't like being told that they've put a ton of time and effort
> > into the wrong reform, and they need to step back from many of the
> > advances they've worked hard to get and start over.
>
> That's why I think it ne
Adam Tarr wrote:
> People don't like being told that they've put a ton of time and effort
> into the wrong reform, and they need to step back from many of the
> advances they've worked hard to get and start over.
That's why I think it needs to be presented as an improvement, a step
forward, and n
Bill Clark wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
> When FairVoteOregon tried to get an IRV initiative on the ballot in
> Oregon a few years back I went to their meetings, explained some of the
> defects of IRV, and made some suggestions.
> It was like talking to a brick wall.
Why do you think that is?
Forest Simmons wrote:
> When FairVoteOregon tried to get an IRV initiative on the ballot in
> Oregon a few years back I went to their meetings, explained some of the
> defects of IRV, and made some suggestions.
> It was like talking to a brick wall.
Why do you think that is? Do you think they
On Tue, 27 Apr 2004, Ken Taylor wrote:
>
> > Why not pit all the best methods head to head against Plurality, and then
> > adopt the method that beats Plurality by the greatest number of votes (if
> > plurality isn't the CW).
> >
> > Wouldn't that be a more democratic way of deciding the voting m
> Why not pit all the best methods head to head against Plurality, and then
> adopt the method that beats Plurality by the greatest number of votes (if
> plurality isn't the CW).
>
> Wouldn't that be a more democratic way of deciding the voting method than
> having a committee of unelected nincomp
On Tue, 27 Apr 2004, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Adam H Tarr wrote:
>
> > If there was an IRV movement where I lived, I would argue with the
> > people in charge of it, and failing convincing them, I would publicize
> > information about IRV flaws and the better alternatives. But if all my
> > eff
On Tue, 27 Apr 2004, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Eric Gorr wrote:
>
> > What do you get when you have an drop of water and a gallon of sewage?
> > Sewage.
> > What do you get when you have a drop of sewage and a gallon of water?
> > Sewage.
>
> Oh, okay. I think I understand your position bett
Adam H Tarr wrote:
> If there was an IRV movement where I lived, I would argue with the
> people in charge of it, and failing convincing them, I would publicize
> information about IRV flaws and the better alternatives. But if all my
> efforts failed, and I was in the voting booth, I would vote y
Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
> Hi Bill,
Hi Ernie,
> I personally am somewhat ambivalent about IRV, but I can give a couple
> reasons:
> a) The 'spoiler' effect. There's a fear that if IRV is adopted as
> 'the' voting reform, and it fails to live up to its hype, then it will
> actually make it
Bill Clark wrote:
>By way of comparison, I'd consider Plurality a drop of water in a gallon
>of sewage, IRV maybe a couple drops of water in a gallon of sewage -- and
>even Condorcet would amount to some mixture of sewage and water. They're
>all flawed systems, if you want to get down to it.
I t
Eric Gorr wrote:
> What do you get when you have an drop of water and a gallon of sewage?
> Sewage.
> What do you get when you have a drop of sewage and a gallon of water?
> Sewage.
Oh, okay. I think I understand your position better now.
It still seems to me that you show a certain animosity
Hi Bill,
On Apr 27, 2004, at 8:23 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
I don't consider the likelihood of the failure [to select the CW]
to be relevant with respect to IRV.
Why not? If IRV does a better job than Plurality of selecting the CW
(a
point you don't seem to be refuting) then
At 11:23 AM -0400 4/27/04, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
I don't consider the likelihood of the failure [to select the CW]
to be relevant with respect to IRV.
Why not? If IRV does a better job than Plurality of selecting the CW (a
point you don't seem to be refuting) then why should
Eric Gorr wrote:
> I don't consider the likelihood of the failure [to select the CW]
> to be relevant with respect to IRV.
Why not? If IRV does a better job than Plurality of selecting the CW (a
point you don't seem to be refuting) then why shouldn't it be used instead
of Plurality?
Obviously (
Participants,
In response to me writing:
To seriously make the case that IRV is not better than Plurality,
instead of talking about the made-up example a person
should
(a) make the case that compliance with mostly sundry mathematical
neatness criteria (like Participation and Monotoncity)
weigh
At 11:02 AM -0400 4/26/04, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> At 6:16 PM +0930 4/26/04, Chris Benham wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
That IRV can and will fail to select the Condorcet Winner in a
significant number of elections, is again sufficient for me to oppose
IRV. I simply do not want to take the risk
> At 6:16 PM +0930 4/26/04, Chris Benham wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
> That IRV can and will fail to select the Condorcet Winner in a
> significant number of elections, is again sufficient for me to oppose
> IRV. I simply do not want to take the risk that the most preferred
> candidate (as defined b
Eric Gorr wrote:
> That IRV can and will fail to select the Condorcet Winner in a
> significant number of elections, is again sufficient for me to oppose
> IRV. I simply do not want to take the risk that the most preferred
> candidate (as defined by the Condorcet Criterion) would not be
> selecte
At 6:16 PM +0930 4/26/04, Chris Benham wrote:
As Eric Gorr wrote (Fri.Apr.23):
Examples have previously been given which demonstrates IRV
inability to perform better then Plurality. In these cases, IRV has
failed to select the Condorcet Winner while Plurality did select
the Condorcet Winner.
S
Chris Benham wrote:
>
> To seriously make the case that IRV is not better than Plurality,
> instead of talking about the made-up example a person
> should
> (a) make the case that compliance with mostly sundry mathematical
> neatness criteria (like Participation and Monotoncity)
> weigh as much
Participants,
That anti-IRV letter mis-represnted IRV in action in Australia, in some
places confusing it with corrupted
Hare-Clarke /quasi-list PR that is used to elect the Australian Senate.
As a replacement for Plurality or Top Two Runoff, I consider IRV to
be a very worthwhile reform.
I
I'd said:
Fairly recently messages have been posted here about IRV proposals for
particular communties or states. A recent such message was about Utah.
Mr. Clark replied:
I assume you're referring to the proposal discussed on this website:
http://www.utahpolitics.org/archives/000173.shtml
(Orig
I know here in Oregon, as with several state constitutions (since
several of them seem to have come from the same template), ranked
ballots are mentioned in the constitution, but Approval ballots could
be seen as unconstitutional.
Also, I can't remember where, but I thought I heard a story of a
Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
(1) IRV is better than plurality.
I'm assuming that you and most everyone on this list agrees with this.
Probably a safe assumption, but many think the advantage is marginal. I
think the advantage is significant AS LONG AS you only have two strong
parties and all other p
At 4:13 PM -0400 4/23/04, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
Mike,
I'm mostly a lurker on this list, but I'd like to respond to your letter.
(1) IRV is better than plurality.
I'm assuming that you and most everyone on this list agrees with this.
I believe you are incorrect.
Examples have previously been giv
Mike,
I'm mostly a lurker on this list, but I'd like to respond to your letter.
(1) IRV is better than plurality.
I'm assuming that you and most everyone on this list agrees with this.
(2) It is easier to explain IRV than Condorcet.
Convincing a group to change from plurality to any other voting
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