At 5:54 AM +0100 1/24/04, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Eric,
--- Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
At 5:01 AM +0100 1/24/04, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >40 A>B>C
>35 B>C>A
>25 C>A>B
> >
>A wins. The 35 votes are not counted.
Actually, the 35 votes matter a great deal in an RP election -
assumin
Eric,
--- Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> At 5:01 AM +0100 1/24/04, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >40 A>B>C
> >35 B>C>A
> >25 C>A>B
> >
> >A wins. The 35 votes are not counted.
>
> Actually, the 35 votes matter a great deal in an RP election -
> assuming you are referring to '35 B>C>A'
>
>
At 5:01 AM +0100 1/24/04, Kevin Venzke wrote:
40 A>B>C
35 B>C>A
25 C>A>B
A wins. The 35 votes are not counted.
Actually, the 35 votes matter a great deal in an RP election -
assuming you are referring to '35 B>C>A'
These 35 votes are a part of the pairwise defeat of B>C being the
strongest (has
I favor version P.
--- Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> The reason that the YVC methods are silly is that you can affect the
> outcome of the election, but (if there are a significant number of
> voters) you have no way of knowing how to vote or not-vote so as to
> achieve your desired o
The voting methods proposed below give very high probabilities to all
voters that "Your vote counts!" - as compared with most other methods
discussed on this list.
This post is really a reductio ad absurdum argument showing that
improving the chances that voters' votes "count" (change the outcome
