On 20 Mar 2003 at 15:33, Alex Small wrote:
> Steve Eppley said:
>-snip-
> > So I prefer a PR system such as the following: Each voter ranks the
> > parties from most preferred to least preferred, then seats are
> > awarded to each party in proportion to the number of v
jority. Since T ranks B over
C, by condition 3 MAM ranks the "A over C" majority over the "C over
B" majority. Combining the last three statements, MAM orders the "A
over D" majority over the "A over C" majority and the "A over C"
majority over the
vantage of allowing each voter to rank the parties is that
the voters' relative rankings of the viable compromises become known,
and that may be much more important that learning each voter's
favorite party.
-- Steve Eppley
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be completely independent of clones. For
instance, if they eliminate all candidates having equally smallest
vote count, that would lose clone independence.
But in small committees the flaws could occur more frequently, and
flaws like clone dependence might be exploitable.
>From my observation
I assume Markus will
argue that this is not a reasonable test of IIA performance. :-)
Did Peyton Young provide a clear argument anywhere to explain his
claim that LIIA is a "slight weakening" of IIA?
Presumably, Young thought LIIA is more than just a curiosity.
Perhaps we should ask him. I think he's currently at Johns Hopkins
(www.jhu.edu), or maybe at the Brookings Institution.
-- Steve Eppley
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nd
some other RP variations are not, I should say that I consider
monotonicity relatively unimportant. I think it would be merely an
aesthetically pleasing "consistency" criterion, were it not for the
risk of needlessly providing ammunition to ivory tower academics
hired to criticize methods proposed by a voting reform movement. If
someone knows of a good justification for requiring monotonicity
(that is better than the aesthetic pleasure derived from its
satisfaction), please let me know. (Or if I may borrow Markus
Schulze' recent words, why is satisfaction of monotonicity not "just
a curiosity"?)
-- Steve Eppley
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more often
than vice versa. (For the results of my simulation comparing of MAM
winners and BeatpathWinner winners pairwise, follow the link from
www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley.)
-- Steve Eppley
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http:
rities that
"straddle" the dividing line. That method would elect A in the
example above.
> To give an example for your question, it would be
> permissible for a method in the family to elect a
> candidate who beats pairwise the approval winner.
>
> Steve Eppley wrote:
&
On 11 Mar 2003 at 16:08, Eric Gorr wrote:
> Steve Eppley wrote:
> >It is more reasonable to use the term MAM as a variation of
> >Ranked Pairs than as a synonym for Ranked Pairs. MAM is
> >monotonic, whereas Zavist-Tideman's Ranked Pairs 1989 is
> >not (nor is
y? If not, then how should the candidate be added?
Is the purpose of this simulation to test which method satisfies
Arrow's IIA as much as possible?
-- Steve Eppley
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27; "greater evil"). So even though
many voting methods could be tweaked to be in the family
that satisfies Sincere Defense, only the best methods
should be considered. In particular, by tweaking a method
that satisfies Minimal Defense, the "minimal defensive
strategy"
On 10 Mar 2003 at 12:27, Markus Schulze wrote:
-snip-
> However, according to Steve Eppley, there is a merit
> difference. Steve, who uses the term "MAM" for Ranked Pairs
It is more reasonable to use the term MAM as a variation of
Ranked Pairs than as a synonym for Ranke
Markus Schulze wrote:
> Steve Eppley wrote:
>> That's why I think the best method is a variation of Ranked Pairs
>> which I call Maximize Affirmed Majorities, or MAM.
>
> In so far as you have always considered Mike Ossipoff to be
> authoritative, I would like to
g" Condorcet Winner (an alternative
that wins each of its pairings by more than half of the
votes) then it must be elected.
Thus anyone who claims no Condorcet-consistent method satisfies
Uncompromising is incorrect.
-- Steve Eppley
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