Steve Eppley wrote:
Dave K wrote:
AND, they express dislike for Condorcet by their example voting
procedure for preferential voting - the procedure shared by IRV
and Condorcet.
I doubt their omission of Condorcet was an expression of
dislike for Condorcet. Remember, that section was written
Adam T wrote:
Steve Eppley wrote:
-snip-
Right, we're defining Condorcet as a family of voting
procedures that accept preference orders from the voters
and elect the Condorcet winner, if there is one, given
those votes.
So... really, this is Condorcet. Condorcet just means
a voting
Green-Armytage [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, August 23, 2004 6:36 AM
Subject: [EM] ironclad pro-Condorcet argument?
Has anyone clearly advanced this pro-Condorcet argument? I think that it
is devastating to methods which are not Condorcet efficient. If someone
else has made
Sorry, I meant PR (Proportionnal represention)
Oh, okay. Yeah, I was just talking about single-winner. PR is a totally
different problem.
I really don't think so. Please note that I'm only talking about
situations where there is a sincere Condorcet winner. If there is no
sincere CW,
At 05:37 PM 8/23/2004 -0400, Warren Schudy wrote:
On Mon, 23 Aug 2004, James Green-Armytage wrote:
BASIC STATEMENT:
If there is a Condorcet winner with regard to the sincere preference
rankings of voters, and the voting method is plurality, then the Vote is
only at equilibrium when the
James Green-Armytage wrote:
BASIC STATEMENT:
If there is a Condorcet winner with regard to the sincere preference
rankings of voters, and the voting method is plurality, then the Vote is
only at equilibrium when the Condorcet winner is selected.
If casual observers could understand and believe
On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 11:29:48 -0700 Steve Eppley wrote:
Hi,
James G-A wrote:
Has anyone clearly advanced this pro-Condorcet argument?
I think that it is devastating to methods which are not
Condorcet efficient.
-snip-
If there is a Condorcet winner with regard to the
sincere
