Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> [quoting Russell Standish]
>
The Game of Life is known to be Turing complete. However, I do not
think any arrangement of dots in GoL could be conscious. Rather there
is an arrangement that implements a universal dovetailer. The UD
Peter Jones writes:
[quoting Russell Standish]
> > > The Game of Life is known to be Turing complete. However, I do not
> > > think any arrangement of dots in GoL could be conscious. Rather there
> > > is an arrangement that implements a universal dovetailer. The UD is
> > > quite possibly enough
Peter Jone swrites:
> > What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
> > consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
> > be associated with consciousness -
>
>
> That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
> have to believe any old programme is cons
Peter Jones:
> > Theology is a subset of metaphysics. Metaphysics does not deal with
> > purely logical and/or empirical facts. T
>
> Metaphysics can. It depends on who is doing it.
>
> > his means you could come up with
> > any metaphysical theory consistent with the logical and empirical fact
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 21-août-06, à 16:23, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
> >>
> >>
> >>> If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
> >>
> >>
> >> I can hardly not agree with that.
> >>
> >>
> >>>
> >>> If numbers do not expl
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> No, it won't be bored because there is no way for it to know that it is going
> through the
> first or the second run. The point I was trying to make is that there is no
> real basis for
> distinguishing between a recording and a program,
There is a basis for di
Brent, you ask the tuppence (or million $) questions.
--- Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> asked:
1:> But is this different than trying to think of new
> models?<
Somebody suggested (on another list) that "MY" model
is the unlimited universe. I could not argue, yet it
is a "limited" model, since
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Brent wrote:
>
>>If you know the domain of your model there won't be any impact from
>
> beyond. Of course the domain is uncertain at the edges - but just because
> there is Grey doesn't mean there is no black and white.<
> Our views (I did not press: definition) of
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Various people write:
>>>
>>>
blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah
>>>
>>>But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in
>>>a recording at the moment?
>>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>
>>Le 24-août-06, à 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>
>>
I would say the multiple branches are needed to have any *stable*
conscious experience, i.e. to have conscious experience "with the
right
(relative) probabili
Brent wrote:
> If you know the domain of your model there won't be any impact from
beyond. Of course the domain is uncertain at the edges - but just because
there is Grey doesn't mean there is no black and white.<
Our views (I did not press: definition) of a "model' differs. Since I
consider th
Sorry Stathis, and especially Colin:
I clicked up this post only after having sent my previous reply about
metaphysics - not different from Colin's post which I missed.
Apologies
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Colin Geoffrey Hales"
Sent:
Stathis,
I don't feel like a 'defender of metaphysics', but what you talk about is
the physicists' pejorative (ironical) denigration of everything they do not
want to call "physics", - like superstition, fictional stupidity.
Also Bruno's wording about 'theology' is different from being part of tha
Thanks Bruno, for accepting my position about atheists. You just did not add
that 'this is why I don't call myself an atheist'.
Theology is well thought of in your explanation, however IMO it carries too
much historical baggage (garbage?) since ~500AD to "renew" peoples' thinking
about the meaning
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > > Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or notice
> > > that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the parallel
> > > branches
> > > in the multiverse suddenly vanished?
> > >
> >
> > I think
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
> consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
> be associated with consciousness -
That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
have to believe any old programme is conscious.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > >
> > > > > > All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
> > > > >
> > > > > True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
> > > >
> > > > Hence the
Le 25-août-06, à 01:01, Russell Standish a écrit :
> On Thu, Aug 24, 2006 at 09:04:26PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or
>> notice
>> that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the
>> parallel branches
Le 24-août-06, à 22:46, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> .. theology
>
> A much better pejorative!
I can understand, but I *strongly* disagree on this. "theology" has
been studied by the so called "rational mystics", which are also the
"greek philosopher/scientist" (but also by Chinese and
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > Various people write:
> >
> > > blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah
> >
> > But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in
> > a recording at the moment?
>
> The question is why you don't rega
Peter jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> > > > > All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
> > > >
> > > > True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
> > >
> > > Hence the need for a metaphysical account of
> > > matt
Russell Standish writes:
> > Is there any reason to believe that we would lose consciousness, or notice
> > that anything strange had happened at all, if most or all of the parallel
> > branches
> > in the multiverse suddenly vanished?
> >
>
> I think this question is ill-posed, but I'll t
You can use "meta" in that way if you like, but "metaphysics" is about as
deeply
ingrained in the language as any philosophical term can be. I think it was Hume
rather than Kant who started the anti-metaphysics movement:
"If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 24-août-06, à 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >> I would say the multiple branches are needed to have any *stable*
> >> conscious experience, i.e. to have conscious experience "with the
> >> right
> >> (relative) probabilities"
> >
> > It may as a matter of
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