George Levy:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Why, out of all possible experiences compatible with my existence, do I
only observe the ones that don't violate the assumption that the laws of
physics work the same way in all places and at all times?
There are two kinds of white rabbits: microscopic and mac
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Why, out of all possible experiences compatible with my existence, do
I only observe the ones that don't violate the assumption that the
laws of physics work the same way in all places and at all times?
There are two kinds of white rabbits: microscopic and macroscopic.
Micr
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Hal Finney wrote:
> >However, I prefer a model in which what we consider equally likely is
> >not patterns of matter, but the laws of physics and initial conditions
> >which generate a given universe. In this model, universes with simple
> >laws are far more likely than unive
- Original Message -
From: "Hal Finney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, January 09, 2004 3:24 PM
Subject: Peculiarities of our universe
> There are a couple of peculiarities of our universe which it would be
> nice if the All-Universe Hypothesis (AUH) could expla
Hal Finney wrote:
I think the problem with your argument is that you are assuming that all
physical arrangements of matter appended to the universe are equally
likely. And in that case, you are right that some random arrangement
would be far more likely than one which looks like an observer who ha
Chris Collins wrote:
This paradox has its origin in perception rather than fundamental
physics:
If I fill a huge jar with sugar and proteins and minerals and shake it,
there is no reason why I can't produce a talking rabbit, or even a unicorn
with two tails. Yet out out of the vast menagerie of
There are a couple of peculiarities of our universe which it would be
nice if the All-Universe Hypothesis (AUH) could explain, or at least
shed light on them.
One is the apparent paucity of life and intelligence in our universe.
This was first expressed as the Fermi Paradox, i.e., where are the al
John Collins writes:
> I described a special case of this in a posting on this list a while
> ago, suggesting that we're almost certainly not in a simulated, 'second
> order' universe: Basically, for every arrangement of matter you could append
> to our universe that would look like some creatu
This paradox has its origin in perception rather than fundamental physics:
If I fill a huge jar with sugar and proteins and minerals and shake it,
there is no reason why I can't produce a talking rabbit, or even a unicorn
with two tails. Yet out out of the vast menagerie of novel objects and
crea
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't think the word "universe" is a basic term. It is a sort
or deity for atheist. All my work can be seen as an attempt to mak
it more palatable in the comp frame.
Tegmark, imo, goes in the right direction, but seems unaware
of the difficulties mathematicians discovered wh
From: Eric Hawthorne <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Why no white talking rabbits?
Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2004 10:36:41 -0800
Hal Finney wrote:
What about a universe whose space-time was subject to all the same
physical laws as ours in all regions - except i
Hal Finney wrote:
What about a universe whose space-time was subject to all the same
physical laws as ours in all regions - except in the vicinity of rabbits?
And in those other regions some other laws applied which allow rabbits
to behave magically?
While this may be possible, we seem to have
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> At 09:45 09/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
>
> >Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > >
> > > At 11:34 08/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
> > >
> > > >I am very willing (maybe too much, that's part of the
> > > >problem) to accept a "Platonic existence" for *the* integers.
> >
At 09:45 09/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> At 11:34 08/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
>
> >I am very willing (maybe too much, that's part of the
> >problem) to accept a "Platonic existence" for *the* integers.
> >I am far from sure however that this does not invol
John M wrote:
>
> [...]
> If you consider (the) (your) universe, something according to YOUR
> current intuition what YOU have of it, then there is nothing else upon which
> you can "simulate" it. You definitely need something ELSE on which
> a simluation can be based. More than just your intuitio
Hal Finney wrote:
>
> Georges Quenot writes:
> > I would be interested in reading the opinions of the participants
> > about that point and about the sense that could be given to the
> > question of what "happens" (in the simulated universe) in any non-
> > synchronous simulation "when" the simula
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> At 11:34 08/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
>
> >I am very willing (maybe too much, that's part of the
> >problem) to accept a "Platonic existence" for *the* integers.
> >I am far from sure however that this does not involve a
> >significant amount of faith.
>
> Indee
Norman Samish :
>
> Max Tegmark, at http://207.70.190.98/toe.pdf, published in Annals of
> Physics, 270, 1-51 (1998), postulates that "all structures that exist
> mathematically exist also physically."
Max Tegmark postulated or conjectured even more in that paper:
that the distinction between mat
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