On 11 Jun 2012, at 15:14, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 June 2012 13:19, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes worse. I am very sorry for my random spelling, which becomes
easily
phonetical when I type too fast.
It's only phonetical if you pronounce worth and worse the same way ;-)
Which illustrates tha
On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote:
>
> > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI
> > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a
> > new topic.
> > It seems to
On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 5:06 AM, John Mikes wrote:
> Stathis:
> in my simplicity: "free is free" and "pseudo" means "not really". So:
> pseudo-free will is not free (will), only something similar. Restricted by
> circumstances. Or so.
> I allow into my 'deterministically' constrained free will(!) a
On Thu, Jun 07, 2012 at 01:33:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> In fact we have p/p for any p. If you were correct we would have []p
> for any p.
This is what I thought you said the "meta-axiom" stated?
How else do we get p/[]p for Kripke semantics?
--
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On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:45:16 AM UTC-5, RAM wrote:
>
> But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact,
> about the subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine
> ourselves in exactly the same subjective situation and still think that we
> could have don
On Sun, Jun 10, 2012 at 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 09 Jun 2012, at 21:53, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno, Wei,
>
> I've been reading the book "saving truth from paradox" on and off, and it
> has convinced me of the importance of the "inside view" way of doing
> foundations research as o
On 6/11/2012 8:45 AM, R AM wrote:
But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact, about the
subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine ourselves in exactly the
same subjective situation and still think that we could have done otherwise.
I can certainly im
On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 7:34 PM, meekerdb wrote:
>
>>
> The answer must be relative to our (imperfect) knowledge. Since that
> knowledge is not sufficient to predict what he would do, we say "Yes, he
> could have done otherwise." In the same way we may say, "I know him well
> and he's not a pers
On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 5:34 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> OK, for the sake of the argument, let's suppose that you ate spaghetti
> because that's what you liked at that moment. Do you think you could have
> done otherwise?
>
> Now, let's
On 11 June 2012 16:27, meekerdb wrote:
That seems confused. The theory is that 'you' are some set of those states.
> If you introduce an external 'knower' you've lost the explanatory function
> of the theory.
>
Well, I'm referring to Hoyle's idea, which explicitly introduces such a
knower. But
On 6/11/2012 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to
say that
they are simul
On 6/11/2012 7:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Does it imply that we have an infinite number of levels between mind and
physics?
You can say that.
Imagine yourself in front of the UD. By the invariance of the first person experience
for the delays, you have to take into account all computations
On 6/11/2012 6:09 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It
seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it
will look like a special moment is chosen out of the others
On 11 Jun 2012, at 10:31, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.06.2012 18:49 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 09 Jun 2012, at 20:57, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
On the other hand, if I understand Bruno's theorem correctly a) and
b) imply quite different things. While a) brings no problem, b)
le
On 11 June 2012 13:19, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Yes worse. I am very sorry for my random spelling, which becomes easily
> phonetical when I type too fast.
It's only phonetical if you pronounce worth and worse the same way ;-)
David
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On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It
> seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it
> will look like a special moment is chosen out of the others, for the
> elementary reason that suc
On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote:
I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI
and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a
new topic.
It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality
(3p) only one observer, a single s
On 10 Jun 2012, at 23:00, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes it is possible. And "worth", it is necessary the case.
worse?
Yes worse. I am very sorry for my random spelling, which becomes
easily phonetical when I type too fast.
Sorry again,
Bruno
ht
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to
say that
they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some
Wonderful, thank you for the link.
On Monday, June 11, 2012 6:18:57 PM UTC+10, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
> On 11.06.2012 03:12 Pierz said the following:
> > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI
> > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a
On Monday, June 11, 2012 12:20:06 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
>
> On 6/10/2012 6:12 PM, Pierz wrote:
> > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and
> eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic.
> > It seems to me an obvious corollary of
On 10.06.2012 18:49 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 09 Jun 2012, at 20:57, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
On the other hand, if I understand Bruno's theorem correctly a) and
b) imply quite different things. While a) brings no problem, b)
leads to
arithmetic -> mind -> physics
That is, I a
On 11.06.2012 03:12 Pierz said the following:
I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI
and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a
new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is
in reality (3p) only one observer, a single s
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