In response to:
> From: Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: Regretted Turnout. Insincere = ranking.
> Unfortunately, I have just found an article that proves, that
> the Condorcet Criterion and the No Punishment Criterion are
> incompatible.
Dear participants,
a few months ago, I asked whether there is an election method,
that meets Local Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives and
that meets the No Punishment Criterion, i.e., that guarantees,
that a sincere voter is never punished for going to the polls.
(If it is not possible to
About the number of Criteria, there apparently are more than
I've heard of. Something called "consistency", which is conveniently
met only by the method proposed by author who defined the criterion.
I don't remember what Consistency is, but you can find it in
the Winter quarter issue of _Journal o
Regarding Mr. Ossipoff's comments of Wed, Jun 24, 1998 7:09 PM EDT---
Demorep1 (not Marcus Schulze) wrote--> > If initial conditions change (i.e. by
adding more voters with different rankings), then the results can be expected
to change.
Demorep1 also says--
How about having each voter vote a *s
On Sat, 13 Jun 1998, Markus Schulze wrote:
> You wrote (13 Jun 1998):
> > If initial conditions change (i.e. by adding more
> > voters with different rankings), then the results
> > can be expected to change.
>
> If it is not possible to create an election method,
> that never rewards tactical
[Demorep1] wrote (13 Jun 1998):
> If initial conditions change (i.e. by adding more
> voters with different rankings), then the results
> can be expected to change.
Markus Schulze wrote-
If it is not possible to create an election method,
that never rewards tactical voters, isn't it senseful
to
You wrote (13 Jun 1998):
> If initial conditions change (i.e. by adding more
> voters with different rankings), then the results
> can be expected to change.
If it is not possible to create an election method,
that never rewards tactical voters, isn't it senseful
to ask, whether there is at least
Mr. Ossipoff wrote ---
It's true, as Demorep said, that if new voters join the election,
the rightful result may well be different from what it was before.
And the 1st choice of the new voters might rightffully lose.
Unfortunately, that means that those new voters have incentive
to falsify some
It's true, as Demorep said, that if new voters join the election,
the rightful result may well be different from what it was before.
And the 1st choice of the new voters might rightffully lose.
Unfortunately, that means that those new voters have incentive
to falsify some of their preferences--if
Markus Schulze wrote:---
Bucklin fails to meet my "No-Punishment Criterion".
Example 1:
39 voters vote A > B > C.
10 voters vote B > A > B.
51 voters vote C > A > B.
Bucklin elects candidate C.
Example 2:
39 voters vote A > B > C.
10 voters vote B > A > B.
51 voters vote
I found an error in one of my last e-mails.
The corrected example of my demonstration,
that Bucklin violates Fishburn's "No-Show
Criterion" looks as follows:
Example 1:
39 voters vote A > B > C.
10 voters vote B > A > C.
51 voters vote C > A > B.
Bucklin elects candidate C.
Example
On Fri, 12 Jun 1998, Markus Schulze wrote:
> Dear Mike,
>
> you wrote (12 Jun 1998):
> > And now, before someone else tells me, I must admit that
> > the Smith//Condorcet(EM) with subcycle rule 2 violates
> > Pareto, and GMC.
>
> This election method also violates the Monotonicity Criterion
>
Dear Mike,
you wrote (12 Jun 1998):
> And now, before someone else tells me, I must admit that
> the Smith//Condorcet(EM) with subcycle rule 2 violates
> Pareto, and GMC.
This election method also violates the Monotonicity Criterion
and the No-Show Criterion.
Markus
Wow. I'd forgotten that the new voters would change what
constitutes a majority. Bucklin indeed violates No-Show.
And now, before someone else tells me, I must admit that the
Smith//Condorcet(EM) with subcycle rule 2 violates Pareto,
and GMC. And, which is the same thing, it violates my
basic dem
Dear Mike,
you wrote (11 Jun 1998):
> The methods which I know of not having that problem are
> Plurality, Approval, & Bucklin.
Borda hasn't this problem, either.
My question is: Is there a method, that meets the "Local
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion" and
that never punishe
In answer to the questions about voters regretting that they
turned out, my answer is: No, it isn't inevitable, because
there are a few methods that don't have that problem. And no,
it isn't patchable, where it occurs, because it's caused by
method attributes that seem essential to the properties
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