Rob LeGrand wrote:
> A while ago, Craig wrote:
> > 9 A>B>C>D=E=F : 100>90>1>0=0=0 : ZI AB : St AB
> > 38 B>D>A>C=E=F : 100>52>51>0=0=0: ZI BDA : St B
> > 40 C>B>A>D=E=F : 100>85>70>0=0=0: ZI CBA : St C
> > 9 D>C>B>A=E=F : 100>10>9>0=0=0 : ZI DC : St DC
Actually the ZI vote fo
A while ago, Craig wrote:
> 9 A>B>C>D=E=F : 100>90>1>0=0=0 : ZI AB : St AB
> 38 B>D>A>C=E=F : 100>52>51>0=0=0: ZI BDA : St B
> 40 C>B>A>D=E=F : 100>85>70>0=0=0: ZI CBA : St C
> 9 D>C>B>A=E=F : 100>10>9>0=0=0 : ZI DC : St DC
> 4 E=F>A>B>C>D : 100=100>90>12>10>0 : ZI EFA : St EF
Mr. Simmons wrote-
I agree that 100 percent consensus is usually an unobtainable ideal, although
it is also an absolute requirement in the case of some jury decisions.
---
D- Not any more in many States --- circa 9/10 of 12 can acquit or convict.
There is the pardon/ parole remedy for improper
Forest wrote:
>I agree that 100 percent consensus is usually an unobtainable ideal,
>although
>it is also an absolute requirement in the case of some jury decisions.
Or to elect the Pope (assuming the standard form of election is used - I
gather that there is at least one archaic form of electio
On Sat, 28 Jul 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Consensus (100 percent agreement) is in utopia-land.
>
>
Demorep wrote that consensus in the form of 100 percent agreement is "in
utopia land."
I agree that 100 percent consensus is usually an unobtainable ideal,
although
it is also an absol
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> In a message dated 7/29/01 12:20:39 AM, you wrote:
>
> <<[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> >
> > See *consent of the governed* in the second paragraph of the U.S.A.
> > Declaration of Independence.
> >
> > Democracy means majority rule --- as far as elections are conc
In a message dated 7/29/01 12:20:39 AM, you wrote:
<<[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> See *consent of the governed* in the second paragraph of the U.S.A.
> Declaration of Independence.
>
> Democracy means majority rule --- as far as elections are concerned.
Mr. Ingles wrote-
Says who? Maybe
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Consensus (100 percent agreement) is in utopia-land.
As is majority rule when defined as "> 50 percent", whenever there are
three or more candidates.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> See *consent of the governed* in the second paragraph of the U.S.A.
> Declaration of Independence.
>
> Democracy means majority rule --- as far as elections are concerned.
Says who? Maybe as far as two-candidate elections are concerned. The
phrase 'majority r
In a message dated 7/25/01 11:01:58 PM, you wrote:
<>
-
D-
See *consent of the governed* in the second paragraph of the U.S.A.
Declaration of Independence.
Democracy means majority rule --- as far as elections are concerned.
The current *tyranny of the minority* is what folks should be
Forest Simmons wrote in part-
When there is no consensus (100 percent approval) the group members try to
understand and deal with the concerns of those who are holding out. If
efforts at assuaging the concerns of the holdouts don't win them over,
then compromises are made by the super satisfied,
On Thu, 26 Jul 2001, Blake Cretney wrote:
>
> In Canada the government requires cable companies to black out
> national and American television for the west, until polls close.
> Last I heard, Elections Canada was pursuing a case against a westerner
> for posting early election results on a
On Thu, 26 Jul 2001 13:01:33 -0700 (PDT)
Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Tue, 24 Jul 2001, Richard Moore wrote in part:
>
> This brings up the East to West time lag on election day. The exit
polls
> are going strong on the East coast before the West coast voters cast
their
> votes
Forest Simmons wrote:
> The East coast folks have an advantage because their results might
> discourage the West coast folks from even bothering to vote, for example.
>
> The West coast folks have an advantage because they have more information
> about the preferences of other voters.
>
> Which
Bart Ingles wrote:
> Suppose you have absolutely no polling data of any kind, but know enough
> about the candidates to place them on a policy continuum. Should this
> still be considered a zero-info situation?
No, it shouldn't. However, in order to affect strategy,
there has to be a way to d
On Tue, 24 Jul 2001, Richard Moore wrote in part:
>
> Incidentally, I've long suspected there is (in general) no
> such thing as universally available "perfect information" in
> Approval voting. It might be possible for one or a few
> voters to have such perfect information, as for instance
I have been in some of these consensus decision making seances.
When there is no consensus (100 percent approval) the group members try to
understand and deal with the concerns of those who are holding out. If
efforts at assuaging the concerns of the holdouts don't win them over,
then compromise
In this context I take "zero-info" to mean negligible information about
the preferences of other voters. In practice this would be hard to
achieve because the same channels that give information about the
candidates tend to reveal information about voter preference (biased one
way or another).
C
On Thu, 26 Jul 2001, LAYTON Craig wrote (in part):
>
> power to make the lives of 35% of the population miserable. The solution to
> tyranny of the majority is to make the decision making structure more
> diffuse, not to elect a single candidate, who isn't very popular, to make
> all the de
I basically agree with the following, but question whether there is a
real answer to which candidate (A or B) should be the winner. B is more
of a consensus candidate (depending on the relative strength of '>>'
versus '>').
The general US population may well favor A, after having been taught
err
Richard Moore wrote:
>
> Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> >
> > I vaguely remember that there was a sudden realization that the above mean
> > criterion was necessary but not sufficient for optimizing expected utility
> > in a zero-info environment.
>
> I think it's necessary and sufficient for zero
Forest wrote (in part):
>But playing the devil's advocate for a minute, I will state the case for
>B:
Again, your argument is very persuasive.
>So either the greed or the arrogance of 55 percent deprives the body
>politic from being governed by maximum consent. Approval = Potential for
>Cons
Richard Moore wrote:
>Considering unequal probabilities for A, B, C, and
>D is considerably more difficult. This is where we need the
>Pij for each pair (not just who the front-runners from a
>poll are) and I don't think we can calculate that with
>precision for the reasons I give below.
You
As usual we rely on Craig to come up with all of the interesting examples.
I'm willing to bend my stance a little on the basis of comments and
examples from Rob, Craig, and Demo, as well as my belief in Universal
Approval as a good standard.
The examples and discussion around them show that dec
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> I vaguely remember that there was a sudden realization that the above mean
> criterion was necessary but not sufficient for optimizing expected utility
> in a zero-info environment.
I think it's necessary and sufficient for zero-info, large
populations.
>
> I also
LAYTON Craig wrote:
>>Discounting E and F, 255/4 = 63.75, so possible strategic
>>vote is CBA. Depending how confident this group is in the
>>information that D will lose, they might truncate to CB or
>>just C, but we don't know for sure. "C only" seems unlikely
>>to me unless these voters are
On Mon, 23 Jul 2001, Richard Moore wrote:
> Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> > The results of these simulations would depend on what strategy you used
> > for zero info Approval. Did you use above mean, not below median, above
> > midrange, above largest gap, some combination of these, or Richard's
>
Richard Moore wrote:
> > 9 A>B>C>D=E=F : 100>90>1>0=0=0 : ZI AB : St AB
> > 38 B>D>A>C=E=F : 100>52>51>0=0=0: ZI BDA : St B
>
>I don't see why the second group would truncate to B in the
>informed vote. Just given the information that clones E and
>F don't have a chance, a simple inf
LAYTON Craig wrote:
> 9 A>B>C>D=E=F : 100>90>1>0=0=0 : ZI AB : St AB
> 38 B>D>A>C=E=F : 100>52>51>0=0=0: ZI BDA : St B
I don't see why the second group would truncate to B in the
informed vote. Just given the information that clones E and
F don't have a chance, a simple informed st
>I think I should modify my challenge to ask for an example that has a
>definite CW that is definitely better than a definite Approval winner.
Okay, I muddled it a bit the first time. This example should meet your
challenge. I don't think the voters could have better strategy given their
Sincer
Forest Simmons wrote:
> The results of these simulations would depend on what strategy you used
> for zero info Approval. Did you use above mean, not below median, above
> midrange, above largest gap, some combination of these, or Richard's
> optimal method?
Forest,
Which method? The only opti
On Sun, 22 Jul 2001, Rob LeGrand wrote:
> Forest wrote:
> > Personally, I have little sympathy with these kinds of regrets.
> > The kind of regret Mr. LeGrand has been talking about (in the context of
> > CW versus Approval winner) is more or less similar to the kind of regret
> > illustrated by
In Craig's example below I agree that B is the best candidate in spite of
the fact that it is the IRV winner :-)
However, it seems to me that B is the most likely Approval winner, too,
even under near zero information conditions [see explanation below]
although to be a good sport I have to admit
Forest wrote:
> Personally, I have little sympathy with these kinds of regrets.
> The kind of regret Mr. LeGrand has been talking about (in the context of
> CW versus Approval winner) is more or less similar to the kind of regret
> illustrated by these examples (regretting one's inability to extra
Mr. Layton wrote-
"Reasonable strategy" is a fairly loose term. In an electorate with very
inaccurate polling information, reasonable strategy could result in a pretty
bad outcome.
D- For offices such as U.S.A. President, a State governor or a major city
mayor there WILL BE *accurate* p
I wrote:
>B is the SU winner over A by 275 (av. 69) to 217 (av. 54). 90% of voters
prefer B to A.
Correction. A = 5680 (av. 57) B = 8600 (av. 86), so the utility margin is
v. significant.
>"Reasonable strategy" is a fairly loose term. In an electorate with very
innacurate polling >informatio
Blake Cretney wrote:
> On Wed, 18 Jul 2001 19:21:43 -0700
> Richard Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>>One thing to remember is that no election method can
>>distinguish between the case where A and C are extremists
>>and B is a moderate compromise (the electorate being highly
>>polarize
Forest wrote:
>Personally, I have little sympathy with these kinds of regrets.
They're fantastic examples. You make quite a persuasive argument.
>Does anybody have an example in which reasonable strategy would tend to
>make the Approval winner definitely less desirable than the Condorcet
>Winn
On Wed, 18 Jul 2001 19:21:43 -0700
Richard Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> One thing to remember is that no election method can
> distinguish between the case where A and C are extremists
> and B is a moderate compromise (the electorate being highly
> polarized), and the case where A and C
>A man buys a thousand dollar cow from a widow for fifty dollars and
Wow, a cow worth a thousand dollars?
Would that be a *cash cow*?
(sorry, couldn't resist)
Forest wrote:
> This method is a kind of cross or hybrid between Borda and Copeland, so it
> is not surprising that it would have high SU and a tendency to pick the CW
> when there is one. However, the following example shows that it doesn't
> always pick the CW:
>
> 51 ABCDE
> 49 BCDEA
>
> Borda(
On Wed, 18 Jul 2001, Richard Moore wrote:
>
> Note 1: Of course, the numerical solution for maximizing
> utility expectation also shares the goal of minimizing
> regret, assuming that utility and regret are opposites.
> But perhaps by "regret" we mean something that is not
> quantified?
>
On Tue, 10 Jul 2001, Rob LeGrand wrote in part:
> utility given sincere votes, but surprisingly it doesn't seem to be the SU
> champ of Condorcet methods. The best one I've found is what I call Borda(wv):
>
> 1. Calculate the pairwise matrix.
> 2. For each entry Pij, set it to zero if it's le
Rob LeGrand wrote:
> By the way, after some more simulations, I can confidently say that Black is
> the best Condorcet method for SU given sincere ballots, for whatever that's
> worth.
Rob,
Can you describe Black? I don't think I've ever seen this
method or possibly I don't know it by this na
49 A>B>C sincere utilities 100>1>0
48 C>B>A sincere utilities 100>1>0
3 B>C>A sincere utilities 100>0>1
Here, 97% of the voters would prefer to flip a coin between A and C than to
see B win. The best individual strategy may be to vote sincerely, but the
best group strategy is to flip the coin.
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> On Tue, 10 Jul 2001, Rob LeGrand wrote:
>
>
>>Forest wrote:
>>
>>>3. It eliminates the occasional low utility Condorcet Winner.
>>>
>>I question the advantage of this . . . advantage. ("Allow myself to introduce
>>. . . myself.")
>>
>
>
> Here's an example of this
Forest wrote:
> Here's an example of this (zero info):
>
> 45 A >> B > C
> 45 C >> B > A
> 2 C > A >> B
> 4 B > A >> C
> 4 B > C >> A
>
> B is the low utility CW that gets eliminated, having only 8 percent
> approval. Demorep's method gives C the win because it is the CW among the
> candidates
In a message dated 7/17/01 1:50:00 PM, Forest wrote:
Here's an example of this (zero info):
45 A >> B > C
45 C >> B > A
2 C > A >> B
4 B > A >> C
4 B > C >> A
B is the low utility CW that gets eliminated, having only 8 percent
approval. Demorep's method gives C the win because it is the CW a
On Tue, 10 Jul 2001, Rob LeGrand wrote:
> Forest wrote:
> > 3. It eliminates the occasional low utility Condorcet Winner.
>
> I question the advantage of this . . . advantage. ("Allow myself to introduce
> . . . myself.")
Here's an example of this (zero info):
45 A >> B > C
45 C >> B > A
2
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