stems appeal, but, by themselves, they
aren't enough, if we want the method to do, or not do, certain things.
Mike Ossipoff
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robably
qualifies as a fundamental standard.
Aside from majority rule, I criticize Margins for its failures of
the fundamental standard of not making people need to vote drastically
insincerely, concealing their actual wishes from the voting system
and from eachother thereby.
Mike Ossipoff
_
nse did Bush win that election. Bush isn't legitimately president.
An unelected nonpresident is going to use this country's
resources to commit a war crime that world opinion is overwhelmingly
against.
Mike Ossipoff
_
MSN
y that a preference for B over A says
nothing by itself about whether the voter would rather elect A than C,
or would rather elect C than A--did I or anyone say otherwise? That,
Blake, is why we call it a preference between B and A.
If you prefer B to A, then you'd rather elect B t
res of those 2 states? To certain particular
state legislators there? It would greatly help if someone would post
here the e-mail addresses to write to. Not knowing those is the
reason why I haven't written yet. I, for one, would write as soon
as I know where to write to.
Mike Ossipoff
__
Adam Tarr wrote:
Tom McIntyre Wrote:
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
101: A
50: BAC
100: CBA
About 60% of the voters have indicated that they'd rather elect
B than A. And so margins elects A.
WV counts, keeps, & honors the B>A majority. A has a majority defeat that
wv doesn't lo
ted to say. I suggest
checking those things out more carefully before posting next time.
But things that margins advocates say tend to justify my concern that
the public might have a very difficult time choosing a good rank-count.
That's why I claim that Approval is the better public proposal. W
nd note that in my example
in this letter, it isn't necessary that the A voters are using
offensive truncation strategy. Maybe they just don't hava preference
between B & C. Either way majority rule is violated by margins but
not b
hings you mention should affect the
choice between margins & wv. It would be quite another thing to
demonstrate that that is so.
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7;s the unnecessary work of adding that
meritless option to the programs. Simpler to just not have it.
If someone wants an interactive count program to count margins Condorcet,
they can use Blake's program.
Mike Ossipoff
_
erate
the
Condorcet tally matrix from a voted ballots list and then run the
Condorcet_DD.pl with the --rank_wv command. It has line commands to request
RP
and BeatpathWSinner (SSD) outcomes.
I reply:
Isn't that a margins Condorcet program at a margins Condorcet website?
Mik
r enactment of Approval.
The websites with voting system criteria that I referred to above are:
http://www.electionmethods.org
(at the technical evaluation page)
and
http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/sing.html
(at the defensive strategy criteria page)
s it still mention Marquette, Wisconsin?
I reply:
Though I haven't had an opportunity to re-read the copy, I'm certain
that it still says what it said before. However, it's possible that
I somehow inexplicably mistakenly believed that it said Wisconsin
when it actually said
em, or, maybe more lilkely, there were more
than 1 edition of the book, in which different Marquettes were named
as the place where Nanson was used in the U.S.
Mike Ossipoff
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I was sure that Hoag & Hallett said "Marquette, Wisconsin".
Sorry if I got it wrong. Maybe different editions of the book
say different states.
Is Marquette, Michigan listed or shown in atlases?
Mike Ossipoff
_
dorcet's method refers
to something that looks at defeat-strength. Copeland's method is
called "Copeland's method", and isn't called "Condorcet's method".
Nowhere is Copeland considered to be what is meant by "Condorcet's
method", even if
da score.
Nanson was used in Wisconsin for a while. So far as I know, the only
Condorcet Criterion method ever used in public political elections.
I don't like Nanson because, like most methods, inlcuding lots of
Condorcet Criterion methods, Nanson doesn't meet any of our defensive
strate
d
reasonably so. We don't have to restart the debate about what Condorcet
meant by his drop-weakest proposal. I suggest that PC is the literal
interpretation, but that it's perfectly possible that Condorcet would
have done Smith//PC or SSD if he carried out his proposal.
I'll resume
ir last
choice. The side that expects to be outpolled by the opposite extreme
isn't going to also expect to have a majority. They vote for Middle,
which is B. And B wins.
It would seem that in this plausible example, your relative margins
is the method that lets the addition of the extreme c
Mike Ossipoff wrote (16 Jan 2003):
But in all Condorcet versions, a candidate wins if
he has no pairwise decisions for or against him.
Markus replied:
Of course, that's not true.
Example:
A = B
A = C
A = D
A = E
A = F
B > C
B > D
B > E
B < F
C > D
C < E
You wrote:
Stephanie and Mike,
I have enjoyed your debate and wonder if you thought of looking at defining
a median in terms of the distribution of individual preference orderings
represented by a beta distribution. Ths approach is rigorous and flexible.
It might also accomodate a definitio
low. Am I right?
No, you're wrong. And I couldn't find the place in your quotation
where I'd defined the median in terms of the Approval voting system.
You continued:
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote :
Steph wrote:
I do not hate Middle, I just dislike under and over representation
when it comes f
if there are 2 or more candidates
who have no defeats against them, and some of those have no
pairwise victories, and some have a pairwise victory, then the tie
should consist of the one(s) who have/has a pairwise victory.
Of course that only matters in small
f saying it would be:
Keep the defeat in which i beats j if there's no beatpath from j
to i among the entire set of qualified defeats and kept defeats.
Mike Ossipoff
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nd
that. The question is whether or not you can justify your criterion
in terms of some standard that an appreciable number of people accept
as fundamental.
Mike Ossipoff
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oose
outside the Schwartz set. Those are vanishingly unlikely in public
elections.
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takes to do so themselves. For instance, in Plurality, IRV, margins
and relative margins, they'll often do so by the defensive strategy
of burying their favorite.
Steph continued:
If you prefer to discuss with Donald and Craig, it is your prerogative.
I reply:
Should that be taken as a call for as
people if they could justify 1p1v in terms
of a fundamental standard.
Their failure to do so, after all this time, is their way of telling
us that they can't justify 1p1v in terms of a fundamental standard,
and that 1p1v apparently has no justification.
of itself and some kept defeats.
Keep a qualified tie defeat if it isn't in a cycle consisting only
of itself and some combination of kept defeats and qualified defeats.
Mike Ossipoff
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t
these comments just occurred to me from the example.
I do understand that mathematics can provide new scope for new methods
, thereby finding better ones, whether immediately proposable or not.
Mike Ossipoff
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Dave said:
MIKE OSSIPOFF said:
The above considerations suggest that if we propose Approval for
municipal elections now done by Runoff, then the Approval balloting
should be followed by a top-2 runoff. It's a matter of suggesting
merely
that people be allowed to vote for as many as they
hough it probably isn't really quite optimal
with so few voters. With Bucklin I assumed that people rank at least
as many candidates as they'd vote for in Approval).
I'm not qualified to discuss how the new CS method should be done,
because I haven't studied linear algebra.
o pay for parties'
voting to decide whom they'll run.
Anyway, obviously plain 1-balloting Approval is what one would replace
Plurality with in the general election in those partisan elections
that don't have a runoff.
M
Criticize them all you want! It's always useful
for people outside the U.S. to express their opinion of the tragedy/disaster
that's now happening to the U.S.
Mike Ossipoff
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f, it
must be that IRV is electing more CWs who come in 3rd or lower in
favoriteness. But those are just the kind of CWs that IRVists don't
want to win! Is IRV biting its own master? Worse for popular CWs,
while helping less popular CWs? By IRVists'
Forrest--
You wrote:
Don might be happy to be expelled; then he can claim that his barbs
were
so sharp that the EM list members couldn't cope with them, so they
banned
him. It might give the EM list a reputation for closed mindedness.
Even undeserved reputations can be bad PR.
I reply:
Mabye
ply to the statements that he keeps
making, just so that it won't seem to anyone that he has unanswerable
arguments.
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have been:
60: ABCDE
70: BACDE
100: C
83: DECBA
75: EDCBA
I hope that I didn't make the same typo in my 2nd example in that
message. The 2nd example should be:
50: ABCDE
51: BACDE
100: C
52: DECBA
49: EDCBA
Mike Ossipoff
_
Don said:
Greetings list members,
Mikeo wrote:
From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Best Method In Use
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 06:15:45 +
I only know of 3 single-winner methods that are used in public
political elections, and a
onduct. Making other members of the list the
topic of their letters to a degree that no one else does, except
for Blake, a year or 2 ago. But Don & Craig seem unable to stop.
Anyway, just the regular habit of posting about other list members
instead of the list's charter top
Don said:
Greetings list members,
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
In my most recent message, the following passage was accidentally
left in after it had been discovered to be incorrect:
"(In ordinary Approval, the fact that the Dems are more numerous than
the Nader people means that the Dem candi
s by far the best method in use, counting national and
international elections.
Though your question was about official governance elections, let
me just add that Approval is also used by mathematical and
engineering professional societies with combin
that I described yesterday.
Anyway, not knowing that, I've said all I can about CS.
It's all hypothetical now, anyway, since CS is too complicated and
unconventional in its definition, and probably too unconventional in
its behavior, to be proposable till the public take more interest
But even if CS is never suitable as a voting system, it still seems
useful for comparing the merits of various distance measures.
Mike Ossipoff
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ms & Nader coalition vote for eachother's candidates,
then both coalition's candidates will get the same vote total in
ordinary Approval, just as thet get the same score in CS Approval.
Mike Ossipoff
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onventional to be
accepted until people are more democratically involved than they
now are. Now, Approval and other CR versions are the best public
proposal.
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protect votes from themselves, from their own `pity
votes'.
I reply:
Wrong. It's proper for a voting system to reliably count the preferences
that people vote--and that's something that IRV doesn't do.
Mike Ossipoff
__
ample. Of course CS has a lot more merit to outweigh nonmonotonicity
than IRV does.
Does anyone have any opinion on Pythagorean distance vs
city-block rectangular distances, for spatial simulations of SU?
Or what about Hamming distance for that purpose (As I said, I
don't know what Hamm
proval and Plurality for voters who
like different numbers of candidates, and have shown that if it's unfair to
the voter who votes among fewer pairs because of the
number that he likes, Approval is about 3 times fairer than Plurality.
Mike Ossipoff
It's been argued that 0,1,2 or 0,.
e date, message number, or approximate date of that EM discussion?
They were quite some time ago, more than a few months. Of course if
I knew even roughly how long ago, I'd have found them for myself by now.
Of course I tried the search feature but it didn't
d, a rule-criterion won't be accepted on EM as a fundamental
standard, and therefore needs justification in terms of something
more fundamental than itself.
Mike Ossipoff
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use unequal voting power to justify
1p1v, you need to do a lot more than you've done so far.
So what is 1p1v--criterion, fundamental standard, or derived standard.
And if it isn't a fundamental standard, then how would you justify
it in terms of a standard that you call fundamental?
Mike Os
t as a criterion. I suppose someone could
look for justification of it as a criterion.
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5) In Approval, any voter can cancel-out any other voter.
6) If, in Approval, more people voted Smith over Jones than vice-versa,
of what relevance is it if some of those voting Smith over Jones
also voted for John Doe? That doesn't change the fact that they
voted preference for Smith
Steph--
You wrote:
Statement of Criterion
If an Ideal Democratic Winner (IDW) exists, and if a two-third majority
prefers the IDW to another candidate, then the other candidate should
not win if that majority votes sincerely and no other voter falsifies
any preferences.
I reply:
wv passes th
says something.
Blake replied:
That's why I don't consider a vote of 3 to 1 to be as decisive as 100 to
50 (I know you don't either).
I reply:
Correct. I don't, if those are the X>Y and Y>X figures in X's defeat
of Y.
Mike Ossipoff
___
hat important? Because
a majority like that can get any result that it agrees on. It's a uniquely
powerful set of voters. So it's reasonable to define majority
rule as the ability of such a group to get their way. Continued tomorrow.
Mike Ossipoff
I choose the second one,
and this fo
ompare
these criterias.
I reply:
Maybe, but when you post your definitions of your criteria, you can
compare them with other criteria, if you want to, by just stating
the criteria and asking which sounds more important, and why.
Mike Ossipoff
_
ot violate "1-person-1-vote".
End of my logic.
I reply:
But if "1-person-1-vote" means what you said above, then FPTP violates
1-person-1-vote about 3 times worse than Approval does.
And if that isn't what you mean by 1-person-1-vote, then exactly what
do you mean by 1-per
e defensive
reversal by a majority as described in the definitions of the
defensive strategy criteria.
And even if you speak of a majority of those registered, or of the
population, using that definition in the defensive strategy criteria,
wv still passes and margins st
regards to the greatest factor by which different voters'
ballot-expectation can differ. I haven't gotten to that because of
other voting system projects, but I hope that someone will post about
that subject before I finally get to doing
ropose Approval, -1,0,1, or
other CR versions instead, due to their greater simplicity and
proposableness.
Mike Ossipoff
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F
sponse to your question, I remind you that it's
margins and relative margins (along with IRV & Plurality) that have
situations where the only Nash equilibria are ones in which some voters
use defensive order-reversal.
Mike Ossipoff
__
se it would free people to express their preference for
someone else. But there are instances, such as Alaska, where a
Republocrat organization tries for a different voting system, and
so maybe such an approach can have some degree of success.
Mike Ossipoff
___
w it's
always used, and it's the meaning that people consider important.
Of what relevance is a non-majority of people who don't even bother to
vote? But if few of those who voted consider a particular pairwise
comparison important enough to vote on, that says something.
Mike Os
wise contest, because it
allows voters to vote in more pairwise contests.
Ballot-expectation takes that into account, along with the relative
importance to the voter of those pairwise contests.
Mike Ossipoff
For 6 candidates the maximum gap, excluding meaningless ballots that are all
0
or
a
in and again. Let's show
that the Democrats are finished.
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of candidates.
So, Approval's worst case remains better than Plurality's worst case
by nearly the same factor, as we add more candidates.
Mike Ossipoff
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htt
s). So why not use a method that lets people
protect the the CW, the voter median, lets them enforce majority rule,
without favorite-burial.
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that
you're saying things that are relevant to the claims that you're
making. You've got to justify your claims a lot better than you've
been doing.
Mike Ossipoff
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the voting system strategically forces people to not express
their wishes, to in fact reverse their real wishes on their ballot.
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meone away from the voter-median, you violate majority
rule. Voting systems, like IRV, that jump to extremes are dangerous.
To be continued--
Mike Ossipoff
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your method lets victory be stolen from a CW, by truncation, when
a majority vote the CW over that candidate, when no one falsifies
a preference. Your method fails the CW more flagrantly than wv does.
You continued:
Finally, once we know that because of sincere truncations, unsincere
truncations
nywhere near as much as by
a factor of 5. only plurality does that. No matter which of those
utility distributions we assign to you and to me, you won't find a
combination of utility distributions in which Approval can give us
ballot expectations that differ as much as they can in plurality.
S
When i replied to this message as individual e-mail, i forgot to
send a copy to myself, and so i'm writing a new reply here, which
might be briefer than the original:
Alex--
you wrote:
MIKE OSSIPOFF said:
But someone wrote to me suggesting a method that has both of those
advantages
the point. There are infinitely many ways to count
ranked ballots. That makes it difficult or impossible to get one of
the few good ones adopted. That's one reason to propse Approval or
-1,0,1 instead of a rank method.
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
An advantage of Approval over CR is that Approval
no one will argue with
you on that.
So let us check another subject:
relative margins (rm) vs winning-votes (wv)
MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit :
A margins advocate could say that he doesn't consider the majority
defensive strategy criteria important, but they measure for the
standards of majority
by truncation.
if that's your point, then you're right. it's something that i've
often said.
please note that SFC is about a CW who is preferred to
candidate y by a majority who vote sincerely. Re-read SFC &a
safely ignore them in
strategy, and so I wouldn't object to them if people wanted them.
But I'd propose Y/N without them, for simplicity.
Mike Ossipoff
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:
35: ABC
33: BAC
32: CBA
But now 2 more voters arrive at the last minute, to vote CBA. They
finally decided to vote in order to do their part to keep their
last choice from winning. But by showing up to vote, they made
their last choice win. Approval will never do that.]
The fact that each of thes
ns advocates say that they like symmetry, and that margins
is more symmetrical. But the situations isn't symmmetrical--If
Smith beats Jones pairwise, there's an asymmetry between the Smith>Jones
voters and the Jones>S
is/her
pairwise preferences or voting his/her favorite over everyone else.
And where the offensive strategy definition says "...intended to
take victory from a CW...", it should add there "...in a Condorcet
Criterion method".
Mike Ossipoff
t's in a cycle of MPPs that are all at least as
strong as it is.
Majority preference is violated if we elect someone who has an
unnulified MPP against him/her.
A voter votes defensive strategy if s/he votes in a way intended to
protect the win of
are consistent with
someone saying that it has chosen such a right
candidate in Northern California, Southern California, and in California.
Obviously, for the reasons that you gave above,
and also because other considerations ar
ective best candidate, and a right or
wrong pairwise defeat, without supplying definitions for those
terms that include tests for compliance with the definitions.
Mike Ossipoff
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oter, as his/her power to improve
his/her expectation by his/her ballot.
Unlike Approval, Instant Runoff is a completely new voting system,
with an expensive new balloting system.
Mike Ossipoff
_
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at you'll
consider Approval as an alternate proposal, because of its many advantages,
especially for such an elegantly simple and easily
proposed & enacted method.
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ed, they changed the winner from B to
C, their last choice.
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ch the mathematical technical type, I am smart enough the get
the principal of the thing and go from there.
I reply:
But please don't get the principle of the thing from only one source.
Amy & Hill are CVD'ers. All the sources that you mentioned are CVD.
You continued:
The
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es used by players,
and the resulting outcome, such that no player can improve the
outcome, according to his preferences, by changing his strategy,
when he's the only player who changes his strategy.
Mike Ossipoff
_
Surf
efeats.
[end of definition]
In our most recent poll here about the best method, Approval won.
Approval:
Using the same ballot now used for 1-vote Plurality, each voter may
mark as many candidates as s/he wishes. The candidate with the most
marks wins.
Mike Ossipoff
if there is one, won't be a problem.
I believe that all the Condorcet versions mentioned above comply
with Pareto, but I don't have a demonstration of that.
Mike Ossipoff
_
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FC, GSFC, WDSC, & SDSC
were written to measure for the standard of getting rid of
the lesser-of-2-evils problem. They also measure for the closely
related, and popular, standard of majority rule.
The discussion of sincere Nash equilibria on EM also relates to
defensive strategy need.
Mike Ossipof
ere's lots of indifference about the
CW, then truncation can steal the election from him. SFC & GSFC
tell conditions in which that needn't happen, though they don't
specifically mention truncation.
Mike Ossipoff
___
wv penalizes partial rankings. But we've been
all over that issue, and there'd be no point in arguing about it more.
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r/CSSD is still
the CSSD definition, because of its obvious motivation & justification.
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p; SDSC, but it at least meets SFC.
& WDSC.
And I claim that margins and relative margins methods fail GSFC
SFC, SDSC, & WDSC.
Actually, I don't just claim those things. I've demonstrated all
of them on EM.
Mike Ossipoff
id
the debate between the rank-counts, if there's any likelihood that
people would insist on comparing a wide range of rank-count
proposals, and debating which is best.
Mike Ossipoff
_
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ng that method
BeatpathWinner, in a public proposal. I don't know
what would be a good name.
Maybe Non-Iterative-Nullification (NIN). And, Josh, I'm
not saying that should necessarily be the name for
public proposals. It's just the descriptive name,
for that definition, that occurs to me
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