On 05 Oct 2013, at 03:07, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2013 2:14 PM, LizR wrote:
On 5 October 2013 06:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
He comes to this because he's *defined* Knightian uncertainty as
radical unpredictability without randomness.
I don't see why it doesn't entail
I'm still slogging through Scott Aaronson's paper, and have now reached
page 37. It looks as though there are still lots of interesting matters to
be discussed, but there is something I already have a problem with that
seems central to what he is saying, namely what is the significance
On 10/4/2013 6:15 AM, LizR wrote:
I'm still slogging through Scott Aaronson's paper, and have now reached page 37. It
looks as though there are still lots of interesting matters to be discussed, but there
is something I already have a problem with that seems central to what he is saying
On 5 October 2013 06:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
He comes to this because he's *defined* Knightian uncertainty as radical
unpredictability without randomness.
I don't see why it doesn't entail randomness, especially if it comes from
quantum fluctuations during the big bang. But
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 02:15:47AM +1300, LizR wrote:
I'm still slogging through Scott Aaronson's paper, and have now reached
page 37. It looks as though there are still lots of interesting matters to
be discussed, but there is something I already have a problem with that
seems central to what
On 10/4/2013 2:14 PM, LizR wrote:
On 5 October 2013 06:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
He comes to this because he's *defined* Knightian uncertainty as radical
unpredictability without randomness.
I don't see why it doesn't entail randomness,
On 30 Sep 2013, at 03:17, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/29/2013 2:03 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Citeren meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 9/29/2013 6:26 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
...
Also, you can run the copy inside a virtual environment and then
the copies will never diverge.
?? I don't
On 30 Sep 2013, at 02:58, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 07:33:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree that free-will is related to a lack of predictibity.
It is not related to any indeterminacy due to superposition or
duplication, as this only would only made the will
of that potential explanation, any
subsequent reasoning that relies on Bell's Inequality is
potentially flawed.
I have just now finished Aaronson's paper. I would thoroughly
recommend the read, and it is definitely a challenge to John Clark's
assertion that only rubbish has ever been written about free
explanation,
any
subsequent reasoning that relies on Bell's Inequality is
potentially flawed.
I have just now finished Aaronson's paper. I would thoroughly
recommend the read, and it is definitely a challenge to John Clark's
assertion that only rubbish has ever been written about free
is a
shame because without taking account of that potential explanation, any
subsequent reasoning that relies on Bell's Inequality is potentially flawed.
I have just now finished Aaronson's paper. I would thoroughly
recommend the read, and it is definitely a challenge to John Clark's
assertion that only
physics - doesn't merit a mention, which is a
shame because without taking account of that potential explanation, any
subsequent reasoning that relies on Bell's Inequality is
potentially flawed.
I have just now finished Aaronson's paper. I would thoroughly
recommend the read, and it is definitely
On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 07:33:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree that free-will is related to a lack of predictibity.
It is not related to any indeterminacy due to superposition or
duplication, as this only would only made the will more slave, to
randomness, instead of of pondering
On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the
will is random in its essence. There is no self-other distinction
between the will and the random source.
I don't see this. The random source here
On 9/29/2013 2:03 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Citeren meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 9/29/2013 6:26 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
...
Also, you can run the copy inside a virtual environment and then the copies will never
diverge.
?? I don't think so. Insofar as they are classical objects
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 02:03:15PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the
will is random in its essence. There is no self-other distinction
between the will and the
On 30 September 2013 14:26, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
I'm complete missing your point here??? The self-other distinction is a
1p thing, not part of physics at all. There are no persons in
physics. Even when talking about the self-other distinction in (say)
bacteria, it is
On 9/29/2013 5:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 07:33:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree that free-will is related to a lack of predictibity.
It is not related to any indeterminacy due to superposition or
duplication, as this only would only made the will more
On 9/29/2013 6:03 PM, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the
will is random in its essence. There is no self-other distinction
between
On 30 September 2013 16:18, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 9/29/2013 6:03 PM, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:
The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the
will is random in its essence. There is no
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 04:39:28PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 16:18, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 9/29/2013 6:03 PM, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:
The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to
On 9/29/2013 8:39 PM, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 16:18, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 9/29/2013 6:03 PM, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
The
On 30 September 2013 16:59, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
Throwing dice inside my head is part of me, part of the entity
making the decision, using a dice thrown externally to me is just
abrogating my free will to an external agent.
Sorry I still don't see the diference, if
On 30 September 2013 16:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I think it's just definitional. What constitutes you. If you see
someone else throw dice and you're bound to follow different actions
depending on how they fall then you're a slave to randomness. If you
decide to throw the
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 02:30:59PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 14:26, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
I'm complete missing your point here??? The self-other distinction is a
1p thing, not part of physics at all. There are no persons in
physics. Even when
on Bell's Inequality is potentially flawed.
I have just now finished Aaronson's paper. I would thoroughly
recommend the read, and it is definitely a challenge to John Clark's
assertion that only rubbish has ever been written about free will.
However it is a long paper (more of a short book), so
reasoning that relies on Bell's Inequality is potentially flawed.
I have just now finished Aaronson's paper. I would thoroughly
recommend the read, and it is definitely a challenge to John Clark's
assertion that only rubbish has ever been written about free will.
However it is a long paper (more
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