Jesse Mazer wrote:
[quoting Stathis]
You are one of 10 copies who are being tortured. The copies are all being
run in lockstep with each other, as would occur if 10 identical computers
were running 10 identical sentient programs. Assume that the torture is so
bad that death is preferable, and
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2005 05:26 PM
Subject: Re: more torture
>
> > > Saibal Mitra writes:
> > >
> > > >Because no such thing as free will exists one has to consider three
> > > >different u
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
If you impose the condition I discussed earlier that absolute
probabilities don't change over time, or in terms of my analogy, that the
water levels in each tank don't change because the total inflow rate to
each tank always matches the total out
Tom Caylor wrote:
Hal wrote:
>I actually think this is a philosphically defensible position. Why should
>one OM care about another, merely because they happen to be linked by
>a body? There's no a priori reason why an OM should sacrifice, it doesn't
>get any benefit by doing so.
>But I'll tell y
I wrote:
No, I don't think they don't all have to have the same volume,
Whoops, weird double negative here...that should read "I don't think they
all have to have the same volume".
Jesse
>Hal wrote: > >I actually think this is a philosphically defensible position. Why should > >one OM care about another, merely because they happen to be linked by > >a body? There's no a priori reason why an OM should sacrifice, it doesn't > >get any benefit by doing so. > >But I'll tell you why we
Someone forwarded the following Time Magazine article to another list:
> Time: Special Body and Mind Issue: The Science of Happiness
> January 17, 2005
>
> The New Science of Happiness;
> What makes the human heart sing? Researchers are taking a close look.
> What they've found may surprise you
>
I wanted to add a few points to my earlier posting about how to derive
OM measure in a Schmidhuberian multiverse model.
The method is basically to take all the universes where the OM appears
and to sum up the contribution they make to the OM measure. However,
the key idea is that this contributio
Hal wrote:
> I wanted to add a few points to my earlier posting about how
> to derive OM measure in a Schmidhuberian multiverse model.
>
> The method is basically to take all the universes where the
> OM appears and to sum up the contribution they make to the OM
> measure. However, the key id
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> I presume the answer is that rather than look at physical size/weight of our
> bodies, one must try to calculate the proportion of the universe's
> information content devoted to that part of our beings essential to being an
> observer (probably something to do with the am
Hal Finney wrote:
> > I presume the answer is that rather than look at physical
> size/weight
> > of our bodies, one must try to calculate the proportion of the
> > universe's information content devoted to that part of our beings
> > essential to being an observer (probably something to do
>
Dear Russell and Hal:
thanks for the compassionate speedy replies. I would be happy to cpomply
with Hal's advice, alas, I have no browser working yet(?), only the mailbox.
Cluttered with garbage. I didn't believe a friend who had similar troubles
when installing Symantec, I lost my cyberways by the
Title: Message
Quite often, when several of us talk about 'descriptions' and
'specifications' in relation to measure (or relative measure) of worlds, we are
also implicitly or explicitly referring to a corresponding underlying ontology
(so the world would not 'really' be made of 'concrete chu
Jonathan Colvin writes, regarding the Doomsday argument:
> There's a simple answer to that one. Presumably, a million years from now in
> the Galactic Empire, the Doomsday argument is no longer controversial, and
> it will not be a topic for debate. The fact that we are all debating the
> Doomsday
Hal wrote:
> Jonathan Colvin writes, regarding the Doomsday argument:
> > There's a simple answer to that one. Presumably, a million
> years from
> > now in the Galactic Empire, the Doomsday argument is no longer
> > controversial, and it will not be a topic for debate. The
> fact that we
> >
On Wed, Jun 15, 2005 at 06:05:16PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>
> Since it is coming from Nick B., over-exhaustive :)
> I don't think anybody, Nick included, has yet come up with a convincing way
> to define appropriate reference classes. Absent this, the only way to rescue
> the DA seems to b
Dear Jonathan,
Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form of dualism
require that one side of the duality has properties and behaviors that are
not constrained by the other side of the duality, as examplified by the idea
of "randomly emplaced souls"?
The idea that all dual
Tom Caylor wrote:
Stathis wrote:
> If you wander into the middle of one of our discussions, it might seem
that we've all forsaken common sense. As a general rule, bizarre-sounding
physical scenarios are proposed as "thought experiments", to explain,
explore or clarify a theory by applying it
At 11:03 AM 6/15/2005, Jesse Mazer wrote:
I wrote:
No, I don't think they don't all have to have the same volume,
Whoops, weird double negative here...that should read "I don't think they
all have to have the same volume".
Jesse
"must have"
"should have"
"are required to have"
RM
Russel Standish wrote:
>> Since it is coming from Nick B., over-exhaustive :) I don't think
>> anybody, Nick included, has yet come up with a convincing way to
>> define appropriate reference classes. Absent this, the only way to
>> rescue the DA seems to be a sort of dualism (randomly
>emplac
Title: Message
Alex Pruss wrote:
Remember that I am working in David Lewis's framework. Each world
is a physical object: a bunch of matter, connected
together spatiotemporally. So I do not need to work with
specifications, but with concrete chunks of stuff. There is nothing
fur
Stephen Paul King wrote:
>Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form
>of dualism require that one side of the duality has properties
>and behaviors that are not constrained by the other side of
>the duality, as examplified by the idea of "randomly emplaced souls"?
>The ide
rmiller wrote:
At 11:03 AM 6/15/2005, Jesse Mazer wrote:
I wrote:
No, I don't think they don't all have to have the same volume,
Whoops, weird double negative here...that should read "I don't think they
all have to have the same volume".
Jesse
"must have"
"should have"
"are required t
Russel Standish wrote:
>> It seems to me that to believe we are randomly emplaced
>souls, whether
>> or not they existed elsewhere beforehand, is to perforce embrace a
>> species of dualism.
>
>Exactly what species of dualism? Dualism usually means that
>minds and brains are distinct orthogonal
On Wed, Jun 15, 2005 at 10:02:19PM -0700, Brian Holtz wrote:
> Alex Pruss wrote:
>
> Remember that I am working in David Lewis's framework. Each world is a
> physical object: a bunch of matter, connected together spatiotemporally. So
> I do not need to work with specifications, but with concrete
On Wed, Jun 15, 2005 at 10:30:11PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>
> Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as "the mind (or consciousness) is separate
> from the body". Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
>
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that the fist
is separate from the
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