That's about what I'd expect from a Gore supporter. ;-)
"Narins, Josh" wrote:
>
> Hrm.
>
> I studied this particular issue.
>
> Some people from Harvard applied Bayesian Ecological Inferences to the
> absentee ballots.
>
> They report the fact that, according to the Office of the Florida Se
I've seen most of these assertions before, but I would hardly say that
they constitute "proof". For one thing all of these sites share a
similar political viewpoint-- for balance you might as well link to some
far right-wing sites to get the other side of the story. For another, I
don't know how
Just to further muddy the waters on the definition of "majority", note
Duverger's use of the term as apparently synonymous with "plurality":
http://www.janda.org/c24/Readings/Duverger/Duverger.htm
(BTW the "two-ballot majority system" Duverger discusses is NOT the
Runoff method, since there is no
http://approvalvoting.com and http://approvalvoting.org are the sites to
look to for lobbying efforts, at least if you favor approval voting. As
for debating the relative merits of various voting systems or proposing
new ones, this (the EM list) is still the place.
Bart
Douglas Greene wrote:
>
Alex Small wrote:
>
> Keep this in mind about selling the public on winning votes or margins:
> Nobody says "Bush won Florida with ", they say "Bush won
> Florida by 537 votes" or whatever the final margin was. (I say Bush won
> Florida 5-4 with 50% of the female vote, 100% of the African Americ
Joe Weinstein wrote:
> Indeed, it's not totally ridiculous simply to confuse Michigan and
> Wisconsin. An early version of 'Wisconsin' was 'Misconsing'.
I always _thought_ they were the same thing. :)
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see ht
Adam Tarr wrote:
>
> So, by my reckoning, every commonly discussed single-winner election method
> passes 1p1v, although Borda sort of teeters on the edge, and Condorcet
> doesn't really fit rules of 1p1v at all. Well, that's the best I can do,
> and I don't think it's particularly meaningful or
"Narins, Josh" wrote:
>
> Firstly, thanks for the tip on "Merrill"
> Unfortunately, I don't know who Merrill is. Are they on the list?
Samuel Merrill, author of
"Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic"
Princeton University Press, 1988
Out of print, but most university libraries should
Alex Small wrote:
>
> I've been thinking about how one would introduce Approval Voting for local
> non-partisan races. Many locales use 2-step runoff for some of their
> elections. Many of us here believe that 2-step runoff is worse than IRV
> or Approval, but a 2 step election fills the void l
Merrill uses a lot of software-modeled comparisons of different systems,
some of which are presented as graphs. To generate useful models, I
think you mainly need knowledge of Statistics (other than basic
algebra). For example, some of Merrill's simulations used normal
distributions of both vote
Stephane, you wrote:
> For Approval, this is how I would do, I am not sure it is optimal.
> 1) I would cut all candidates into two equal groups the ones I like, the
> ones I do not.
> Without poll information, I believe it is the vote that would optimize
> my voting power...
You seem to be equati
James Gilmour wrote:
> Bart Ingles wrote:
> > James Gilmour wrote:
> > >
> > > [...] Publishing "results"
> > > precinct by precinct is just totally irrelevant when all that matters is the
> > > city-wide totals. It is not a question of ke
James Gilmour wrote:
>
> [...] Publishing "results"
> precinct by precinct is just totally irrelevant when all that matters is the
> city-wide totals. It is not a question of keeping them secret. Rather the
> question is why on earth would you want to publish such irrelevant information?
Free
James Gilmour wrote:
>
> Bart wrote:
> > For example, instead of precincts, suppose the division is between
> > walk-in and absentee votes, or between election-night and recount
> > results. Imagine candidate A being declared the winner, with a recount
> > turning up additional votes supporting
Looks like Volume 1 has finally been published.
Edited by Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura.
The chapter on voting procedures was written by Brams and Fishburn.
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0444829148/ref=pm_dp_ln_b_2/002-7248534-6817642?v=glance&s=books&vi=contents
For more informa
Actually I have long thought that the situation with boxing in the 70's
was like a Condorcet cycle (or like the rock-paper-scissors game), where
Frazier defeated Ali, who defeated Foreman, who defeated Frazier.
Bart
Alex Small wrote:
>
> My description of boxing probably shows my ignorance:
The issue is that H wins BOTH precincts, but still loses the combined
election. That's the definition of consistency as applied to voting
systems. It seems to me to be related to monotonicity violations.
I think the question is not so much whether the individual precinct
results are relevant, a
But that's not a consistency violation. Consistency, as applied to
election methods, means that if ALL districts elect the same candidate
separately, then when combined they should still elect that candidate.
Plurality, Approval, and Borda are all consistent.
Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon
My submission to the Pulse column was edited somewhat for the print
version of the LP News, but left intact in the online version:
http://www.lp.org/lpnews/0210/pulse.html
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
Adam Tarr wrote:
>
> Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> > In effect, the two sides combine as a "pool" of votes, and don't
> > know
> > which side they are on until after the election. In fact by
> > truncating
> > they are voting for an AC lot
I didn't realize it, but the Alaska IRV referendum has come and gone...
http://www.fairvote.org/press/alaska.htm
I was a little surprised by the percentages (64/36 against).
Bart
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com
This is in Merrill's book as well:
Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic
Samuel Merrill, III
Princeton University Press, 1988
It's out of print, but can be tracked down through public or university
libraries via Inter-Library Loan.
The book includes several other election methods, an
I'm basically looking at the inputs and outputs, and ignoring what goes
on in between as irrelavent. Adam seems to be taking the opposite
approach, which I suspect is more difficult.
The reason I am comparing only the diagonal (T/T vs. NT/NT) is that the
A and C sides can't know which they ar
Adam Tarr wrote:
>
> Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> > > > Adam Tarr wrote:
> > > There's no sense in talking about uncertainty and ties; it only
> > > confuses the issue.
> >
> >Sorry to spoil your clarity. Having never seen an election w
Adam Tarr wrote:
>
> Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> > Adam Tarr wrote:
> > > Specifically, there is the remarkable fact that a voter in a
> > winning
> > > votes-based Condorcet voting system can NEVER be hurt by fully
> > expressing
> > > their
tually punish truncation in this case. This
punishment then sets up the prisoner's dilemma, in which it doesn't pay
for either side to truncate unless both do.
But then I don't see truncation as necessarily a bad thing. If
truncation can defeat a "hated middle" candid
The Libertarian Party News "Pulse" column has an open question for the
upcoming October issue, "What do you think about the changes to the LP
Platform, approved at the recent National Convention? If you don't like
them, what *should* be done to the LP Platform? And why? (Please keep
answers to
Craig Carey wrote:
>
> http://www.fairvote.org/irv/faq.htm
>
> > Who opposes IRV?
> >
> > Little organized opposition to IRV exists. Election
> > officials are understandably cautious about a system that
> > may increase their workload, and some incumbents
Simple letter deserving a simple response:
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/opinion/3763071.htm
I'll try to write something if I get time tonight or tomorrow, or can
help edit & co-sign someone else's.
Bart
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc)
recombine, et cetera, as issues may require. The
methods listed above all have built-in "glass ceilings" which prevent
new parties from competing with the top-two.
Bart Ingles
Joe Weinstein wrote:
>
> SEIZED BY AN IDEA
>
> MY CHANGED VIEWS ON ELECTION METHODS, ON THE ROLE O
It seems clear that Craig has not yet grasped the concept of approval
voting, and doesn't understand why others might favor it. Nobody here
who advocates approval voting does so for multi-seat elections. Since
Craig's example is for a 3-seat election, the rest of his argument is
moot.
That asi
James Gilmour wrote:
>
> While I can see merit in an open discussion of voting systems, I have great
>difficulty in understanding the attraction of Approval
> Voting. If I've got it right, Approval Voting breaks the first and most fundamental
>rule of democratic representation: "one person,
I could see how a coin toss strategy might actually be preferred by a
nearly indifferent voter who suspects he or she has been influenced more
by campaign tactics than by real data.
Bart
Joe Weinstein wrote:
>
> For an Approval electoral contest, Forest Simmons notes that the average
> citiz
Alex Small wrote:
> ...
> I'm curious if any work has been done comparing the Condorcet efficiencies
> of Approval and IRV. It's been a few months since I looked at Brams and
> Fishburn, and I don't have a copy handy, so I don't know if they compared
> the two. When my copy arrives (ordered it
Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
> While Condorcet's cyclic ambiguities can be a debate topic,
> hopefully these only occur in near-tie situations, and those who would
> debate hopefully can be locked in a closet until they can agree on a
> public position.
No, sorry, there does not need to be a ne
Steve Barney wrote:
>
> [...] The BC is not always proportional, but it is under
> certain, arguably the most appropriate, conditions, as when 2 blocs of voters
> are completely polarized and vote the reverse of each other. For example, if,
> as in some voting rights court cases based on racism
I mailed my check.
-B
Alex Small wrote:
>
> Thus far $445 is pledged. I think I made a mistake in setting an all-or-
> nothing goal. I intend to mail my donation to Hager in the next week,
> since I feel it's better to give him all the hope we can, even if it
> doesn't reach the initial goal
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> As an interesting side note, the nation of Sri Lanka (just south of India)
> recently switched over to such an instant two stage runoff (we called it ITTR in
> a thread a few months ago, for instant top two runoff). Thus far, their ITTR
> elections have produced th
e
candidate any more appealing.
Bart Ingles
I'll pledge $100.
Alex Small wrote:
>
> Since proposing $2002 in 2002 I've received a pledge from Mike, and thumbs
> up responses from Forest, Joe, and Bart. In the absence of any other
> nominees, and in the absence of any evidence that potential nominees will
> even exist, I call the questi
Alex Small wrote:
>
> Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> >I don't know how Hager will make out in the LP convention -- apparently
> >the Indiana LP doesn't participate in that state's primary elections.
> >Checking out the LP website, Indiana has two candidates f
I don't know if it would get very far, but it would be fun to see how
much press a lawsuit on behalf of a losing Condorcet candidate could
generate, on the grounds that the ballots show him preferred by a
majority to the official winner. Or maybe it should be a class-action
suit involving the su
It's almost been sickening to watch from the sidelines, and not have
time to even try to get the word out. But at least I can write a
check.
I don't know how Hager will make out in the LP convention -- apparently
the Indiana LP doesn't participate in that state's primary elections.
Checking o
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> On Mon, 11 Feb 2002, Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> > I had the chance to speak to an Australian visitor at a recent local
> > Libertarian convention. Her stated reason for liking IRV was that she
> > was able to rank a sure-to-lose fringe candi
Blake Cretney wrote:
>
>MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>
> > I reply:
> >
> > Well, I've said that one thing that I don't like about IRV is that
> > its mathematical strategy is exceptionally difficult, requiring
> > estimate of many probabilities. Difficulty doesn't mean that people
> > won't
We should hold a running contest to see who can identify the most
logical fallacies in one of Donald's posts. I propose 1/2 credit for
straw man, since this seems the most common and easily identifiable.
Here are a few guides to the various fallacies, courtesy of Jeeves:
http://www.kcmetro.
Blake Cretney wrote:
>
> If some people are able to get more influence by a greater
> understanding of the method, or better guesses about how other's are
> voting, I say that is a bad thing, although to some extent inevitable.
> Some people would say that the better informed have a right to w
Adam Tarr wrote:
>
> That's not really what the example was about. I assumed a
> right,middle,left candidate (Bush, Gore, and Nader respectively in the
> example). Gore voters broke both ways in their second choice, but not Bush
> or Nader voters. The only time I mention a Bush or Nader vote
I would have agreed with you as recently as a year ago, but I now see
Hare (aka IRV) as a sort of dead end in a rat maze. It won't help elect
any third party candidates (look at Australia's lower house). And it
will neutralize any ability of third parties to influence policy
(although 3rd parti
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>
> Does anyone know of other IRVie proposals around the country that
> need to be dealt with now?
It finally got on the ballot in SF. Here's the a PDF containing the
voter information pamphlet (4 MB). Wish I'd known that it was possible
to submit a paid ballot argument
Richard Moore wrote:
>
> It would be harder to make people see the advantages of a new
> method if adopting that method fails to bring those promised
> advantages. So abolishing the EC is either a prerequisite or a
> corequisite to getting a better method in place.
Only if your focus is the U
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Another angle just occurred to me: a simulation of the two step runoff
> might be preferable to the IRV simulation of the many step runoff.
I believe this is what is known in Britain as the "supplemental vote".
The other problem here is that you need to anticipate wh
I would be surprised if they actually allow much of a forum for
dissenting opinion, but I could be wrong. I wonder how many IRV critics
it would take to make a difference there?
Alexander Small wrote:
>
> I've only been interested in alternative election methods for a short time,
> but it see
, probably more effective than a plain runoff.
Bart Ingles
Steve Barney wrote:
>
> Do we have a consensus that the instant runoff vote (IRV) is MATHEMATICALLY
> better than the common two step plurality vote (primary) with a follow-up
> runoff between the 2 top plurality vote getter
g third party candidates, and possibly even major party
nominees.
Bart Ingles
rom having to rank potentially dozens of nominees,
and allows flexibility over how many points to assign to each of the top
11 choices. Pure Borda may not have been practical here.
Bart Ingles
Olli Salmi wrote:
>
> I'm not sure if this is very interesting. This year's Eu
No argument from me, my only point was that this particular concern
seemed moot, because almost all methods (except Borda) meet this
"first-choice majority" criterion when considering actual ballots, and
none meet it when considering sincere preferences.
So yes, I agree the emphasis is misplaced
When looking at votes-as-cast, it's easy to show how Borda can elect a
unanimously despised candidate:
Voter rating
<---preferred despised--->
40 A C D E
60
Two points to consider:
(1) When examining actual ballots, if only one candidate has a majority,
that candidate will be the Approval winner. In other words, Approval
Voting cannot fail to elect a first choice majority *as expressed in
actual ballots*.
(2) If concerned about sincere preferences
erals and
neoliberals are in a close race to survive the elimination round).
Bart Ingles
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> D- The CVD folks sent the below to Science Magazine which apparently had a
> story about voting in May 2001. [...]
>
> I have NOT seen the original Science magazine material.
You also evidently haven't seen Brams and response, appearing on the
next page.
I don't h
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> On Mon, 7 Jan 2002, Steve Barney wrote:
>
> > Bart:
> >
> > What is the definition of a "deterministic" voting system, as Saari apparently
> > uses the term?
>
> I think in this context it refers to how well you can predict the ballots
> from the utilities. As Bart
te, or because you
> cannot tell which approved candidates were more preferred than others. With the
> BC you can always tell (correct me if I'm wrong) how many first place votes,
> second place votes, etc., a candidate got, if you have the final tally and the
> number of ballots (assumin
My thoughts as well. This is probably one of the better systems in
current use in single-seat government elections, although I would prefer
to simplify it into plain approval voting rather than combine it with
Condorcet.
Bart
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> If your interpretation of the Slovenia e
me that you are not advocating cumulative voting for single winner
> elections, but are saying that Tom's idea might be a good way to get
> proportional representation in multi-winner elections.
>
> Forest
>
> On Sat, 5 Jan 2002, Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> >
>
ording to the sum or average of rates.
>
> It seems to be a useful device.
>
> Forest
>
> On Fri, 4 Jan 2002, Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> >
> > I don't recall using the term "average ranking". My focus was on
> > average (or total) point counts (i.e
Bart Ingles wrote:
> If the A and C voters swap just under half of their 2nd and 3rd choice
> preferences, the final Borda scores might be something like:
My use of the word "swap" probably makes it sound as though the A and C
voters are exchanging votes with one another. Th
I had been meaning to reply to this posting, but never quite got around
to it.
Steve Barney wrote on 11/26/01:
>
> Election Methods list:
>
> Many introductory math textbooks, and the webpage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> referred
> us to in a recent message, draw too strong a conclusion from Arrow's T
;C B 3rd
>
>A: (1+1)/2=1
>B: (2+3)/2=2.5
>C: (3+2)/2=2.5
>
> That makes more sense to me, on an intuitive level, than averaging the total
> point scores. Don't you agree?
>
> Steve Barney
>
> PS: Thanks for the
ine in PDF
> format - see table 2.2 in the bottom half of page 4:
>
> "EXPLAINING ALL THREE-ALTERNATIVE VOTING OUTCOMES," DONALD G. SAARI
> http://www.math.nwu.edu/~d_saari/vote/triple.pdf
>
> Steve Barney
>
> > Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2002 21:02:21
27;s BC election tally is the sum of her pairwise
> tallies. (See Saari, _Basic Geometry of Voting, Springer-Verlag, 1995
> "EXPLAINING ALL THREE-ALTERNATIVE VOTING OUTCOMES," DONALD G. SAARI
> http://www.math.nwu.edu/~d_saari/vote/triple.pdf
>
> > Date: Tue, 01 Jan 2002 15
I wonder if Bennett's ballot was counted per Borda rules -- i.e.
Bennetts's first choice receiving 10 points, the remaining nine
receiving 5 points each.
If this were a public election held in Florida, Bennett's candidate
would have contested the election, claiming that either the election
meth
I think I have actually seen definitions of monotonicity which already
take this into account. You only need to specify that the remaining
candidates stay in the same relative order -- no need to mention
"avoidable/unavoidable changes" since such changes are always avoidable.
So maybe something
Richard Moore wrote:
>
> Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> > Furthermore, the lack of constraint makes it harder for a voter to foul
> > the ballot. In other words, a voter can hardly violate non-existent
> > constraints. Which is harder to mess up ... lone mark or Approval? A
> > lone mark voter wh
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Joe Weinstein argues the advantages of unconstrained CR style ballots
> below. I would like to add my two bits worth.
>
> Most of the arguments against the use of CR ballots are based on the
> misguided assumption that the only way to use CR ballots is to give the
> w
Richard Moore wrote:
>
> Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> > Here's an example that turns out to be more interesting than it first
> > appears to be:
> >
> > (Sincere intensities or utilities are in parentheses.)
> >
> > 45 A(100) B(50) C(0)
> > 30 B(100) C(50) A(0)
> > 25 C(100) A(50) B(0)
>
> ..
http://www.hager2002.org/
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Bart wrote--
>
> In NYC the top candidate only needs 40% of the vote to avoid a runoff.
> Makes sense to me, since 40% is no more arbitrary than 50%. I would
> gladly accept a strong plurality over a manufactured majority.
>
> D- Anything less than a majority
One way to reduce the likelihood of a runoff election while keeping
conventional elections is to adopt the 40% rule used in New York City's
mayoral primaries:
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20011010/pl/politics_newyork_dc_2.html
In NYC the top candidate only needs 40% of the vote to avoid a r
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Any method that doesn't satisfy the FBC can be manipulated by bogus polls,
> so Bart was right (as usual).
Just trying to be vigilant. :)
Can this be taken as evidence of an actual business connection between
CVD and a voting equipment manufacturer (note listed contact
information)?
[EMAIL PROTECTED] forwarded:
> [press release deleted]
> Voting Solutions, LLC is a closely held partnership based in Oakland. For
> more informatio
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> If voter X is almost sure that his ballot will make the difference between
> a hated (by X) Condorcet Winner and a Condorcet tie (to be settled by
> chance), voter X might be tempted to deliver up the election to chance
> even if that required him to vote his favorite
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Anybody watching on TV about the lifestyle of Taliban folks (with their circa
> 6,000 B.C. politics) in poor suffering Afghanistan ???
>
> Not too much apparent discussions of election method reforms among them.
If the Taliban is forced out of power, I could see s
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Consider the case of a beats-all check followed by your random ballot
> suggestion:
>
> Voters are to submit ranked ballots with truncations allowed internally as
> well as at the extremes (i.e. where there is no preference equal ranks are
> allowed).
>
> Suppose that
Rob LeGrand wrote:
>
> On the other hand, the best Condorcet methods, while imperfect,
> usually make it extremely difficult for a voter to take advantage of
> voting insincerely no matter what information he has. I'd rather have
> a method that doesn't depend on polls.
Then see my previous p
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> However (in defense of Rob's point of view) it seems to me that if a
> method yields results that make people regret sincere voting, then voters
> can be manipulated by mis-information into an unsatisfactory result.
>
> If voters are satisfied (after the fact) with th
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in part -
>
> What are the counter-intuitive results of Approval?
>
>
> D- A *real* first choice can lose (if rankings were being used).
>
> 48 A
> 3 AC
> 1 BC
> 48 C
>
> 100
>
> Approval
>
> A 51 (all *real* first choice votes
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Meanwhile, how can we make the best use of our limited equipment?
I don't suppose anyone is turning blue while waiting for my answer. :)
Alexander Small wrote:
> Is there a quantitative measure for how polarizing a candidate is?
If there is, it would probably have to use more than the rankings shown
below. Consider the following two examples, both of which fit the
rankings profile you provide with your question:
> 9% B>C>A
> 5
This one looks interesting...
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> http://www.irpp.org/po/index.htm
>
> back issues [link]
>
> Policy Options, Jul-Aug 2001 (Canada politics magazine)
[...]
>
> "Alternative voting or mixed me
Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>
> Now as for the "trivial" and "important" preferences. This is nothing
> innate to preference ballots. It will always occur that in an election
> some people care more about what they vote and others less, so it will
> always be the case that "trivial" votes "cancel out"
Apparently the Yahoo group which archives this list's messages is able
to handle approval voting in its online polls feature. I added a poll
for a mock 2000 presidential election (you must be a member of the Yahoo
group to go here):
http://groups.yahoo.comgroup/election-methods-list/polls
If
[one of my links was broken]
Apparently the Yahoo group which archives this list's messages is able
to handle approval voting in its online polls feature. I added a poll
for a mock 2000 presidential election (you must be a member of the Yahoo
group to go here):
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/
Didn't mean to set myself up as the InterNic of voting system
nomenclature, but it was a concern I had. If that caused a
misunderstanding over the term "approval" then at least we know what to
watch out for in the future. Or maybe there should be a disclaimer
following any use of the word appro
It appears I misunderstood Mr. Ketchum's earlier post after all:
On Sep. 10, 2001 Dave Ketchum wrote:
> Must be able to combine votes from thousands of precincts.
>
> IRV clearly fails, due to easily declaring wrong winners - also has
> trouble due to vote patterns being important (Condorcet
at
">>>" stuff.
Because of the potential for confusion, I actually object to using
"approval" as part of the name of methods other than approval voting.
> On Sat, 22 Sep 2001 23:27:56 -0700 Bart Ingles wrote:
> >
> > Dave Ketchum wrote:
> > >
&g
Buddha Buck wrote:
>
> Hmm... I'd love to see an example of this, since I fail to see how it
> could happen.
I couldn't find any examples, and wouldn't mind seeing one myself, but
in addition to Nurmi (who cites Young) here are a couple other mentions
of the asserted incompatibility between Co
Craig Carey wrote:
>
> The Gang of 9 was running an anti-IRV campaign. The anti-IRV cartoons
> are dated 2 Sept 2001 to 3 days ago (17 Sept), and they are here:
>
> http://www.thegangof9.com/past_cartoons.phtml
What a great web site! Too bad it's only for Eugene, OR.
I had trouble viewi
Interesting. It certainly calls into question the assumption made by
some, that most people would *want* to be able to express all of their
preference on a ballot. I see no widespread evidence of this. I
suspect that most would be satisfied with merely removing the Hobson's
choice of having to
Sorry about the late replies, but my inbox got away from me again.
Craig Layton wrote:
>
> Let me leave fluffy aside. I don't have my original example but I'll
> provide a simple one;
>
> 49.2% A>B>C (sincere utilities 100>30>0)
> 49.3% C>B>A (sincere utilities 100>30>0)
> 00.5% B>A>C (sinc
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