On 24 Sep, 18:17, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> >> But this is the very hinge of disagreement. CTM's Trojan Horse is the
> >> incoherence of its posit of materialism.
>
> > Accordign to whom?
>
> >>It's demonstrably as
&
On 24 Sep, 18:16, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> >> > You seem to be assuming a workign MGA
>
> >> Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical
> >> intelligibility of CTM,
>
> > I haven't seen you giv
On 24 Sep, 17:34, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 24 Sep, 16:16, "david.nyman" wrote:
> > > 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> > > > Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think
&g
On 24 Sep, 16:16, "david.nyman" wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> > Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think
> > physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM
> > +structure.
> > The difference is th
On 24 Sep, 16:48, David Nyman wrote:
> On Sep 24, 9:39 am, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> Could you either
> >> state clearly what work this label is supposed to do, beyond the posit
> >> of AR on an abductive basis that we have already agreed on, or drop
> &g
On 24 Sep, 16:01, "david.nyman" wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> >> AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a
> >> priori truth. The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the
> >> consequence of a reasoned argument. T
On 24 Sep, 14:32, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> >> If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold
> >> that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular
> >> computational types.
>
>
On 24 Sep, 14:50, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> > Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists
> > tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM
> > has no trouble explaining how people play chess.
>
On 24 Sep, 14:32, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> >> If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold
> >> that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular
> >> computational types.
>
>
On 24 Sep, 07:25, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > CTM has enough physical commitment to keep a whole
> > bunch of phsycalists happy. In fact i can;t see many
> > Ai research types being happy at retaining CTM only if phsycical
> > realism is abandoned. But then it is a moot point
> > since the MGA an
On 24 Sep, 02:28, David Nyman wrote:
> On Sep 22, 1:10 pm, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > > No it's what a program is... Would you be different if instantiated on a
> > > x86
> > > computer than on an ARM based one ?
>
> > There's a diff
On 24 Sep, 02:10, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/23 Flammarion :
>
> >> I thought you had denied that you were seeking some
> >> ultimate metaphysically primitive justification, rather than defining
> >> a particular set of constraints on the theoretical
On 24 Sep, 01:19, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/23 Flammarion :
>
>
>
> >> > > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> >> > > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> >>
On 24 Sep, 09:14, Flammarion wrote:
> On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> > 2009/9/23 Flammarion :
>
> > >> >>You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
> > >> >> cause consciousness. But did you also
On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/23 Flammarion :
>
>
>
> >> >>You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
> >> >> cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
> >> >> the rea
On 23 Sep, 08:00, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 23:47, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> Well little problem in gmail sorry.
>
> >> So I do it again /o\
>
> >> Sorry I wanted to
On 23 Sep, 03:20, Brent Meeker wrote:
> David Nyman wrote:
inherent in MR.
>
> Such a theory is available. It is the evolutionary account of the
> development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio,
> Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett. Knowing the physical function of a
> specie
On 23 Sep, 02:06, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
> >> So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
> >> argument?
>
> > I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
>
> >>You concluded that t
On 23 Sep, 16:10, David Nyman wrote:
> On Sep 22, 7:47 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> > > Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is
> > > obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that
> > > it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciou
On 23 Sep, 15:33, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 23 Sep 2009, at 10:39, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> >> Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why
> >> does it organize into living being if it is propertyless?
>
> > It only lacks essenti
On 23 Sep, 13:12, David Nyman wrote:
> >> Bruno argues that an experiential-computational type can't be
> >> plausibly associated with one of its valid physical tokens in at least
> >> one case.
>
> > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> > UD. That is not possibl
On 23 Sep, 07:06, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 19:07, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>> On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>>>>> You have
On 23 Sep, 06:59, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 20:15, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> 2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
> >>> On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman wrote:
> >>>> On Se
On 22 Sep, 19:56, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
> > since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
> > to stop qualia being attached to it. If there were, that would
> > be a property.
>
> In what might such attachment consist
On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Well little problem in gmail sorry.
>
> So I do it again /o\
>
> Sorry I wanted to write "it does *add* nothing".
>
> Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can
> relate physically running a program on a computer, and run
On 13 Sep, 17:51, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/11 Flammarion :
>
> >> I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the
> >> realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause
> >> consciousness, that would entail th
On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>
> > > The level "0" has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
> >
On 1 Sep, 18:35, David Nyman wrote:
> What this shows is that CTM and comp are not different, but rather
> that comp is CTM properly understood. Its 'supervention' on
> virtualisation - i.e. a bottomless stack as perceived from inside -
> means that demanding that it further supervene on dist
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
> The level "0" has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
> by a computational observer (us if CTM is true).
If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism,
it is testable because "small world" materia
On 22 Sep, 19:08, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman wrote:
> > > On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > > > There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>
> > > What do you mea
On 21 Sep, 08:58, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 20 Sep 2009, at 02:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
> > So does being "pure thought" mean "without a reference", i.e. a
> > fiction? As in "Sherlock Holmes" is a pure thought?
>
> Consider the Many world theory of Everett, or the many histories of
> com
On 22 Sep, 17:52, David Nyman wrote:
> On Sep 22, 4:46 pm, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > There is no problem attaching consc to PM.
>
> What do you mean by this?
since PM notoriously has no intrinisc properties, there is nothing
to stop qualia being attached to it. If there wer
On 22 Sep, 17:16, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an im
> > On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>>> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
> >>>> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>
> >>&g
On 22 Sep, 16:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial
> > UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities.
>
> You are in a third person way.
That is sti
On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
> >> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>
> > "Instead of linking [the
On 22 Sep, 15:10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 10:50, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > No he doesn't. His arguments have to assume Platonism as
> > well as CTM.
>
> CTM needs Church thesis (to define the C of CTM). This requires
> Arithmetical Realism, t
On 22 Sep, 14:37, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
> >> But surely what is 'literally' the case depends critically on one's
> >> starting assumptions. If one starts with a theoretical commitment to
> >> the primacy of the physical,
On 22 Sep, 13:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Is mathematic dependant on human being from your point of view ?
>
> That's what I understand.
Yes, exactly.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything L
On 22 Sep, 12:59, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists
> > > (mathematically) independantly of any of it's
On 22 Sep, 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> It does show that you're nothing more than a program... which exists
> (mathematically) independantly of any of it's instantiation.
Such existence is blatant Platonism.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message be
On 18 Sep, 08:33, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I start from pure cognitive science. Saying "yes" to the doctor is not
> pure math.
Saying yes to the doctor does not show
that i am being run on an immateial UD.
The existence of an immaterial UD needs
to be argued separately.
--~--~-~--~--
On 18 Sep, 00:31, David Nyman wrote:
> On Sep 17, 11:17 pm, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > > Has it? I thought we were discussing whether CTM made any meaningful
> > > commitments as a physical theory, not whether physics can or can't
> > > include consciousne
On 18 Sep, 00:26, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/17 Flammarion :
>
> > Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it
> > is ontological.
>
> > Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure
> > maths.
> >
On 16 Sep, 18:52, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 16 Sep 2009, at 17:25, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 16 Sep, 15:51, "m.a." wrote:
> >> the ocean of virtual particles which may give
> >> rise to all "real" particles exists somewhere bet
On 17 Sep, 17:35, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/17 Bruno Marchal :
>
> > Then for the inside/personal views, the whole of human math including
> > Cantor paradise cannot be enough to describe the human mind. It is
> > more general:
>
> In that case, what light does the comp approach shed on the '
On 17 Sep, 14:12, "m.a." wrote:
> - Original Message -----
> From: "Flammarion"
> To: "Everything List"
> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 6:17 AM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
> > On 16 Sep, 21:42, &quo
On 17 Sep, 00:02, David Nyman wrote:
> Has it? I thought we were discussing whether CTM made any meaningful
> commitments as a physical theory, not whether physics can or can't
> include consciousness per se. Now you raise the question, I don't
> believe it can, simply because in common with
On 17 Sep, 00:52, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/16 Flammarion :
>
> > The knowabilitry of a claim about what powers numbers
> > have can only depend on what labels are correctly attached.
> > Petrol is not flammable just becaue I attached the label
> > "flam
On 16 Sep, 21:42, "m.a." wrote:
> - Original Message -----
> From: "Flammarion"
> To: "Everything List"
> Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2009 11:25 AM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
> > On 16 Sep, 15:51, "m
On 16 Sep, 16:02, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/16 Flammarion
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 16 Sep, 14:58, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion
>
> > > > On 16 Sep, 13:49, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > > > 2009/9/16 Fla
On 16 Sep, 15:51, "m.a." wrote:
> the ocean of virtual particles which may give
> rise to all "real" particles exists somewhere between matter and thought.
I see no reason to believe that
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_particle
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You
On 16 Sep, 14:58, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/16 Flammarion
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 16 Sep, 13:49, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion
>
> > > > On 16 Sep, 13:30, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > > > 2009/9/16
On 16 Sep, 13:49, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/16 Flammarion
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 16 Sep, 13:30, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion
>
> > > > On 16 Sep, 12:54, David Nyman wrote:
> > > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion :
On 16 Sep, 13:30, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/16 Flammarion
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 16 Sep, 12:54, David Nyman wrote:
> > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion :
>
> > > >> I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
> > >
On 16 Sep, 12:54, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/16 Flammarion :
>
> >> I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
> >> between numbers existing mathematically and numbers existing
> >> Platonically, other than that different labels a
On 16 Sep, 01:48, "m.a." wrote:
> - Original Message -----
> From: "Flammarion"
> To: "Everything List"
> Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2009 10:46 AM
> Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology
>
> > On 15 Sep, 15:19,
On 15 Sep, 19:21, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/14 Flammarion :
>
> >> They don't exist physically. They do exist mathematically. It is all
> >> what is used.
>
> > You mean they exist Platonically. For formlalists,
> > such "existence" is a
On 15 Sep, 15:19, "m.a." wrote:
> A modest question. What's left of materialism (to even argue about) when
> orthodox theoretical physics itself sees the world in terms of virtual
> particles and one-dimensional strings? m.a.
What makes you think they are not material?
--~--~-~--
On 13 Sep, 09:02, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 12 Sep 2009, at 16:42, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 11 Sep, 19:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 11 Sep 2009, at 17:45, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> Once you say "yes" to the doctor, there i
On 13 Sep, 18:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Marty,
>
> >Could you please clarify to a non-mathematician why the
> > principle of excluded middle is so central to your thesis (hopefully
> > without using acronyms like AUDA, UD etc.).
>
> Without the excluded middle (A or not A), or with
On 11 Sep, 19:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 11 Sep 2009, at 17:45, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 4 Sep, 22:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 04 Sep 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> ... Bruno has been arguign that numbers
> >&
On 4 Sep, 22:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 04 Sep 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > ... Bruno has been arguign that numbers
> > exist because there are true mathematical statements asserting their
> > existence. The counterargument is that "existence"
On 10 Sep, 23:09, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/10 Brent Meeker :
>
> > But isn't that because the "computational" in CTM is abstracted away
> > from a context in which there is action and purpose. It's the same
> > problem that leads to the question, "Does a rock compute every
> > function?" W
On 10 Sep, 14:56, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/9 Flammarion :
>
> >> What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio
> >> arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation.
>
> > It is strictly an argument against the claim that
> >
On 9 Sep, 01:39, David Nyman wrote:
> > 1. Computationalism in general associates that consciousness with a
> > specific comptuer programme, programme C let's say.
> > 2. Let us combine that with the further claim that programme C
> > causes cosnciousness, somehow leveraging the physical c
On 3 Sep, 17:12, John Mikes wrote:
> I am fundamentally opposed to 'ontology', because I consider it explaining
> the partial knowledge we have about 'the world' as if it were the total.
How much we don't know is somehting we don't know.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
On 3 Sep, 17:12, John Mikes wrote:
> Dear Peter,
> the Yablo-Carnac-Gallois-Quine compendium is an interesting reading - except
> for missing the crux:
> You, as a person, with knowledge about the ideas of the bickering
> philosophers, could do us the politesse of a brief summary about "who is
On 3 Sep, 09:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/3 Flammarion :
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 3 Sep, 01:26, David Nyman wrote:
> >> 2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>
> >> >> and is thus not any particular physical
> >> >> object. A specific physical
On 2 Sep, 21:20, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>
> > i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to
> > the question
>
> Well, a computation is a type,
A type of computation is a type.
A token of a type of computation is a token
On 2 Sep, 18:03, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Flammarion wrote:
>
> > On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> >> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> >>> I think his exploration of
> >>> the constraints on our actions in "Freed
On 2 Sep, 17:56, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>
> >> I wonder what you mean by "either physically realized or in Platonia"?
> >> ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation
> >> is restricted to the s
On 2 Sep, 16:56, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker :
>
> > But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional
> > relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different
> > at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a
> >
On 2 Sep, 16:58, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>
> >> Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative
> >> character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious
> >> fact that such 'frozen' capsules
On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> > I think his exploration of
> > the constraints on our actions in "Freedom Evolves" is pretty much on
> > the money.
>
> So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I
> have read so
On 1 Sep, 23:48, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need
> > anythign more for the specious present than a "snapshop" some of
> > which is out of date?
>
&g
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>
>
>
>
>
> > David Nyman wrote:
> >> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
> >>> to show that CTM does not necessari
On 31 Aug, 21:31, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 31 Aug 2009, at 19:31, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 28 Aug, 16:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal wrote:
&
On 31 Aug, 19:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 31 Aug 2009, at 19:15, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> >> When discussing fundamental science, no use of the word "exist"
> >> should
> >> be taken literally.
>
> > Fine. Then I am not literally b
On 1 Sep, 17:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:11, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> That's another version of Platonia and
On 1 Sep, 17:29, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion wrote:
>
> There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
> on:
>
> > OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
> > specifically to access consciousn
On 1 Sep, 16:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> >>
On 1 Sep, 16:32, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 15:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> > wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> > If there is nothing at the bottom
> > of the
On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> >>>> On 1 Sep, 13
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> >> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>>> That is the point. I should say that my starting po
On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> >> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> > >That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> >> >
On 1 Sep, 14:40, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 12:04, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > Yeah. Or you could just answer my questions.
>
> The problem is the world of assumption contained in your use of
> "just".
Really?
>There is no possibility of a context-fr
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > >That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> > > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
> > > the basis of any consistent not
On 1 Sep, 13:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> Can't matter have processes?
>
> >> But in t
On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 30 Aug 2009, at 23:21, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> > 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>
> >> Ok, so you want to solve the "hard problem" right at the beginning by
> >> taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.
>
> > No I don't - that's
On 31 Aug, 15:38, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 31 Aug 2009, at 15:47, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
On 1 Sep, 12:26, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
> >> follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
> >> basis of that assumption. If you prefer a t
On 1 Sep, 11:19, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> Peter, I've considered whether anything is to be gained from my
> responding further, and much as I regret coming to this conclusion, I
> don't think we can make any further progress together on this topic
On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > Can't matter have processes?
>
> But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
> matter have processes. You said yourself that primary matter is
> proper
On 1 Sep, 11:16, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Exactly,
> if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it
> is being simulated on "the level 0" of the real (if there is one).
>
> There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual
> machine running on a virtual
On 1 Sep, 11:09, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >> This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
> >> superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
> >> dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
>
> >
On 1 Sep, 10:58, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> > I think you should be more concerned about the long passages
> > I am not commenting on. That is becuase I find them completely
> > incomprehensible.
>
> In that case you may wish to reconsider
On 1 Sep, 00:09, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/31 Flammarion :
>
> > That says nothing about qualia at all.
>
> It would be helpful if we could deal with one issue at a time. Most
> of the passage you commented on was intended - essentially at your
> provocation - as a c
On 1 Sep, 00:46, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/31 Flammarion :
>
> >> It's more an attempt to characterise our
> >> metaphysical *situation*: i.e. the intuition that it is enduring,
> >> immediate, self-referential and self-relative. Actually, reflecting
On 1 Sep, 01:21, David Nyman wrote:
> On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > I would not put AR on the same par as PM(*).
>
> > I know that Peter have problem with this, but AR does not commit you
> > ontologically. It is just the idea that arithmetical propositions are
> > either true o
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