On 28 May 2015 at 13:55, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 01:23:20PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> A stroke results in objective and subjective changes, such as the inability
>> to move a limb, understand language or see. These are gross examples of
>> "fading qualia". W
On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 01:23:20PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> A stroke results in objective and subjective changes, such as the inability
> to move a limb, understand language or see. These are gross examples of
> "fading qualia". What you are proposing, as I understand it, is that if t
On Thursday, May 28, 2015, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 11:22:59PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > But that is not what happens when brain tissue is destroyed, as in a
> > stroke. Qualia do actually fade, and entire sensory and
> > cognitive modalities fade, leaving
A small correction: I said "... and the unifying thread is the self-model
or ego. This allows for top-down control of attention." What I mean to
say is "This allows for a narrative of top-down control". It is not
actually clear that there is any such thing as top-down control, although
we routine
Language starts to get in the way here, but what you're suggesting is akin
to someone who is blind-drunk - they will have no memory of their
experience, but I think most would say a blind-drunk is conscious.
But I think the driving scenario is different in that my conscious
attention is elsewhere.
On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 08:22:58PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 2:17 AM, Russell Standish
> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 08:17:39PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> > > > Not at all. My suggestion is that there wouldn't be any partial
> > > > zombies, just normally funct
On 5/27/2015 7:06 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
In the driving scenario it is clear that computation is involved, because all sorts of
contingent things can be going on (e.g. dynamics of driving among other cars), yet this
occurs without crossing the threshold of consciousness. Relying on some kind
Are we any less conscious of as it happens, or perhaps our brains are
simply not forming as many memories of usual/uneventful tasks.
Jason
On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 9:06 PM, Terren Suydam
wrote:
> In the driving scenario it is clear that computation is involved, because
> all sorts of contingent
In the driving scenario it is clear that computation is involved, because
all sorts of contingent things can be going on (e.g. dynamics of driving
among other cars), yet this occurs without crossing the threshold of
consciousness. Relying on some kind of caching mechanism under such
circumstances w
On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 2:17 AM, Russell Standish
wrote:
> On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 08:17:39PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> > > Not at all. My suggestion is that there wouldn't be any partial
> > > zombies, just normally functioning consciousness, and full zombies,
> > > with respect to Chalmers fa
On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 11:22:59PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> But that is not what happens when brain tissue is destroyed, as in a
> stroke. Qualia do actually fade, and entire sensory and
> cognitive modalities fade, leaving others intact. What you are proposing is
Then perhaps we're
On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 06:28:58PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 27 May 2015, at 17:48, John Clark wrote:
>
> >On Wed, May 27, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >>> The Church-Turing thesis says something about intelligence but
> >not consciousness, it says that any real world computation, l
On Thursday, May 28, 2015 at 6:06:22 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
>
> On 5/26/2015 10:31 PM, Pierz wrote:
>
> Where I see lookup tables fail is that they seem to operate above the
>> probable necessary substation level. (Despite having the same
>> inputs/outputs at the higher levels).
>>
>>
On 5/26/2015 10:31 PM, Pierz wrote:
Where I see lookup tables fail is that they seem to operate above the
probable
necessary substation level. (Despite having the same inputs/outputs at the
higher
levels).
But your memoization example still makes a good point - namely that some co
I am not even involved in your conversation here, but I must, at least at this
point cheer on Stephen Wolfram. Although I am a bit disappointed that he did
not invent Wolframite. Here is a nice clip from Wkipedia.
Stephen Wolfram. In Chapter 9 of A New Kind of Science,[4] Stephen Wolfram
prese
2015-05-27 19:36 GMT+02:00 John Clark :
> On Wed, May 27, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > Citing Wolfram is a per-authority argument. That is not valid.
>>
>
> But citing Bruno Marchal as an authority is valid?? If you say one thing
> and Wolfram says another I'll put my money on Wolfram. Who wo
On 27 May 2015, at 18:18, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, May 26, 2015 spudboy100 via Everything List > wrote:
> You are proposing anyons, chilled to perfection, might be the seat
of non-biological consciousness?
The study of artificial consciousness is a game for dilettantes and
is a bit of
On Wed, May 27, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Citing Wolfram is a per-authority argument. That is not valid.
>
But citing Bruno Marchal as an authority is valid?? If you say one thing
and Wolfram says another I'll put my money on Wolfram. Who wouldn't?
John K Clark
--
You received this messa
On 27 May 2015, at 17:48, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, May 27, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The Church-Turing thesis says something about intelligence but
not consciousness, it says that any real world computation, like a
intelligent action, can be translated into a equivalent program on a
On Tue, May 26, 2015 spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> You are proposing anyons, chilled to perfection, might be the seat of
> non-biological consciousness?
>
The study of artificial consciousness is a game for dilettantes and is a
bit of a bore, but Ar
On Wed, May 27, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The Church-Turing thesis says something about intelligence but not
>> consciousness, it says that any real world computation, like a intelligent
>> action, can be translated into a equivalent program on a Turing machine.
>
>
> > Church thesis does not
On Wednesday, May 27, 2015, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 27, 2015, Russell Standish > wrote:
>
>> On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 08:17:39PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
>> > > Not at all. My suggestion is that there wouldn't be any partial
>> > > zombies, just normally functioning co
On Wednesday, May 27, 2015, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 08:17:39PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> > > Not at all. My suggestion is that there wouldn't be any partial
> > > zombies, just normally functioning consciousness, and full zombies,
> > > with respect to Chalmers fading
On 26 May 2015, at 22:32, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/26/2015 2:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 May 2015, at 06:59, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 26 May 2015 at 05:45, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
Of that I have no opinion because nobody knows what "comp" means,
l
On 26 May 2015, at 22:12, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/26/2015 1:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So you are claiming that it would be impossible to have a
conscious being that experienced a Newtonian universe - that this
would produce a logical contradiction?
With comp, yes. Precisely, it would refut
On 26 May 2015, at 18:03, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, May 26, 2015 , LizR wrote:
> Comp is the theory that consciousness is the product of Turing-
emulable processes
No that's computationalism, "comp" on the other hand is whatever
Bruno says it is, and that changes from day to day as circu
On 27 May 2015, at 09:00, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 12:31 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, May 27, 2015 at 11:27:26 AM UTC+10, Jason wrote:
On Mon, May 25, 2015 at 1:46 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 25 May 2015, at 02:06, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, May 24, 2015 at 3
On 27 May 2015, at 07:31, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, May 27, 2015 at 11:27:26 AM UTC+10, Jason wrote:
On Mon, May 25, 2015 at 1:46 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 25 May 2015, at 02:06, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, May 24, 2015 at 3:52 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 23 May 2015, at 17:
On 27 May 2015, at 03:27, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, May 25, 2015 at 1:46 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 25 May 2015, at 02:06, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, May 24, 2015 at 3:52 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 23 May 2015, at 17:07, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 12:44 PM
On 26 May 2015, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/26/2015 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 May 2015, at 22:49, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/25/2015 5:16 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Monday, May 25, 2015 at 4:58:53 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 5/24/2015 4:09 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Sunday, May 24, 2015 at 4:
On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 08:17:39PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> > Not at all. My suggestion is that there wouldn't be any partial
> > zombies, just normally functioning consciousness, and full zombies,
> > with respect to Chalmers fading qualia experiment, due to network effects.
> >
>
> Doesn't th
On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 12:31 AM, Pierz wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 27, 2015 at 11:27:26 AM UTC+10, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 25, 2015 at 1:46 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 25 May 2015, at 02:06, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, May 24, 2015 at 3:52 AM, Bruno Mar
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