On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
If the physical laws are turing emulable, then whatever is
responsible
for my consciousness can be Turing emulable at some level (I
On Aug 30, 7:23 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Aug 2009, at 07:06, marc.geddes wrote:
It’s true that there is no wave function collapse in Bohm, so it uses
the same math as Everett. But Bohm does not interpret the wave
function in ‘many world’ terms, in Bohm the wave
On Aug 30, 7:05 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
This does not make sense.
You said;
The truth of Gödel sentences are formally trivial.
The process of finding out its own Gödel sentence is
mechanical.
The diagonilization is constructive. Gödel's
proof is constructive. That is what
On 30 Aug 2009, at 10:12, marc.geddes wrote:
On Aug 30, 7:23 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Aug 2009, at 07:06, marc.geddes wrote:
It’s true that there is no wave function collapse in Bohm, so it
uses
the same math as Everett. But Bohm does not interpret the wave
On 30 Aug 2009, at 10:34, marc.geddes wrote:
On Aug 30, 7:05 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
This does not make sense.
You said;
The truth of Gödel sentences are formally trivial.
The process of finding out its own Gödel sentence is
mechanical.
The diagonilization is
On 30 Aug 2009, at 18:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not at all. Most theories can formally determined their Gödel
sentences, and even bet on them.
They can use them to transform themselves into more powerful, with
respect to probability, machines, inheriting new Gödel sentences, and
they can
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Ok, so you want to solve the hard problem right at the beginning by
taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.
No I don't - that's why I said I'd rather not use the word
consciousness. What I have in mind at this point in
2009/8/28 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
1. It seems reasonable that relations must have relata. However,
relata
need not have a rich set of properties. You could build a physical
universe out
a single type of particle and various relations.
What we're trying to get to here, remember,
On Aug 31, 4:55 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Aug 2009, at 10:34, marc.geddes wrote:
On Aug 30, 7:05 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
This does not make sense.
You said;
The truth of Gödel sentences are formally trivial.
The process of finding
On Aug 31, 4:19 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Aug 2009, at 10:12, marc.geddes wrote:
But look at this. I decide to do the following experience. I prepare
an electron so that it is in state up+down. I measure it in the base
{up, down}, and I decide to take holiday
marc.geddes wrote:
On Aug 31, 4:19 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Aug 2009, at 10:12, marc.geddes wrote:
But look at this. I decide to do the following experience. I prepare
an electron so that it is in state up+down. I measure it in the base
{up,
On Aug 31, 3:23 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
marc.geddes wrote:
A weakness of MWI is that it does not describe the reality we actually
see - additional steps are needed to convert wave function to human
observables - Bohm makes this clear, MWI just disguises it.
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