James G-A asked about supermajority methods.
> What to do when we want to use a method that offers the benefits
> of Condorcet but where a supermajority requirement is appropriate,
> e.g. where 70% of the electorate should consent to a new course of
> action before the status quo is changed?
-s
Dear James Green-Armytage,
you wrote (28 Dec 2004):
> Is there a record of this discussion?
I have a file (plain text; 1727 kB; zipped 554 kB)
with this discussion. However, your mail server
cannot handle large attachments. And YahooGroups
currently doesn't allow uploads of files of more
than ca.
>Dear James Green-Armytage,
>these proposals to combine Condorcet methods and
>supermajority requirements have been discussed in the
>"Debian-EM Joint Committee" between December 2000 and
>April 2001.
Is there a record of this discussion?
my best,
James
Election-methods mailing list - see
Dear James Green-Armytage,
these proposals to combine Condorcet methods and
supermajority requirements have been discussed in the
"Debian-EM Joint Committee" between December 2000 and
April 2001.
**
You wrote (27 Dec 2004):
> Tally: Do a ranked pairs tally. We'll call the winner
> option A.
This is James Green-Armytage replying to Markus Schulze.
>Dear James Green-Armytage,
>please read:
>1) chapter "Super-Majorities" of http://www.condorcet.org/rp/details.shtml
>2) appendix 5 of
>http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/files/schulze1.zip
>Markus Schulze
Dear Markus,
Dear James Green-Armytage,
please read:
1) chapter "Super-Majorities" of http://www.condorcet.org/rp/details.shtml
2) appendix 5 of
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/files/schulze1.zip
Markus Schulze
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list in
Apropos my earlier supermajority idea, perhaps it is unnecessary to have
a separate 'consent' ballot, although it may make things a bit more clear.
That is, if you wanted to discard the 'consent' ballot, you could insert
the status quo as an option, and require that the winner of the base
Dear election methods fans,
What to do when we want to use a method that offers the benefits of
Condorcet but where a supermajority requirement is appropriate, e.g. where
70% of the electorate should consent to a new course of action before the
status quo is changed?
Here's an idea...
Let's as
