Metaphysics made simple

2016-07-29 Thread Brent Meeker
How to solve the problem of identity: http://existentialcomics.com/comic/121 Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-29 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> No idea what " two 3-1 "I" " is and very much doubt it is worth >> knowing. > > > See preceding posts. I tried that. It didn't help. >> If computationalism is correct then everything about "you" can >> be

Re: Holiday Exercise

2016-07-29 Thread Brent Meeker
On 7/28/2016 11:41 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why does it need to be defined? Why not recognize it is not a well defined concept...like the end of a road. We need operational legal definitions as to when a person is still competent to make decisions about themselves...and those are pretty

Re: Holiday Exercise

2016-07-29 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 10:32 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > ​> ​ > It's not the duplication that is supposed to produce another person, ​That's right, and the reason is the duplicating machine duplicates everything about you, not almost everything, *EVERYTHING*. So there are

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-29 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 28 Jul 2016, at 21:56, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​there are two 3-1 "I", ​No idea what ​ ​"​two 3-1 "I"​ " is ​and very much doubt it is worth knowing. See preceding posts. ​> ​Turing emulable telepathy. ​No

Re: Holiday Exercise

2016-07-29 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 28 Jul 2016, at 20:18, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 8:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​>​>> ​ ​"I" designates the M guy experience in Moscow, and the W experience of the W-guy in W. ​>> ​​I know, and that's why that personal pronoun is ambiguous ​ ​>

Re: Holiday Exercise

2016-07-29 Thread Bruce Kellett
On 29/07/2016 4:30 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 11:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 3:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: But they are not "one person". Although they share the same memories of before the duplication that have different memories afterward. According to that

Re: Holiday Exercise

2016-07-29 Thread Brent Meeker
On 7/28/2016 11:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 3:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 10:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the

Re: Holiday Exercise

2016-07-29 Thread Bruce Kellett
On 29/07/2016 3:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 10:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the duplicates become different persons because of the

Re: Holiday Exercise

2016-07-29 Thread Brent Meeker
On 7/28/2016 10:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote: If computationalism ​ is