In a message dated 97-05-10 21:57:51 EDT, you write:
>I think Arrow did show that there's no such thing as the "perfect" method,
>so we should stop trying for that.
I interpret Arrow's proof to show that there is no perfect *preferential
voting* method. Other methods (such as rated voting) fall
On Tue, 6 May 1997, Hugh Tobin wrote:
> Markus Schulze wrote:
> > But the way you have defined "truncation resistant" and
> > Smith//Condorcet [EM], the following problems will occur:
> > (2)Distributing the worst preferences random among the least
> >favoured candidates becomes a usefull
>Here is an example to show why voters would truncate, if
>a Condorcet Criterion Method is used:
>
>Case 1:
>
>47 voters vote ABC.
>10 voters vote BAC.
> 8 voters vote BCA.
>35 voters vote CBA.
Wouldn't it be nice if we could just find out which candidate was liked by
the most voters? For exampl
Dear Rob, dear Hugh,
you did me wrong. I have never said, that Smith//Condorcet [EM]
is not "truncation resistant" due to your definition of "truncation
resistant".
The problem looks a little bit different: Usually only downward
truncation [i.e., the voter gives his worst preference to more
than
Markus Schulze wrote:
>
> Dear Hugh Tobin,
>
> I cannot agree with your statement, that (if a Condorcet Criterion
> method is used) only omnissent voters can vote strategically.
>
I did not make the statement attributed to me. I did, I believe, show
that rational strategic voters would not us
