On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> No idea what " two 3-1 "I" " is and very much doubt it is worth >> knowing. > > > See preceding posts. I tried that. It didn't help. >> If computationalism is correct then everything about "you" can >> be duplicated as long at the atoms have the correct position and velocity, >> not almost everything, not everything except for the 1-view, *EVERYTHING* >> ! > > > Let us imagine you are correct. If everything is duplicated, the whole > computational histories are duplicated. Yes > > Above you agree that the W-experience and the M-experience are different, Certainly. Only a fool would disagree. > > but if the device duplicates every thing, It does if computationalism is correct, and I think it is. > we should then have two experiences in W and two experiences in M, but > then again. That is not the case, so we get a contradiction, and you were > wrong. Oh for heaven's sake! Obviously they’re identical when the duplication is made, but after that they can and will differ if they see different things, like different cities. And what's with this two experiences in W stuff? If I stepped into the duplicating machine in Helsinki and then do it again in Washington then there would be 2 bodies in Washington that looked just like me, but there would still only be one person until one of the bodies saw an aspect of Washington and formed a memory the other didn't have. > > Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of > view, with or without computationalism. If computationalism is true and if Charles Darwin was right then the correct arrangement of atoms can indeed duplicate a first person view from its first person point of view. Otherwise no. > It just does not make any sense. No it would make perfect sense, it's just that if a first person view from its first person point of view were duplicated then things would be odd, not logically inconsistent not physically impossible, just odd. And the reason your "proof" is worthless is that very near that beginning the assumption is made that things can't be odd. But things can be odd. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
