On 21/05/2018 18:12, Ben McGinnes wrote:
> Had their publications been limited to the articles on the 13th and
> 14th, I could buy that. Unfortunately the updates to the SSD website
> on the 15th really strain things, especially the FAQ. Not only is it
> potentially panic-inducing, but they recom
On 21/05/2018 19:34, Onno Ekker wrote:
> Isn't the simplest way to prevent such an attack to decouple the
> downloading and reading of e-mail? If you go online, download e-mail, go
> offline and then read e-mail, there's no way a html-message can phone
> home or otherwise leak information? Or am I
On Mon, May 21, 2018 at 08:51:17AM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> That being the *incredibly* unhelpful and likely actively harmful
>> recommendation to remove encryption and decryption functionality from
>> vulnerable MUAs.
>
> I blame the EFF for that more than I blame the Efail developers.
Hi,
Phil Pennock:
> 4. Get together actual MUA maintainers who are users of the GnuPG
>code-base in a mailing-list and hammer out details of "what should be
>done about old mail". Cryptographers have long said to decrypt
>inbound mail and re-encrypt it to a storage key, which can
>
On 21/05/18 15:01, Phil Stracchino wrote:
> On 05/21/18 09:57, Andrew Gallagher wrote:
>> On 21/05/18 14:35, Phil Stracchino wrote:
>>> What MySQL (from mid-5.7 on) does for tablespace encryption might be of
>>> note here. MySQL uses a fixed table key for each encrypted InnoDB
>>> table, but encry
On 05/21/18 09:57, Andrew Gallagher wrote:
> On 21/05/18 14:35, Phil Stracchino wrote:
>> What MySQL (from mid-5.7 on) does for tablespace encryption might be of
>> note here. MySQL uses a fixed table key for each encrypted InnoDB
>> table, but encrypts the table keys with a master key which is
>>
On 21/05/18 14:35, Phil Stracchino wrote:
> What MySQL (from mid-5.7 on) does for tablespace encryption might be of
> note here. MySQL uses a fixed table key for each encrypted InnoDB
> table, but encrypts the table keys with a master key which is
> periodically rotated. This allows regular rotat
On 05/21/18 08:34, Ben McGinnes wrote:
> To say, “we have this edge case scenario that really needs an active
> targeted attack on a case by case basis, so everyone should just stop
> integrating encryption” is the kind of thing that can get people
> killed.
Indeed. "There is a possible attack a
On 05/20/18 16:28, Phil Pennock wrote:
> 4. Get together actual MUA maintainers who are users of the GnuPG
>code-base in a mailing-list and hammer out details of "what should be
>done about old mail". Cryptographers have long said to decrypt
>inbound mail and re-encrypt it to a storage
> That being the *incredibly* unhelpful and likely actively harmful
> recommendation to remove encryption and decryption functionality from
> vulnerable MUAs.
I blame the EFF for that more than I blame the Efail developers. I
expect the people who develop new attacks to overstate their importance
On Sun, May 20, 2018 at 02:26:47AM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Writing just for myself -- not for GnuPG and not for Enigmail and
> definitely not for my employer -- I put together a postmortem on Efail.
> You may find it worth reading. You may also not. Your mileage will
> probably vary. :)
On 2018-05-20 at 02:26 -0400, Rob J Hansen wrote:
> https://medium.com/@cipherpunk/efail-a-postmortem-4bef2cea4c08
Excellent post. I favor breaking backwards compatibility and including
in the shipped README a description of "The conditions under which we
anticipate future backwards compatibility
On 20/05/2018 17:42, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Because each time GnuPG floats the possibility of ending PGP 2.6
> compatibility, there's enough user outrage -- and not enough user
> support -- to roll the decision back. I agree that it's pants-on-head
> crazy, but it's a crazy demanded by the comm
On 2018-05-20 18:42, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> What on earth is the point of maintaining
>> support for a *known insecure* version of a security tool?
> Because each time GnuPG floats the possibility of ending PGP 2.6
> compatibility, there's enough user outrage -- and not enough user
> support -
> We *know* 2.6 is insecure.
For signatures, yes (due to MD5 being first broken 20 years ago, and by
now even the rubble has stopped bouncing). For encryption in an active
attacker model, yes (due to lack of MDC/AE). For encryption in a
passive attacker model, it's still strong. Not as strong
On 05/20/18 05:22, Andrew Gallagher wrote:
>
> I said earlier that deprecation has to happen, but I’ll reiterate here. If
> doing the things that we know need to be done requires breaking backwards
> compatibility, then so be it.
There is no value in preserving backwards compatibility when the
Hi Robert.
On 20/05/2018 02:26, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Writing just for myself -- not for GnuPG and not for Enigmail and
> definitely not for my employer -- I put together a postmortem on Efail.
> You may find it worth reading. You may also not. Your mileage will
> probably vary. :)
>
> htt
I want to get involved and give a damn!
Break backwards compatibility already: it’s time. Ignore the haters. I
trust you.
On 20/05/2018 09:26, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Writing just for myself -- not for GnuPG and not for Enigmail and
> definitely not for my employer -- I put together a postmorte
> On 20 May 2018, at 07:26, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>
> Writing just for myself -- not for GnuPG and not for Enigmail and
> definitely not for my employer -- I put together a postmortem on Efail.
> You may find it worth reading. You may also not. Your mileage will
> probably vary. :)
I would
Writing just for myself -- not for GnuPG and not for Enigmail and
definitely not for my employer -- I put together a postmortem on Efail.
You may find it worth reading. You may also not. Your mileage will
probably vary. :)
https://medium.com/@cipherpunk/efail-a-postmortem-4bef2cea4c08
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