Alexander Small wrote:
> I had this argument by e-mail with Alan Natapoff, who has argued that the
> EC gives more power per voter than popular elections. The main difference
> is that elections pick leaders, while baseball is serious business ;)
> Voters are people with rights while homeruns ar
>> From: Alexander Small <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> Subject: [EM] World Series and EC
>> Regarding the post arguing that the world series was close
>> in number of games won but not in number of home runs:
>> I had this argument by e-mail with Alan Natapoff, who has
>> argued that the EC gives more
>> From: Alexander Small <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> Subject: [EM] Electoral College and Minority Vetoes
>> >I can't see that there's much difference between allowing a
>> >minority to exercise power against the popular will on the
>> >one hand, and giving them the veto on the other.
>> I'm taking a
Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> Richard Moore wrote:
>
>>It would be harder to make people see the advantages of a new
>>method if adopting that method fails to bring those promised
>>advantages. So abolishing the EC is either a prerequisite or a
>>corequisite to getting a better method in place.
>>
>
>> From: Blake Cretney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Doesn't matter what preference means, Markus
>> > You could just as well say egg-salad sandwiches too. But when
>> > we say "I prefer chocolate to vanilla, we mean that I like chocolate
>> > better than vanilla. That's what preferenc
Adam wrote-
I consider the Open List/STV multi-winner debate to be analogous to the
Approval/Condorcet debate in single-winner elections. Condorcet may be
better, but Approval is a lot simpler and you could get it implemented more
easily.
---
D- For newer folks- there is also Proxy P.R. -- ea
On Thu, 31 Jan 2002, Steve Barney wrote in part:
> remains true that some methods are more manipulatable than others. I am only
> claiming that IRV is LESS manipulatable than the primary w/runoff procedure
> when there are 4 or more candidates.
Why do you believe this?
Here's a rule of thumb t
Forest and "[EMAIL PROTECTED]":
Yes, all voting methods certainly are manipulatable. In fact, that was
mathematically proven by Gibbard and Satterthwaite (Satterthwaite, Mark A.;
"Strategyproofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence
Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welf
>This, if I understand you right, is the system in use in senate elections
>in Australia. 95% of the voters follow party recommendations
>(http://www.aec.gov.au/pubs/factfiles/factsheet7.htm).
This is interesting, but it differs from my proposal in that you cannot mix
the above-the-line and bel
One must be cautious when developing a STV system especially if designed on
Malta's example.
Please note that the implementation of STV in Malta has practically meant
the triumph of the two-party system.
A third party effectively needs about 16.6% of the vote in any one
constituency. The 16.6% r
First of all, I think you meant runs, period, not home runs.
Secondly, the argument that you need to capture many states to reflect
broad support has been shown to be bogus in a variety of ways on this
list. The electoral college is arbitrary and inconsistent, it does not
accurately advance t
At 19:42 +0200 25.1.2002, Adam Tarr wrote:
>So my idea is this: Implement STV, but allow a _party_ to be entered as a
>line
>in the ballot.
This, if I understand you right, is the system in use in senate elections
in Australia. 95% of the voters follow party recommendations
(http://www.aec.gov.au
Regarding the post arguing that the world series was close in number of
games won but not in number of home runs:
I had this argument by e-mail with Alan Natapoff, who has argued that the
EC gives more power per voter than popular elections. The main difference
is that elections pick leaders, wh
>I can't see that there's much difference between allowing a
>minority to exercise power against the popular will on the
>one hand, and giving them the veto on the other.
I'm taking a lemon and trying to make lemonade. The rule of equal
representation in the Senate for every state is fixed. The
>B) Do we give the party votes a list of choices like an Open Party List?
> This is better, but the lowest candidate will receive little if any
>benefit from the party votes.
I'm still not sure I understand Open Party list. I provided an example in
my last post which illustrated how I thi
On Wed, 30 Jan 2002 18:37:39 -0800 Richard Moore wrote:
> I think the EC is actually an obstacle to election method reform.
> The EC can take an FBC-compliant method and make it non-compliant,
> for instance. Suppose one large state selects a Green slate of
> electors by Approval, and this causes
Quoting Blake from below:
>
> But for reasonable people, the objective proof of a method passing a
> criterion has to be supplemented by an argument for why they should
> care. So, the question is, if you want to make a Condorcet-based
> argument against plurality, is this simplified by the
Mr. Cretney wrote in part-
Theory doesn't necessarily mean debatable. My point was that we've
expanded the issue under discussion. The old theory only considered
preference orders and methods based on them. We need a new theory to
talk about what's going on in people's heads, and how that
Dear Mike,
you wrote (30 Jan 2002):
> Plurality, Approval, RB, & RC pass Regularity so defined. CR
> fails, because the criterion only talks about order.
Due to Pattanaik and Peleg, the input of a decision scheme is
a set of linear orders. So when you define plurality on lone-mark
ballots then p
01/31/02 - Two new design features for STV:
Greetings List members, recently I wrote in reply to Adam's letter:
>Donald: Yes, it has been proposed before to allow people to vote for
>candidates and/or parties in any mix.
Adam replied: "...I didn't see any specific mention of this in the
follow
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