Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2005 14:45:57 -0800 (PST)
From: Rob LeGrand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] Re: simulating an Approval campaign/election
Forest wrote:
Actually, DSV with Strategy A can sometimes converge to a stable
equilibrium even when there is no Condorcet Winner:
4900 C
2400 B
2700 A
Forest wrote:
> Actually, DSV with Strategy A can sometimes converge to a stable
> equilibrium even when there is no Condorcet Winner:
>
> 4900 C
> 2400 B
> 2700 A>B
You're right. I forgot to disclose my assumption of strict
preferences. A better way to say what I meant: When for every
candidat
From: Rob LeGrand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] Re: simulating an Approval campaign/election
Russ wrote:
You seem to have confirmed my hypothesis that, in the idealized
case (DSV batch mode), Approval voting almost always converges on
the Cordorcet winner if one exists, but rarely
Russ wrote:
> Interesting. Do you mind if I ask why you are interested in
> Declared-Strategy Voting as opposed to Undeclared-Strategy
> Voting?
DSV is the invention of Lorrie Cranor and the subject of her
dissertation (http://lorrie.cranor.org/dsv.html). "Declared" just
means that a voter declar
From: Russ Paielli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Re: simulating an Approval campaign/election
Rob LeGrand honky1998-at-yahoo.com |EMlist| wrote:
You're simulating a DSV (Declared-Strategy Voting) election with
Approval. My current research is on just that topic, thou
Rob LeGrand honky1998-at-yahoo.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ Paielli wrote:
Here's what I modeled. I have three candidates only. I randomly
generate votes, with equal probabilities for all six possible
preference orders. The only control variable for each vote is
where the voter "draws the line." In thi
Russ Paielli wrote:
> Here's what I modeled. I have three candidates only. I randomly
> generate votes, with equal probabilities for all six possible
> preference orders. The only control variable for each vote is
> where the voter "draws the line." In this case, that amounts to
> whether or not th
