Well yes, I suppose there is a set of assumptions about persons that
makes the argument work, the trouble is can we come up with a truly
believable set of assumptions? (My comment also on Jesse Mazer's post also).
This is good - it is delving deeper into Parfit's argument, exposing
subtle traps w
I meant that it makes intuitive sense that you *cannot* sequence
effectively on all computable growing functions.
Tom
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 26-mai-06, à 19:35, Tom Caylor a écrit :
> >
> > Bruno,
> > You are starting to perturb me! I guess that comes with the territory
> > where you're leading us.
>
> You should not worry too much. I confess I am putting your mind in the
> state of mathematicians before the
There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in terms
of qualia. These qualia are ultimately defined by the way neurons are
connected, but you could also think of persons in terms of the high-level
algorithm, instead of the ''machine language'' level algorithm specified by
the
Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
>On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through
> > non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all,
> > there is a continuous sequence of intermed
On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through
> non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all,
> there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a
> fertilized
L'esprit de l'escalier:
after reading my post below as an interesting
list-post it occurred that I left out an important
addage:
I may feel as the same person (self) in my earlier
life and situations - I do not IDENTIFY with 'it'. I
know: "it is me" but not "I am like that". Not even:
"I was like
I read the remark of Russell and Satathis's reply with
great interest.
Russell wrote (among others):
*
> > ...The change into
> > Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as
> >one would have to
> > pass through non-functional brain structures in
> >order to change from me to him.< <
*
refle
Russell Standish writes:
> >Even though it is very unlikely to happen in reality, it is easy
> > enough to imagine that the relatively minor physical/psychological
> > changes that have occurred in the past day are exaggerated, so that
> > instead of changing from me-yesterday to me-today, I chan
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