On Sat, 2005-08-13 at 09:39 -0400, Warren Smith wrote:
> So anybody who is interested in third parties ever having
> a chance, would be advised NOT to foolishly advocate either IRV or Condorcet,
> but insetad would be advised to advocate RANGE VOTING (which experimentally
> favors third parties far
Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote Aug 15 13:22:50 PDT 2005:
>At 04:07 PM 8/13/2005, RLSuter at aol.com wrote:
>>As an example of strategic campaigning, Ralph Nader could have
>>used a strategy in either 2000 or 2004 involving campaigning
>>strongly up to and through the fall TV debates but promising to
>>w
At 04:07 PM 8/13/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
As an example of strategic campaigning, Ralph Nader could have
used a strategy in either 2000 or 2004 involving campaigning
strongly up to and through the fall TV debates but promising to
withdraw after the debates if polls had shown that he had no
Hi Warren,
I'm eagerly awaiting your reply on this message.
Rob
On Sat, 2005-08-13 at 14:12 -0700, Rob Lanphier wrote:
> Hi Warren,
>
> I'm not following your theorem. Can you give an example of what you are
> referring to, showing a set of sincere preferences, followed by a set of
> tactical
> > In a message dated 8/13/05, Warren Smith writes:
> >>Given that this is the case, we now can take it to be 100% certain that
> >>Condorcet voting methods will lead to 2-party domination, just like the
> >>flawed plurality system those methods were supposed to "fix", and just
> >>like experim
Hi Warren,
I'm not following your theorem. Can you give an example of what you are
referring to, showing a set of sincere preferences, followed by a set of
tactical ballots which illustrate your point?
E.g.:
Sincere preferences:
Group 1 - 18 votes: A>B>C
Group 2 - 18 votes: A>C>B
Group 3 - 16 v
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In a message dated 8/13/05, Warren Smith writes:
Given that this is the case, we now can take it to be 100% certain that
Condorcet voting methods will lead to 2-party domination, just like the
flawed plurality system those methods were supposed to "fix", and just
like
In a message dated 8/13/05, Warren Smith writes:
> Given that this is the case, we now can take it to be 100% certain that
> Condorcet voting methods will lead to 2-party domination, just like the
> flawed plurality system those methods were supposed to "fix", and just
> like experiemntlly is tr
Warren,
I believe it's safe to say that all deterministic rank methods which disallow
equal ranking must fail the "favorite betrayal" criterion. You don't have to
prove that for individual rank methods.
You started your message like this:
--- Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> On the p
On the probability that insincerely ranking the two frontrunners max and min, is
optimal voter-strategy in a Condorcet election.
--Warren D. Smith Aug 2005--
MATHEMATICAL MODEL: 3-candidate V-voter Condorcet elections
with random voters (all 3!=6
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