Ted,
"While there is no CW, eliminate the least-approved candidate" is
accurate.
--- Araucaria Araucana <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I was under the impression that RAV was the following:
>
> Do While # of candidates > 1
> # Iterate to find the Smith set:
> While there is a candidate w
On 21 Mar 2005 at 18:46 PST, Russ Paielli wrote:
> My first comment is that this proposal is significantly more complicated
> than my (or Kevin's) "Ranked Approval Voting" (RAV) proposal, which
> simply drops the least approved candidate until a CW is found.
Russ, could you please clarify this?
On 21 Mar 2005 at 12:52 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>
>> Second point: In the USA, at least, it may be more desirable for the
>> pairwise winner to have lower approval. This seems paradoxical, but
>> it tends to keep the winner from making overly radical changes.
> Sorry, but I think some radical
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
> First point: High Approval score indicates broad consent that the
> candidate is minimally acceptable. But it doesn't indicate highest
> preference.
Agreed.
> The main effect of Approval in DMC is to use it to discount the
> pairwise defeats of candidates with less widespr
On 20 Mar 2005 at 01:38 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Dear Russ!
>
> I completely agree with what you wrote!
>
> Just like you, I think that
> [Russ Paielli wrote earlier:]
>> an "ideal" election method must integrate both ordinal and cardinal
>> information, and the cardinal information should be si
