>-Original Message-
>From: Norman Samish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Monday, June 27, 2005 4:33 AM
>To: everything-list@eskimo.com
>Subject: Re: Have all possible events occurred?
>
>
>
>>>Norman Samish writes: Stathis, when you say "if you believe that
>>>everything possible exists
Stephen Paul King,
Thanks for your kind reply, which I am struggling with. You seem to be
saying that something can "exist" yet not "occur." Whether it "occurs"
depends on relations and context. Can you give me supporting information,
hopefully intelligible to one who does not have degree
At 11:07 PM 6/26/2005, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
R. Miller writes:
"Stathis Papaioannou" writes: Of course you are right: there is no way to
distinguish the original from the copy, given that the copying process works
as intended. And if you believe that everything possible exists, then there
>>Norman Samish writes: Stathis, when you say "if you believe that
>>everything possible exists" are you implying that everything possible need
>>NOT exist (thus refuting Tegmark)? Wouldn't this mean that space-time was
>>not infinite? What hypothesis could explain finite space-time?
>Brent
At 10:53 PM 6/26/2005, rmiller wrote:
At 03:44 PM 6/26/2005, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Richard,
Let me follow up on your suggestion: Assuming a "personality" is made
up of multiple modules,does it necessarily follow that a "hidden
observer" exist as a seperate entiry, or could it be th
R. Miller writes:
"Stathis Papaioannou" writes: Of course you are right: there is no way to
distinguish the original from the copy, given that the copying process
works
as intended. And if you believe that everything possible exists, then
there
will always be at least one version of you who
At 03:44 PM 6/26/2005, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Richard,
Let me follow up on your suggestion: Assuming a "personality" is made
up of multiple modules,does it necessarily follow that a "hidden
observer" exist as a seperate entiry, or could it be that the usual
single personality result
Stathis writes
> > same here; if you are interested in knowing what the
> > case is, and not merely what the appearances are, then you
> > have to understand that you are a physical process, and it
> > may so happen that you execute in different places, and in
> > different times, and that overlap
Lee Corbin writes:
The objective view, which brings us much more into alignment
with what is actually the case, is, as always, the third-person
point of view.
A good historical analogy is this: to really understand the
planets, moons, and sun, it was necessary to totally abandon
the Earth-centr
Jesse writes
> > It's *not* aesthetic whether, say, George Bush is you or not. He's
> > definitely not! He doesn't have your memories, for the first thing.
> > It's simply objectively true that some programs---or some clumps
> > of biological matter---are Jesse Mazur and others are not. (Even
> >
Norman Samish writes:
"Stathis Papaioannou" writes: Of course you are right: there is no way to
distinguish the original from the copy, given that the copying process
works
as intended. And if you believe that everything possible exists, then there
will always be at least one version of you w
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
> >I do not equate my identity with the matter that composes my body at
all.
> >I would say that my personal identity cannot be defined in a
> >communicable way, in the way I see it. I believe there is something
> >fundamental about consciousness.
>
> If you don't equate
Lee Corbin wrote:
Jesse writes
> > First, I think that it's important to remove the qualifier "identical"
> > here. Would two copies cease to be identical if one atom were out of
> > place?
>
> I meant something more like "running the same program"
Okay, that's fine.
> > On another tack, you
Jesse writes
> > First, I think that it's important to remove the qualifier "identical"
> > here. Would two copies cease to be identical if one atom were out of
> > place?
>
> I meant something more like "running the same program"
Okay, that's fine.
> > On another tack, you are the same person,
Dear Richard,
Let me follow up on your suggestion: Assuming a "personality" is made up
of multiple modules,does it necessarily follow that a "hidden observer"
exist as a seperate entiry, or could it be that the usual single personality
results from an entrainment (the modules become like os
Lee Corbin wrote:
Jesse writes
> Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> > If I, on the other hand, knew that this wonderful room was going to
> > be available to me on a specific date,... I would enthusiastically
> > pay a good fraction of my net worth for this opportunity.
> >
> >Why? Why would I do it? Beca
At 10:22 AM 6/26/2005, Norman Samish wrote:
"Stathis Papaioannou" writes: Of course you are right: there is no way to
distinguish the original from the copy, given that the copying process works
as intended. And if you believe that everything possible exists, then there
will always be at least
Jesse writes
> Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> > If I, on the other hand, knew that this wonderful room was going to
> > be available to me on a specific date,... I would enthusiastically
> > pay a good fraction of my net worth for this opportunity.
> >
> >Why? Why would I do it? Because logic grabs me b
Lee Corbin wrote:
If I, on the other hand, knew that this wonderful room was going to
be available to me on a specific date, I would collect all my favorite
movies, my best books, some certain chemicals that it is best not to
describe in detail, and would look forward to the most wonderful
after
Here is yet another delightful Stathis experiment that I fished up from
about ten days ago:
Hal wrote
> Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> > You find yourself in a locked room with no windows, and no memory of how
> > you
> > got there. The room is sparsely furnished: a chair, a desk, pen and paper,
Stathis has another good thought experiment.
> You are in a room strapped to an electric chair with a counter counting down
> from one minute. There are two buttons accessible to you on the chair,
> marked A and B. Pressing button A will cause the chair either to release
> you, with Pr=0.4, or
Bruno wrote
> Le 23-juin-05, ? 05:38, Lee Corbin a ?crit :
>
> > you *can* be in two places at the same time.
>
> From a third person pov: OK.
> From a first person pov: how?
Right. "From a first person... you cannot be." This further
illustrates the limitations of the first person account, i
Le 26-juin-05, à 08:47, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 03:25:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Perhaps. It depends of your definition of "OM", and of your
"everything" theory.
Let me tell you the "Lobian's answer": if I have a successor OM then
I
have a successor OM whi
Dear Norman,
You ask a very important question!
As I see it, we need to show that mere *existence* is equivalent to
"occurance". I would argue that "*occurance* is relational and contextual
and *existence* is not. Therefor, the mere a priori *existence* of all
possible OMs, Copies, Worl
Le 26-juin-05, à 08:47, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 03:25:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Perhaps. It depends of your definition of "OM", and of your
"everything" theory.
Let me tell you the "Lobian's answer": if I have a successor OM then I
have a successor OM which
"Stathis Papaioannou" writes: Of course you are right: there is no way to
distinguish the original from the copy, given that the copying process works
as intended. And if you believe that everything possible exists, then there
will always be at least one version of you who will definitely expe
Of course you are right: there is no way to distinguish the original from
the copy, given that the copying process works as intended. And if you
believe that everything possible exists, then there will always be at least
one version of you who will definitely experience whatever outcome you are
Le 26-juin-05, à 03:22, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Le Samedi 25 Juin 2005 18:51, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Not really because you assume our eyes are bounded. Any finite machine
running forever recurs but not infinite or universal one.
Bruno
Yes I assume my eyes are bounded... because they are
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 03:25:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Perhaps. It depends of your definition of "OM", and of your
> "everything" theory.
>
> Let me tell you the "Lobian's answer": if I have a successor OM then I
> have a successor OM which has no successor OM.
>
> OK, I am cheati
30 matches
Mail list logo
