Dear Steve,
what I once called "Approval Seeded Bubble Sort" but would now (for
increased respectibility) call the "Local Kemenization of the Approval
Order" is a member of the family of methods that satisfy your conditions
(1) and (2).
We initialize with the approval order and then, starting at
Thanks for the clarifications. I should have been able to get your drift,
but I was too tired or lazy at the time.
You just gave me another use for dyadic ballots:
One version of dyadic ballot looks like
Nader (8) (4) (2) (1)
Gore(8) (4) (2) (1)
Bush(8) (
You wrote that MAM is similar to MIKE OSSIPOFF's SDSC.
I now request the proof of that.
Here is the definition of MIKE OSSIPOFF, who thinks like you since one of
his rules is similar:
http://www.electionmethods.org/evaluation.html
_
--- Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a
écrit :
> Clearly B is the "approval" winner, if you interpret
> being ranked
> over the line as being "approved." (An
> interpretation I think should
> be avoided, since "approval" is a misleading
> absolutist concept and
> *relative* preferences are wha
he ballot list:
perl ballot2tally.pl --approval_bonus 1 --zero_equalrank yourvotedballotlist
-- Original Message --
* From: Kevin Venzke
* Subject: [EM] Approval-Condorcet hybrid encouraging truncation
* Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2003 02:35:46 -0800
My recent "MinMax"
he ballot list:
perl ballot2tally.pl --approval_bonus 1 --zero_equalrank yourvotedballotlist
-- Original Message --
* From: Kevin Venzke
* Subject: [EM] Approval-Condorcet hybrid encouraging truncation
* Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2003 02:35:46 -0800
My recent "MinMax"
On 12 Mar 2003 at 0:33, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Forest Simmons wrote:
> >I must be missing something. Could you give an
> >example in which the approval winner is not the
> >winner of the method?
Here's an example: Suppose 100 voters vote on 2 candidates A & B as
follows:
6040
Forest Simmons wrote:
>I must be missing something. Could you give an
>example in which the approval winner is not the
>winner of the method?
I don't think it's itself a method. It's a "family of
voting methods" of them, like he said. The two rules
specify what the ballot must look like, and w
I must be missing something. Could you give an example in which the
approval winner is not the winner of the method?
Forest
On Mon, 10 Mar 2003, Steve Eppley wrote:
> On 10 Mar 2003 at 11:36, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> > My recent "MinMax" message concluded with a
> > half-hearted attempt at a syste
On 10 Mar 2003 at 11:36, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> My recent "MinMax" message concluded with a
> half-hearted attempt at a system combining Approval
> and Condorcet. I have a much better proposal now,
> although I'm not entirely certain of its merits.
-snip-
I have another way of combining Approval a
My recent "MinMax" message concluded with a
half-hearted attempt at a system combining Approval
and Condorcet. I have a much better proposal now,
although I'm not entirely certain of its merits. I'll
continue to think about it, although I have some
interesting implications already.
The voter ran
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