Re: [EM] Least Additional Votes. The importance of strategy.

2005-03-18 Thread Eric Gorr
Juho Laatu wrote: Hello Eric, I think many people might really use strategy that is harmful to them but looks promising at first sight. There seems to be an assumption that people would only educate themselves to even consider such a strategy but stop just before they discover such a strategy wo

Re: [EM] Least Additional Votes. The importance of strategy.

2005-03-17 Thread Juho Laatu
Hello Eric, I think many people might really use strategy that is harmful to them but looks promising at first sight. They might falsely think like in the lines of the Borda method: "last position in the ballot gives least points" Or in terms of ranking: "one negative point to the last candidat

Re: [EM] Least Additional Votes. The importance of strategy.

2005-03-17 Thread Eric Gorr
Juho Laatu wrote: This is interesting. I believe that when Condorcet based methods are taken into use there really will be large number of people who will put the strongest competitor of their favourite candidate last on their ballot - just to make sure that she will not be elected. I agree this

Re: [EM] Least Additional Votes. The importance of strategy.

2005-03-16 Thread Juho Laatu
Hello Mike, Thanks for the comments. I agree with most of the stuff. Few comments follow. Best Regards, Juho You continued: This is based on the assumption that strategical voting is not that easy in real life, at least not in elections where the number of voters is large. I reply: It happens

Re: [EM] least additional votes

2005-03-16 Thread Juho Laatu
Hello Forest, Least Additional Votes (like Approval) has the advantage (over many other methods) of being able to tell the losers by how many votes they missed winning the election. Yes. Ability to understand what happened in the election is a good requirement for any election method - not a man

[EM] Least Additional Votes. The importance of strategy.

2005-03-14 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
I'll get to Least Additional Votes after the other issues you brought up: You wrote: I guess often also the wish to make election results a linear preference order is present. This happens although we (in theory) already know that group preferences can not be presented as a linear preference orde

[EM] least additional votes

2005-03-14 Thread Forest Simmons
James opined that the winner should always come from the Smith set because otherwise majority rule is violated more than necessary. However, it seems to me that majority is just one form of consensus. Max approval is another form. Consider (sincere) 52 A>B>>C 48 B>C>>A Candidate B is the max appr

[EM] least additional votes method (was "first wave Condocet versions...")

2005-03-14 Thread James Green-Armytage
Hi Juho, and welcome to the list. >Least Additional Votes: >"Elect the candidate that wins all others. If there is no such candidate, >elect the one that needs least additional votes to win all others." I'd like to clarify this, especially the second part. What exactly is an "additional vote" in