On 2/16/2012 20:40, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 2:32 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/16/2012 11:09 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility
that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It
would be helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine is
capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I am pretty well
convinced that it cannot based on all that I have studied of QM and
its implications.
This where the paradox of the philosophical zombie arises. It seems
pretty certain that a TM, given the right program, can exhibit
intelligence. So can we then deny that it is conscious based on
unobservable quantum entanglements (i.e. those that make its
computation classical)?
Brent
So is intelligence and consciousness, ala having 1p, qualia and all that
subjective experience stuff, the same thing in your mind?
Surely they must be related. If not, you do indeed get the p. zombie
problem: someone who acts in all respects like a different person with
(assumed) consciousness, indistinguishable in behavior, yet without
consciousness. The question boils down to: let's say you knew some
person well, they one day got a digital brain transplant, they still
behave more or less as you remember them, do you think they are now
without consciousness or merely that their consciousness is a bit
changed due to different quantum entanglements?
Onward!
Stephen
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