On Thu, 22 Feb 2001 00:02:12 +
Martin Harper <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Forest Simmons wrote
>
>
> > is it possible for IRV to pick the same candidate as both the best
and the
> > worst? In other words, is there a pair of examples which are
identical
> > except for the reversal of prefer
Donald,
You are an idiot.
Love,
Rob
On Mon, 19 Feb 2001, I Like Irving wrote:
> Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2001 07:16:38 -0500
> From: I Like Irving <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: "[EM]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: [EM] Mike-O to be on `America's Funniest Home Videos'
> Rese
Mr. Simmons wrote in part-
Can anything be salvaged from IRV? I think so: it's an ill wind indeed
that blows no good at all.
One idea implicit in IRV is this: Keep eliminating the worst candidates
from the rankings until the best choice among the remaining candidates is
obvious.
The idea is a
Hi, I'm Forest. When you say "ties in voting preferences," I take it you
are talking about the individual voter filling out the ballot, and not
knowing what to do if he has no real preference in the case of two of the
candidates. Is that right?
The answer to this question is that some versions r
>If A then B, is commonly understood to mean that A causes B. In mathmatics
>this isn't the case. An if...then statement is a truth functional
>statement, saying that whenever A is true, B is true. If we have
>established the truth of 'if A then B' (or we are positing the truth of
>that
>stat
The surest interpretation of the "given..." clause, based on its
position, is that it's a modifier for "probability", and that it
specifies the conditions under which the probability is defined.
One other thing:
When I spoke of the absurd contradiction of saying that my statement
#3 isn't true,
> > So you're saying that b is true when it isn't making any prediction
> > about Y. When X is false, b says nothing true about whether Y is
> > true, and says nothing false about whether Y is true. And you claim
> > that b is true when it isn't taking a position about Y.
>
>That's the way "if"
Okay, this is a bit of a side track to the discussion, but I'll try to
clarify anyway;
>It's unavoidable that we speak English, or some other language that
>we all speak, in order to discuss these things at all. I don't know
>whether or not it's true that "if" has the different meaning in
>mathem
LAYTON Craig wrote:
> > > So you're saying that b is true when it isn't making any prediction
> > > about Y. When X is false, b says nothing true about whether Y is
> > > true, and says nothing false about whether Y is true. And you claim
> > > that b is true when it isn't taking a position about
It was asked:
> > >What are the most acceptable forms of tie breaking
> > >other than random, that might be used before random
> > >in the case of Condorcet Voting.
> >
> > >
> > >I mean actual ties in voting preferences
> > >and not merely failure to have a Condorcet approved
> > >candidate.
>
This discussion began when Richard said that it isn't true that my
Pij definition and Bart's have the same meaning.
But, even if we accept Richard's apparent notion about Bart's wording,
and the conclusions that Richard draws from that notion, the only
difference between my Pij definition and Ba
Where to start? These argument-faults range from general principles
to specific definition interpretations. I'll start with the most general,
and then skip around.
Blake said that mathematicians say that if a statement says nothing
about a certain proposition, then it's saying something true abo
On Wed, 21 Feb 2001 04:59:30 -
"MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >You see, the problem with this argument is as follows:
> >
> >b is a conditional statement of the form, if X then Y. Now b is
true
> >whenever
> >X and Y are both true. But b is also true if X is false and Y is
true
Can anything be salvaged from IRV? I think so: it's an ill wind indeed
that blows no good at all.
One idea implicit in IRV is this: Keep eliminating the worst candidates
from the rankings until the best choice among the remaining candidates is
obvious.
The idea is appealing. I like it, and I s
> > So you're saying that b is true when it isn't making any prediction
> > about Y. When X is false, b says nothing true about whether Y is
> > true, and says nothing false about whether Y is true. And you claim
> > that b is true when it isn't taking a position about Y.
>
>That's the way "if" is
Here's some more (as threatened):
An example of iteration:
We start with rankings and a crude method for picking the winner.
Rankings:
34% A>B>C
36% C>B>A
30% B>A>C
Crude Starting Method: Method_0 is just the one we mentioned last time ...
choosing the candidate with the least number of last
Forest Simmons wrote
> is it possible for IRV to pick the same candidate as both the best and the
> worst? In other words, is there a pair of examples which are identical
> except for the reversal of preference directions, that both have the same
> winner when IRV is applied?
According to http
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 02/21/01
Tie Solutions for all Ranked Choice Elections: by Donald Davison
There are two methods to solve ties - the Low Series method and the Next
Lower Choices method. It is best to try the Low Series method first because
if a Low Series does
There are various tiebreakers using ONLY a place votes table (resulting from
the use of number votes) when there is a Condorcet circular tie among 3 or
more choices.
Example- 5 choices in a circular tie
Place Votes
1 2 3 4 5
A A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
B B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
C
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