On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 9:39 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Jan 14, 4:41 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> > On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
> >
> > > Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
> > > zombies can't exist,
> >
> > I think the two ideas "zombie
On 1/14/2012 10:32 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/15/2012 1:07 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 6:21 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/14/2012 4:05 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 10:41 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I suppose that that is the case, but how do mathematical entities implement
On 1/15/2012 1:07 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 6:21 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/14/2012 4:05 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 10:41 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I suppose that that is the case, but how do mathematical
entities implement themselves other than via physical processes? W
On 1/14/2012 7:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 14, 4:55 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 11:38 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish
from a conscious person must be con
On 1/14/2012 6:21 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/14/2012 4:05 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 10:41 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I suppose that that is the case, but how do mathematical entities implement
themselves other than via physical processes? We seem to be thinking that this is a
s
On Jan 14, 4:55 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 1/14/2012 11:38 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
> > zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish
> > from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it i
On Jan 14, 4:41 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
> > zombies can't exist,
>
> I think the two ideas "zombies are impossible" and computationalism are
> independent. Where you mig
On 1/14/2012 4:05 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 10:41 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I suppose that that is the case, but how do mathematical entities
implement themselves other than via physical processes? We seem to be
thinking that this is a solvable "Chicken and Egg" problem and I
argue
On Sat, Jan 07, 2012 at 07:02:52AM +0200, acw wrote:
> On 1/6/2012 18:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >On 05 Jan 2012, at 11:02, acw wrote:
>
> Thanks for replying. I was worried my post was too big and few
> people will bother reading it due to size. I hope to read your
> opinion on the viability
On 1/14/2012 11:38 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish
from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is
impossible to create something that acts like a p
On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
> zombies can't exist,
I think the two ideas "zombies are impossible" and computationalism are
independent. Where you might say they are related is that a disbelief in
zomb
On 1/14/2012 10:41 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I suppose that that is the case, but how do mathematical entities implement
themselves other than via physical processes? We seem to be thinking that this is a
solvable "Chicken and Egg" problem and I argue that we cannot use the argument of
red
Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish
from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is
impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a
person. Zombies are not Tu
On 1/14/2012 1:15 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 14.01.2012 18:12 John Clark said the following:
On Fri, Jan 13, 2012 meekerdb wrote:
There is no way consciousness can have a direct Darwinian
advantage
so it must be a byproduct of something that does have that virtue,
and the obvious candidat
Hi David,
On 1/14/2012 12:51 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 14 January 2012 16:50, Stephen P. King wrote:
The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than by
invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter.
Sure, but do you mean to say that the interpreter must be ph
On 14.01.2012 18:12 John Clark said the following:
On Fri, Jan 13, 2012 meekerdb wrote:
There is no way consciousness can have a direct Darwinian
advantage
so it must be a byproduct of something that does have that virtue,
and the obvious candidate is intelligence.\
That's not so clear si
On 14.01.2012 17:56 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/14/2012 12:08 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 14.01.2012 03:06 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/13/2012 2:50 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.01.2012 22:36 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/13/2012 12:54 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
By t
On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> OK, but today we avoid the expression "computable number".
>
Why? Seems to me that quite a large number of people still use the term. A
computable number is a real number that can be computed to any finite
amount of digits by a Turing Machine, howeve
On 14 January 2012 16:50, Stephen P. King wrote:
> The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than by
> invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter.
Sure, but do you mean to say that the interpreter must be physical? I
don't see why. And yet, as you say, the
On Fri, Jan 13, 2012 meekerdb wrote:
> >> There is no way consciousness can have a direct Darwinian advantage
> so it must be a byproduct of something that does have that virtue, and the
> obvious candidate is intelligence.\
>
>
>
> That's not so clear since we don't know exactly what is the r
On 1/14/2012 12:08 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 14.01.2012 03:06 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/13/2012 2:50 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.01.2012 22:36 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/13/2012 12:54 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
By the way in the Gray's book the term intelligence is
Hi Bruno,
You seem to not understand the role that the physical plays at all!
This reminds me of an inversion of how most people cannot understand the
way that math is "abstract" and have to work very hard to understand
notions like "in principle a coffee cup is the same as a doughnut".
On 13 Jan 2012, at 17:30, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I am not entirely sure what you mean by computable numbers (I
guess you mean function).
A computable number is a number that can be approximated by a
computable function, and a computable function
On 14.01.2012 03:06 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/13/2012 2:50 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.01.2012 22:36 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/13/2012 12:54 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
By the way in the Gray's book the term intelligence is not even
in the index. This was the biggest s
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