Jesse Mazer writes:
[quoting Stathis Papaioannou]
Recent theory based on the work of Eric Kandel is that long term memory is
mediated by new protein synthesis in synapses, which modulates the
responsiveness of the synapse to neurotransmitter release; that is, it
isn't just the "wiring diagram"
George Levy wrote:
[quoting Stathis Papaioannou]
>I believe the level of detail required and the complexity of the
required models is grossly underestimated.
>Simply getting a 3D image of a brain down to electron microscopic
detail, including all the synaptic
>connections, woul
Lee Corbin writes:
[quoting Bruno Marchal]
> Why not choose D, that is "I will see 0 on the wall OR I will see 1
> on the wall."
Okay, now you have switched back to the prior (prediction)
level.
Here is the reason not to say that. As the person who is about
to be duplicated knows all the fact
On Sun, Jul 10, 2005 at 11:49:53PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >3) Combining General and Particular Architectures
> >Fusing information to combine apriori knowledge of general architecture
> >brain functions, and particular architecture data obtained from in situ
> >functional measuremen
Stathis writes
> > But if you answer "I will see 0 on the wall OR I will see 1 on the wall"
> > then it makes it sound as though one of those cases will obtain but
> > not the other. (This is usually how we talk when Bruno admits, for
> > example, that tonight he either will watch TV *or* he will
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Nevertheless, I still think it would be *extremely* difficult to emulate a
whole brain. Just about every physical parameter for each neuron would be
relevant, down to the atomic level. If any of these parameters are slightly
off, or if the mathematical model is sligh
I agree with Jesse. Nature (if that exists) build on redundancies. (As
the UD). So if the substitution level is at the neural neurons,
``slight" changes don't matter.
Of course we don't really know our substitution level. It is consistent
with comp the level is far lower. But then at that l
Hi stathis,
Le Dimanche 10 Juillet 2005 13:22, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Nevertheless, I still think
> it would be *extremely* difficult to emulate a whole brain.
while I agree with you about the difficulty to emulate a brain that already
exists (such as emulate you or me for example), I
Again travel has forced me to take an absence from this list for a while,
but I think I will be home for several weeks so hopefully I will be able
to catch up at last.
One question I would ask with regard to the role of time is, is there
something about time (and perhaps "causality") that goes ove
Hal Finney writes
> Can we imagine a universe like ours, which follows exactly the
> same natural laws, but where time doesn't really exist (in some
> sense), where there is no actual causality?
You yourself have already provided the key example in imagining
a two dimensional CA where the second
Hal Finney wrote:
So again, is it enough to look at the natural laws of our universe in
order to decide whether the consciousnesses within it are real? Or do we
need more? Can we imagine a universe like ours, which follows exactly the
same natural laws, but where time doesn't really exist (in
Jesse Mazer wrote:
[quoting Stathis Papaioannou]
Nevertheless, I still think it would be *extremely* difficult to emulate a
whole brain. Just about every physical parameter for each neuron would be
relevant, down to the atomic level. If any of these parameters are
slightly off, or if the mathe
Quentin Anciaux writes:
> Nevertheless, I still think
> it would be *extremely* difficult to emulate a whole brain.
while I agree with you about the difficulty to emulate a brain that already
exists (such as emulate you or me for example), I don't think it is as such
difficult as to emulate a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It is likely that multiple error correction and negative
feedback systems are in place to ensure that small changes are not
chaotically amplified to cause gross mental changes after a few seconds,
On the other hand, the above may be precisely how consciousness oper
Bruno asked a while back for various people to try to encapsulate
their favorite theory or model of the "everything exists" concept,
so I will try to describe my current views here.
Basically it can be summed up very simply as: Universal Distribution
(UD) plus ASSA (absolute self selection assumpt
Dear Johnathan,
I find this idea to be very appealing! It seesm to imply that
"consciousness" per say has more to do with the attractor in state space
that any particular tableaux of neutron firings.
This, of course, would not fit well with the material eliminativists to
be forced to ext
I wasn't very clear in my last post. What I meant was this:
(a) A conscious program written in C is compiled on a computer. The C
instructions are converted into binary code, and when this code is run, the
program is self-aware.
(b) The same conscious program is written in some idiosyncratic
Stathis writes
> I wasn't very clear in my last post. What I meant was this:
>
> (a) A conscious program written in C is compiled on a computer. The C
> instructions are converted into binary code, and when this code is run, the
> program is self-aware.
>
> (b) The same conscious program is wr
Jesse writes
> >So again, is it enough to look at the natural laws of our universe in
> >order to decide whether the consciousnesses within it are real? Or do we
> >need more? Can we imagine a universe like ours, which follows exactly the
> >same natural laws, but where time doesn't really exist
Lee Corbin wrote:
Jesse writes
>
> For me, it's not that I think it's meaningful to imagine a universe just
> like ours but without causality, rather it's that I think causality is
> probably important to deciding whether a particular system in our
universe
> counts as a valid "instantiation
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