On 4/1/2012 14:33, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain
you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you
have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks
about game physics got me thinking about this
On 4/2/2012 00:43, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Apr 01, 2012 at 02:33:44PM +0100, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain
you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you
have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My
On 3/12/2012 05:50, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Mar 8, 2012 at 1:52 PM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Do they really have to state that they assume existence exists?
You mean that primary matter exists? Yes that is an hypothesis.
So your complaint is that a biologist like
On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/11/2012 8:30 PM, acw wrote:
On 3/12/2012 00:39, meekerdb wrote:
This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity
of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means
that physics is fundamental to our
On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote:
On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is
such that there always exists a standard what is the Real version? If
it is not possible to tell
On 3/12/2012 09:41, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/12/2012 3:49 AM, acw wrote:
On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote:
On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual
On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote:
This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole
point of the exercise.
I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of
subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail
100% determinacy,
On 3/12/2012 00:39, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote:
On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote:
This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the
whole
point of the exercise.
I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of
subjective experience
John Clark, it seems to me that you're intentionally ignoring the 1p
(first person) point of view (qualia or subjective experience) and one's
expectations from that point of view.
To follow UDA and get COMP's conclusions you need these assumptions:
Mind (1p), Mechanism (surviving a digital
On 3/6/2012 06:59, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/5/2012 9:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 10:42 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/5/2012 8:28 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 7:24 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes
not completely Turing emulable.
But it makes them enough
On 3/1/2012 18:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/1/2012 9:57 AM, acw wrote:
On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical
On 3/1/2012 19:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/1/2012 10:39 AM, acw wrote:
On 3/1/2012 18:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/1/2012 9:57 AM, acw wrote:
On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno
On 3/2/2012 03:37, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 7:14 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/1/2012 9:27 AM, Bob Zannelli wrote:
The Relativity of Existence
Authors: Stuart
Heinrichhttp://arxiv.org/find/physics/1/au:+Heinrich_S/0/1/0/all/0/1
Subjects: History and
On 2/21/2012 02:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 20, 2:53 pm, acwa...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 2/20/2012 18:37, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 20, 10:32 am,
acwa...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 19, 11:57 pm,
1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Feb
On 2/24/2012 20:51, Terren Suydam wrote:
On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 3:30 PM, Terren Suydamterren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 2:27 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/24/2012 10:26 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
I certainly will. In the meantime, do you have an example
On 2/24/2012 22:20, Terren Suydam wrote:
On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 4:47 PM, acwa...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 2/24/2012 20:51, Terren Suydam wrote:
On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 3:30 PM, Terren Suydamterren.suy...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 2:27 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net
On 2/22/2012 14:49, Terren Suydam wrote:
However I don't understand how Mary could have anything but a single
continuation given the determinism of the sim. How could a
counterfactual arise in this thought experiment? Can you give a
concrete example?
Mary's brain/SIM implementation is
On 2/22/2012 17:17, marty684 wrote:
Bruno,
If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP) which can express
states to an arbitrary degree of precision, is there any room for chance or
probability? And if so, how do they arise? (If you've been over this before,
please refer me to
On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
..
Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
still aren't reality
It doesn't matter if they believe in the
On 2/20/2012 18:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 20, 10:32 am, acwa...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 19, 11:57 pm,
1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.comwrote:
On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
..
Believable falsehoods are
On 2/20/2012 03:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:
If I am a simulation, and a programmer watches 'me' and can intervene
and change my program and the program of my universe at will, then to
me they are a true God, and I would be well advised to pray to them.
I think you might be misunderstanding
On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote:
[SPK]
Interesting. How then do we explain the fact that humans suffer all
kinds of computational errors such as schizophrenia, dismorphia, etc. We
intentionally lie... The list of computationally erroneous behavior of
the brain is almost endless. How
On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote:
[SPK]
Interesting. How then do we explain the fact that humans suffer all
kinds of computational errors such as schizophrenia, dismorphia, etc. We
intentionally lie
On 2/16/2012 17:58, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote:
[SPK]
Interesting. How then do we explain the fact that humans suffer all
kinds of computational
On 2/16/2012 19:09, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 1:16 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 17:58, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote:
[SPK]
Interesting
On 2/16/2012 19:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2012 10:16 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 17:58, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote:
[SPK]
Interesting. How
On 2/16/2012 20:40, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 2:32 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2012 11:09 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility
that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It
would be helpful if we first
On 2/16/2012 22:37, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2012 1:00 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 20:40, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 2:32 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2012 11:09 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility
that the brain can
On 2/16/2012 23:08, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 3:06 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 19:09, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 1:16 PM, acw wrote:
The assumption in COMP is that a subst. level exists, it's the main
assumption! What does that practically mean? That you can eventually
On 2/14/2012 13:45, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/14/2012 5:13 AM, acw wrote:
How does the existence on an entity determine its properties? Please
answer this question. What do soundness and consistency even mean
when there does not exist an unassailable way of defining what they are?
Look
On 2/14/2012 05:57, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/13/2012 11:18 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/14/2012 02:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/13/2012 5:27 PM, acw wrote:
[SPK] There is a problem with this though b/c
it assumes that the field is pre-existing; it is the same as the
block
universe idea
On 2/12/2012 15:48, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/11/2012 5:15 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/11/2012 05:49, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
I think the idea of Platonia is closer to the fact that if a
sentence
has a truth-value, it will have that truth value, regardless if you
know
On 2/12/2012 17:29, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Folks,
I would like to bring the following to your attention. I think that we
do need to revisit this problem.
http://lesswrong.com/lw/19d/the_anthropic_trilemma/
The Anthropic Trilemma
http://lesswrong.com/lw/19d/the_anthropic_trilemma/
On 2/14/2012 02:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/13/2012 5:27 PM, acw wrote:
[SPK] There is a problem with this though b/c
it assumes that the field is pre-existing; it is the same as the block
universe idea that Andrew Soltau and others are wrestling with.
Why is a pre-existing field so
On 2/14/2012 03:00, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/13/2012 5:54 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/12/2012 17:29, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Folks,
I would like to bring the following to your attention. I think that we
do need to revisit this problem.
http://lesswrong.com/lw/19d/the_anthropic_trilemma
On 2/10/2012 13:54, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
[SPK]
I do not see how this deals effectively with the concurrency problem!
:-( Using the Platonia idea is a cheat as it is explicitly unphysical.
But physics by itself does not explain consciousness either (as shown
On 2/10/2012 14:01, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
Another way to think of it would be in the terms of the Church Turing
Thesis, where you expect that a computation (in the Turing sense) to
have result and that result is independent of all your
implementations
On 2/11/2012 05:49, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
I think the idea of Platonia is closer to the fact that if a sentence
has a truth-value, it will have that truth value, regardless if you
know it or not.
Sure, but it is not just you to whom a given sentence may have
On 2/11/2012 06:32, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi ACW,
Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!!
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion),
that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However,
let's try and see
On 2/7/2012 06:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/6/2012 9:55 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/7/2012 05:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/6/2012 5:37 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/7/2012 00:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/6/2012 3:50 PM, acw wrote:
I'm not so sure to term ``body'' is as meaningful if we consider the
extremes which seem
On 2/7/2012 06:15, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/6/2012 6:50 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/6/2012 06:25, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi ACW,
On 2/4/2012 1:53 PM, acw wrote:
snip
Before reading the UDA, I used to think that something like Tegmark's
solution would be general enough and sufficient, but now I
On 2/6/2012 06:25, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi ACW,
On 2/4/2012 1:53 PM, acw wrote:
One can wonder what is the most general theory that we can postulate
to explain our existence. Tegmark postulates all of consistent
mathematics, whatever that is, but is 'all of consistent mathematics
On 2/7/2012 00:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/6/2012 3:50 PM, acw wrote:
I'm not so sure to term ``body'' is as meaningful if we consider the
extremes which seem possible in COMP. After a digital substitution, a
body could very well be some software running somewhere, on any kind
of substrate
On 2/7/2012 05:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/6/2012 5:37 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/7/2012 00:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/6/2012 3:50 PM, acw wrote:
I'm not so sure to term ``body'' is as meaningful if we consider the
extremes which seem possible in COMP. After a digital substitution, a
body could very well
On 2/4/2012 14:38, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/4/2012 8:58 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 February 2012 12:22, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
No, I am not. I bet that comp is TRUE, but I don't see COMP as requiring
that the physical world is supervening on numbers (up to
isomorphisms) as
On 1/31/2012 14:28, Pierz wrote:
I'll tell you a campfire story of my own. One day my grandmother was
going to drive my mother home across town. We were at my gran's place
at the time and a close friend of mine was present. As they were about
to leave, my friend went suddenly pale. She said
On 1/31/2012 18:44, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we close our eyes, we still see visual noise, even in total
darkness. If qualia were based on computation, we should expect that
no sensory input should equate to total blackness, since there is no
information to report. Since we can dream or
On 1/31/2012 19:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 31, 12:45 pm, acwa...@lavabit.com wrote:
A digital or analog camera would get similar amounts of noise as the
eye, actually probably less than the eye.
Why do you say that? Have you ever taken a photo with the lens cap on?
First, the eyes
On 1/27/2012 15:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 27, 12:49 am, acwa...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 1/27/2012 05:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jan 26, 9:32 pm,
acwa...@lavabit.com wrote:
There is nothing on the display except transitions of pixels. There is
nothing in the universe, except
On 1/26/2012 08:19, Pierz wrote:
As I continue to ponder the UDA, I keep coming back to a niggling
doubt that an arithmetical ontology can ever really give a
satisfactory explanation of qualia. It seems to me that imputing
qualia to calculations (indeed consciousness at all, thought that may
be
On 1/27/2012 03:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 26, 5:52 pm, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On Jan 26, 1:19 am, Pierzpier...@gmail.com wrote:
of my own here: no properties can emerge from a complex system that
are not present in primitive form in the parts of that system.
On 1/27/2012 05:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 26, 9:32 pm, acwa...@lavabit.com wrote:
There is nothing on the display except transitions of pixels. There is
nothing in the universe, except transitions of states
Only if you assume that our experience of the universe is not part of
the
, acw wrote:
On 1/10/2012 17:48, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jan 2012, at 12:58, acw wrote:
On 1/10/2012 12:03, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Jan 2012, at 19:36, acw wrote:
To put it more simply: if Church Turing Thesis(CTT) is correct,
mathematics is the same for any system or being you can
On 1/10/2012 17:48, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jan 2012, at 12:58, acw wrote:
On 1/10/2012 12:03, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Jan 2012, at 19:36, acw wrote:
To put it more simply: if Church Turing Thesis(CTT) is correct,
mathematics is the same for any system or being you can imagine
, acw wrote:
On 1/10/2012 17:48, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jan 2012, at 12:58, acw wrote:
On 1/10/2012 12:03, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Jan 2012, at 19:36, acw wrote:
To put it more simply: if Church Turing Thesis(CTT) is correct,
mathematics is the same for any system or being you can
On 1/10/2012 12:03, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Jan 2012, at 19:36, acw wrote:
On 1/9/2012 19:54, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 9, 12:00 pm, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 09 Jan 2012, at 14:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 9, 6:06 am, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I
On 1/9/2012 19:54, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 9, 12:00 pm, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 09 Jan 2012, at 14:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 9, 6:06 am, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I agree with your general reply to Craig, but I disagree that
computations are
On 1/6/2012 18:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Jan 2012, at 11:02, acw wrote:
Hello everything-list, this is my first post here, but I've been
reading this list for at least half a year, and I'm afraid this post
will be a bit long as it contains many thoughts I've had on my mind
for quite some
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