Q,
I've made a slight change on the DMC page on electowiki.
I've extended the definition somewhat: the ballot is a combination of ordinal
ranking (equal ranks allowed) and approval rating. The approval rating
information can be either binary approval (approved/not-approved) or
finer-grained
Simmons, Forest simmonfo at up.edu writes:
Jeff Fisher recently opined that DMC voters would
likely adopt the strategy of approving all candidates that they considered
certain to be beaten pairwise by their Favorite. This
would put these candidates in a better position to doubly
Title: Re: [Condorcet] Can we come to consensus?
Jeff Fisher recently opined that DMC voters would
likely adopt the strategy of approving all candidates that theyconsidered
certainto be beatenpairwise by their Favorite. This
would put these candidatesin a better position to doubly defeat
At 05:05 PM 8/15/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
Unsophisticated voters might have to rely on the advice of their favorite
candidate or some other trusted advisor when they don't have a strong
feeling for approval and disapproval.
So, in 1992, had the voting method been Approval, Ross Perot
The approval strategy that maximizes voting power (thus minimizing the
probability of an approval voter's regret) in a close three way race is this:
First decide your preference order among the three major candidates, say ABC.
Of course you should approve A and leave C unapproved. Approve B
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
I´d said:
Many strategies can be related to Weber's strategy of voting for
candidates with positive strategic value, according to Weber's strategic
value formula. But that doesn't make them the same strategy, as we've
been using the term
I´d said:
Many strategies can be related to Weber's strategy of voting for candidates
with positive strategic value, according to Weber's strategic value formula.
But that doesn't make them the same strategy, as we've been using the term
here. Only Russ claims that to vote for whichever of the
Forest Simmons simmonfo-at-up.edu |EMlist| wrote:
From: Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Rewording Strategy A (BF(1st))
Forest Simmons simmonfo-at-up.edu |EMlist| wrote:
Departing from Strategy A, we offer the following refinement in the same
spirit:
For each candidate C, if you
From: Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Rewording Strategy A (BF(1st))
Forest Simmons simmonfo-at-up.edu |EMlist| wrote:
Departing from Strategy A, we offer the following refinement in the same
spirit:
For each candidate C, if you think the winner is more likely to come
from the
Kevin,
I think my message was prompted by Alex Small's message,
but I wasn't replying specifically to him or to Russ Paielli.
Rather, I was trying to say that many comments I've read
on this list about how supporters of particular candidates
should vote stratetgically in approval elections make
Ralph,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Because it would be next to impossible for any approval
strategy formula to account for all these differences, I'm
skeptical about all formulas that purport to express ideal
strategies for supporters of particular candidates. Before
one can hope to
Many comments about approval strategy have made little sense
to me, because they ignore the fact that strong supporters of a
particular candidate can have very divergent views about other
candidates. Using the 2004 U.S. presidential election as an
example, supporters each candidate, from the
A better definition of tied or near-tied is:
For a parrticular voter, two candidates are tied or near-tied if, by voting
for one of them and not for the other, that voter could make or break a tie
for first place between them.
[end of definition]
In the inequalities in my previous posting, I
Date: Sat, 08 Jan 2005 07:42:29 -0800
From: Michael A. Rouse [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Question/Strategic Approval Voting
Mike wrote:
I've been bouncing back and forth between Range and Approval voting for
the past couple of days, trying to see how each is affected by
strategy.
I
Kevin Venzke wrote:
I would guess that any single-winner method which produces proportional results
on the whole, is actually producing garbage results, if you focus on any
particular
district. Consider Random Ballot to see what I'm getting at.
Yes Random Ballot, randomly selecting a ballot
Forest wrote:
CRAB stands for Cumulative Repeated Approval Balloting.
The ballot-by-ballot mode is automatically Cumulative.
The batch mode of Lorrie Cranor is not cumulative.
That's correct. I wasn't clear that I wasn't talking about CRAB in my last
post.
I believe that CRAB will
On Fri, 21 Nov 2003, Rob LeGrand wrote:
David wrote:
Thanks for the information. So am I right in thinking that strategy A
gets to the Condorcet winner by a process of iteration. In response to a
series of Approval polls the voters alter their choices and end up voting
in such a way that
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Are you looking to show that Plurality, for example, is more likely to be
proportional
than Condorcet? Random Ballot is easily more proportional than that. Better
yet,
put a PR method in your model.
The one thing the model has demonstrated clearly than anything else is the
David wrote:
Thanks for the information. So am I right in thinking that strategy A
gets to the Condorcet winner by a process of iteration. In response to a
series of Approval polls the voters alter their choices and end up voting
in such a way that they elect the Condorcet winner. Or is it
David wrote:
A 380approve A
AB 28 approve AB
AC 9approve AC
B 80 approve B
BA 2 approve B
BC 133 approve B
C 4 approve C
CA 13approve AC
CB 351 approve C
This gives the following result in the Approval election:
A 432 winner
B 243
C 377
C is
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