that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA.
Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind. Then
the probability the original went to Mars is 1.
The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a
step 5 case. The probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2
.
This, in my opinion, illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA.
Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind. Then the probability
the original went to Mars is 1.
The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a step 5 case. The
probability
for n
experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a
probability near one to go quickly on Mars.
Bruno,
Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend
to get back to it later, but I had a strange
try again and again, and again ... You are the
observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see
the guy
who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2,
staying on
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter
the guy who got
the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry
Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as
a probability near one to go quickly on Mars.
Bruno,
Thanks for your very detailed
.
Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind. Then the probability the
original went to Mars is 1.
The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a step 5 case. The
probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2.
Everybody feels they are the original. The question
, you can of course only see the guy who got the
feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n
experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience).
Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go
quickly on Mars.
Bruno,
Thanks
, and
again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you
can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely
unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has
probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the
infinite iteration, the guy
, and the version of earth
complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer,
and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the
feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n
experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter
are the
observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see
the guy
who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2,
staying on
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter
experience). Assuming the infinite
to be infinitely
unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has
probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the
infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly
on Mars.
Bruno,
Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend
the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely
unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has
probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the
infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly
on Mars.
Bruno,
Thanks for your very detailed
... You are the observer, and from your point of
view,
you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely
unlucky,
as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n
(that the
Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy
, and again ... You are the observer, and from
your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got
the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry
Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy
experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience).
Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go
quickly on Mars.
Bruno,
Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get
back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading
the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P =
1/2,
staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry
Potter
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near
one to
go quickly on Mars.
Bruno,
Thanks for your very
the guy who got the feeling to be
infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n
experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a
probability near one to go quickly on Mars.
Bruno,
Thanks for your very
On 19 Nov 2010, at 22:37, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/19/2010 6:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Nov 2010, at 06:10, Rex Allen wrote:
In this case, if we had sufficient mental capacity there would no
need
to think in terms of trees or forests - we could think exclusively
in
terms
On Nov 18, 5:10 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Nov 16, 2010 at 5:38 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Nov 16, 3:27 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
If logic and reason reduce to causal laws, then ultimately causal laws
alone explain the result.
On 11/19/2010 6:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Nov 2010, at 06:10, Rex Allen wrote:
In this case, if we had sufficient mental capacity there would no need
to think in terms of trees or forests - we could think exclusively in
terms quarks, electrons, photons, and whatnot. Thinking in
On Nov 16, 5:50 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 15 Nov 2010, at 20:24, 1Z wrote:
On Nov 14, 11:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 14 Nov 2010, at 19:39, 1Z wrote:
On Nov 11, 12:54 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Nov 9, 2010 at 3:53
On 17 Nov 2010, at 12:27, 1Z wrote:
On Nov 16, 5:50 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 15 Nov 2010, at 20:24, 1Z wrote:
On Nov 14, 11:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 14 Nov 2010, at 19:39, 1Z wrote:
On Nov 11, 12:54 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com
On Tue, Nov 16, 2010 at 5:38 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Nov 16, 3:27 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
If logic and reason reduce to causal laws, then ultimately causal laws
alone explain the result.
If causal explanation and rational explanation
are categoreally
On Nov 16, 3:27 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
Logical and rational are adjectives. You're confusing descriptive
labels with causal forces.
Your argument still doesn't work. You re tacitly assuming that
being the result of causal laws is exclusive of being the result
On 16 Nov 2010, at 04:51, Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Nov 14, 2010 at 6:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
? Are you saying that it is obvious that compatibilism is false?
Compatibilism is false. Unless you do something sneaky like change
the meaning of the term free will to make
On Nov 14, 11:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 14 Nov 2010, at 19:39, 1Z wrote:
On Nov 11, 12:54 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Nov 9, 2010 at 3:53 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Nov 4, 4:40 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Nov 14, 2010 at 1:39 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Nov 11, 12:54 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
It follows by definition.
1. IF a universe governed by causal laws -
2. THEN everything that occurs within that universe is a result of
those laws acting on the
On Sun, Nov 14, 2010 at 6:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
? Are you saying that it is obvious that compatibilism is false?
Compatibilism is false. Unless you do something sneaky like change
the meaning of the term free will to make it true.
Which is like changing the definition
On 11 Nov 2010, at 02:37, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/10/2010 4:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
snip
Put succinctly, if we have knowledge we must accept beliefs only
because we understand them to be true; but if determinism is correct,
then we automatically accept whatever beliefs that our constituent
On Nov 11, 12:54 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Nov 9, 2010 at 3:53 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Nov 4, 4:40 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
If an entity exists in a universe that is subject to unchanging causal
laws, how can it have justified
is what it is purely contingently, it could change at any moment. The
persistence of the laws of the universe seems consequently to break
all laws of probability: for if the laws are effectively contingent,
it seems that they must frequently manifest such contingency If the
duration of laws does
On Sun, Nov 14, 2010 at 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 11 Nov 2010, at 02:37, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/10/2010 4:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
Bryan Caplan:
Put succinctly, if we have knowledge we must accept beliefs only
because we understand them to be true; but if
On 14 Nov 2010, at 19:39, 1Z wrote:
On Nov 11, 12:54 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Nov 9, 2010 at 3:53 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Nov 4, 4:40 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
If an entity exists in a universe that is subject to unchanging
On 14 Nov 2010, at 22:17, Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Nov 14, 2010 at 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 11 Nov 2010, at 02:37, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/10/2010 4:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
Bryan Caplan:
Put succinctly, if we have knowledge we must accept beliefs only
On Sun, Nov 14, 2010 at 6:26 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 14 Nov 2010, at 22:17, Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Nov 14, 2010 at 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
We have good reason to believe that our brains are not so bad dynamical
mirror of the most probable
On 11/11/2010 10:43 AM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 8:37 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 11/10/2010 4:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
Once you give up free choice, you're left with skepticism.
Bryan Caplan had an interesting comment on this:
Now it is a fact that
On Tue, Nov 9, 2010 at 3:53 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Nov 4, 4:40 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
If an entity exists in a universe that is subject to unchanging causal
laws, how can it have justified true beliefs (a.k.a. knowledge)
either?
If the entity's beliefs
On 11/10/2010 4:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Nov 9, 2010 at 3:53 PM, 1Zpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Nov 4, 4:40 am, Rex Allenrexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
If an entity exists in a universe that is subject to unchanging causal
laws, how can it have justified true beliefs
On Nov 4, 4:40 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Nov 3, 2010 at 5:50 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net
wrote:
On Tue, Nov 2, 2010 at 8:24 PM, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
if laws were contingent, they would change so frequently, so
explanation or reason.
I didn't mean luck in the sense of probability...which implies that
there is some mechanism that causes some possible worlds to be
instantiated, but not others.
As Meillassoux says:
To demonstrate why laws, if they can change, have not done so
frequently, thus comes down
Dear Rex,
-Original Message-
From: Rex Allen
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 12:40 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Probability, Necessity, and Infinity
On Wed, Nov 3, 2010 at 5:50 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net
wrote:
On Tue, Nov 2, 2010 at 8:24 PM
On Wed, Nov 3, 2010 at 5:50 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On Tue, Nov 2, 2010 at 8:24 PM, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote:
if laws were contingent, they would change so frequently, so
frenetically, that we would never be able to grasp anything
whatsoever, because
~Zero probability is an essential property of existence.
It is not possible to obtain self-identity until/once more then one
instances of self-referencing entity/system exists. It may be
presented as an unique binary sub-string of minimal length to be found
in huge/(infinite?) binary ring. Thus
Anna,
I wanted to write positively to your posts, procrastinated it though and
others took it up.
Now I want to reflect to one word, I use differently:
*MODEL*
There are several 'models', the mathematical (or simple physical) metaphor
of a different subject is one, not to mention
If I may,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory
The basic concept is that every model is composed of a set of elements, a
set of n-ary relations between them, a set of constants and symbols, plus a
set of axiomatic sentences to define it. It's been a few years since my
mathematical logic MSc
I am realizing that I don't have time to get into this. I assume that
your use of the word model is equivalent to theory.
Er, no. I mean a foundational mathematical model which includes at
least one set representative of the multiverse, or at the very least a
countable transitive submodel
Capable of supporting implies some physical laws that connect an
environment and sapient beings. In an arbitrary list universe, the
occurrence of sapience might be just another arbitrary entry in the list
(like Boltzman brains). And what about the rules of inference? Do we
This is true.
A. Wolf wrote:
Capable of supporting implies some physical laws that connect an
environment and sapient beings. In an arbitrary list universe, the
occurrence of sapience might be just another arbitrary entry in the list
(like Boltzman brains). And what about the rules of inference? Do we
I'm well aware of relativity. But I don't see how you can invoke it when
discussing all possible, i.e. non-contradictory, universes. Neither do I see
that list of states universes would be a teeny subset of all mathematically
consistent universes. On the contrary, it would be very large.
A. Wolf wrote:
I'm well aware of relativity. But I don't see how you can invoke it when
discussing all possible, i.e. non-contradictory, universes. Neither do I see
that list of states universes would be a teeny subset of all mathematically
consistent universes. On the contrary, it would
So long as it is not self-contradictory I can make it an axiom of a
mathematical
basis. It may not be very interesting mathematics to postulate:
Axiom 1: There is a purple cow momentarily appearing to Anna and then
vanishing.
I fear this is not an axiom of a mathematical basis. :)
The
A. Wolf wrote:
So long as it is not self-contradictory I can make it an axiom of a
mathematical
basis. It may not be very interesting mathematics to postulate:
Axiom 1: There is a purple cow momentarily appearing to Anna and then
vanishing.
I fear this is not an axiom of a
2008/11/9 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
A. Wolf wrote:
I can if there's no rule of inference. Perhaps that's crux. You are
requiring
that a mathematical structure be a set of axioms *plus* the usual rules of
inference for and, or, every, any,...and maybe the axiom of choice
too.
A. Wolf wrote:
I can if there's no rule of inference. Perhaps that's crux. You are
requiring
that a mathematical structure be a set of axioms *plus* the usual rules of
inference for and, or, every, any,...and maybe the axiom of choice
too.
Rules of inference can be derived from the
On Sat, Nov 8, 2008 at 8:41 PM, Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
To infer means there is a process which permits to infer.. if there
is none... then you can't simply infer something.
The process itself arises naturally from the universe of sets
guaranteed by the axioms of set theory.
What is your objection to the existence of list-universes? Are they not
internally consistent mathematical structures? Are you claiming that
whatever
the list is, rules of inference can be derived (using what process?) and
thence
they will be found to be inconsistent?
You're rally
Well by your definition a universe is consistent (the inconsistent ones don't
exist). So given a universe we could look at it as a list of states if it
could
be foliated by some parameter (which we might identify as time).
The inconsistent ones don't exist, but an abstract description of
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
To infer means there is a process which permits to infer.. if there
is none... then you can't simply infer something.
Right. So you can't infer a contradiction.
Brent
2008/11/9 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/11/9 Brent Meeker [EMAIL
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/11/9 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
A. Wolf wrote:
I can if there's no rule of inference. Perhaps that's crux. You are
requiring
that a mathematical structure be a set of axioms *plus* the usual rules
of
inference for and, or, every, any,...and maybe the
A. Wolf wrote:
What is your objection to the existence of list-universes? Are they not
internally consistent mathematical structures? Are you claiming that
whatever
the list is, rules of inference can be derived (using what process?) and
thence
they will be found to be inconsistent?
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Also... a list consisting of A exists and A does not exists is
consistent to you ?
No, that would be inconsistent.
Could I infer A exsits or A does not exists from this list ? If I
takes the states separately, there is no contradiction... but If I
take the states
To infer means there is a process which permits to infer.. if there
is none... then you can't simply infer something.
2008/11/9 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/11/9 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
A. Wolf wrote:
I can if there's no rule of inference. Perhaps
Thomas,
MW must be some how different from the same concept in everyday
language? In the latter probably just means likely to happen but
if EVERYTHING happens then how can the concept make sense? I guess it
must be two different concepts, then?
I wouldn't say so. Always look at the word
Thomas,
epistemic state of an agent, or in the proverbial 10-year-old's
words, knowledge of the state of affairs from a certain point of
view. This is the Bayesian interpretation of probability.
EVERYTHING happens can be interpreted as an expression in terms of
the frequentist interpretation
. This is the Bayesian interpretation of probability.
EVERYTHING happens can be interpreted as an expression in terms of
the frequentist interpretation of probability. As I see it (of
course), EVERYTHING happens is the epistemic state of, or
knowledge from the point of view of, the Plenitude
domains
can have probability distributions in a conceptual sense.
Anna
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about whether we can assume there is a
universe where I wore a red sweater instead of a blue one today. I
would certainly guess that the probability of this happening is
nonzero, but I have no way of confirming that there exists a
particular model containing this state which is non-contradictory
] wrote:
Anna's explanation was from the frequentist side.
Gunther's was from the Bayesian side.
I actually agree with the Bayesian point of view, but I was trying to
avoid injecting expectation into a description of how infinite domains
can have probability distributions in a conceptual sense
(By the way, the personal God is the only one in whom a
person can possibly believe, but that could be another topic.)
Absolutist statements make proof by contradiction easy. :)
Anna
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You received this message because you are subscribed
My interpretation/intent of my below statement is a simple logically
consistent statement, akin to saying that a person's subjective point
of view is subjective, or more closely, a person's point of view is
personal (i.e. from the point of view of a person), or 1+1=2. Not all
absolutist
today. I
would certainly guess that the probability of this happening is
nonzero, but I have no way of confirming that there exists a
particular model containing this state which is non-contradictory.
Certainly the model couldn't be identical to the current universe I'm
in, because I don't
... or akin to this from the QTI thread:
In the standard view, believing in
philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for
there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every
physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think
that's
On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 1:05 PM, Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My interpretation/intent of my below statement is a simple logically
consistent statement, akin to saying that a person's subjective point
of view is subjective, or more closely, a person's point of view is
personal (i.e.
On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 1:07 PM, Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I like this topic. I will think about it a little first.
By the way, is your use of blue and red a metaphor for Obama and
McCain? ;)
Wow. :)
Subconciously, perhaps in part. But it's mainly because the last pair
of
Hin
2008/11/7 Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Anna, OK, I understand.
Thomas, as another reference point for study, what I refer to as the
point of view from the Plenitude, or Plotinus' One, has frequently
been referred to as the God's eye point of view.
(I didn't bring that up at first
frequencies.
In my view probability theory is a mathematical model and it is useful
precisely because it applies (not necessarily exactly, but as a good
approximation) to things. So one switches between relative frequency,
propensity, and subjective interpretations in a single problem.
Brent
.
It also raises the question about whether we can assume there is a
universe where I wore a red sweater instead of a blue one today. I
would certainly guess that the probability of this happening is
nonzero, but I have no way of confirming that there exists a
particular model containing
On Nov 7, 11:11 am, A. Wolf [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 1:05 PM, Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My interpretation/intent of my below statement is a simple logically
consistent statement, akin to saying that a person's subjective point
of view is subjective, or
If you don't require some mathematical model of evolution of states
determining what happens in a Markovian way (like a Schroedinger eqn for
example) then one consistent mathematical model is just a list:... Anna
wore a red sweater on 6 Nov 2008, Anna wore a blue sweater on 7 Nov
2008, Anna
A. Wolf wrote:
If you don't require some mathematical model of evolution of states
determining what happens in a Markovian way (like a Schroedinger eqn for
example) then one consistent mathematical model is just a list:... Anna
wore a red sweater on 6 Nov 2008, Anna wore a blue sweater on 7
Does model imply a theory which predicts the evolution of states
(possibly probabilistic) so that the state of universe yesterday limits
what might exist today?
No. Model means a mathematical object. One specific, unchanging,
crystalline object you can hold in your hand and look at from a
A. Wolf wrote:
Does model imply a theory which predicts the evolution of states
(possibly probabilistic) so that the state of universe yesterday limits
what might exist today?
No. Model means a mathematical object. One specific, unchanging,
crystalline object you can hold in your
But not a logical contradiction. It would just contradict our assumed
model of physics, i.e. a nomological contradiction.
I realize I can't give a concrete example from physics due to the lack of
total human understanding, so it is difficult to get across the exact point.
If we presume that
A. Wolf wrote:
But not a logical contradiction. It would just contradict our assumed
model of physics, i.e. a nomological contradiction.
I realize I can't give a concrete example from physics due to the lack of
total human understanding, so it is difficult to get across the exact
So universes that consisted just of lists of (state_i)(state_i+1)...
would exist, where a state might or might not have an implicate time value.
Of course, but would something that arbitrary be capable of supporting
the kind of self-referential behavior necessary for sapience?
Anna
/ must exist.
It also raises the question about whether we can assume there is a
universe where I wore a red sweater instead of a blue one today. I
would certainly guess that the probability of this happening is
nonzero, but I have no way of confirming that there exists a
particular model
A. Wolf wrote:
So universes that consisted just of lists of (state_i)(state_i+1)...
would exist, where a state might or might not have an implicate time value.
Of course, but would something that arbitrary be capable of supporting
the kind of self-referential behavior necessary for
Many thanks for your fine answers, and patience with an ignorant.
When I said probability I meant from the frequentist side, or from
what Tegmark has called bird's point of view (which I guess
corospond to what Tom calls God's point of view, - whether or not
one believes) But the subjective
since it's a sequence of trillions and trillions of
real (micro-)events.
PS.
Of course a macro-event is also real but it's not a fundamental
event, and therefore the concept probability must be USED differently
here, even though the concept itself is the same. Does that sound
right
On 06 Nov 2008, at 02:37, Thomas Laursen wrote:
Hi everyone, I am a complete layman but still got the illusion that
maybe one day I would be able to understand the probability part of MW
if explained in a simple way. I know it's the most controversal part
of MW and that there are several
At 10:54 AM 11/6/2008, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Nov 2008, at 02:37, Thomas Laursen wrote:
Hi everyone, I am a complete layman but still got the illusion that
maybe one day I would be able to understand the probability part of MW
if explained in a simple way. I know it's the most
Many thanks for your answers, Anna and Bruno. Although I don't grap
much since I'm not familiar with maths or physics on a higher level.
Like rmiller suggests: consider me as an bright child (age 41 :-) But
maybe probability in MW is not really explainabel in everyday
language? First of all, I
language? In the latter probably just means likely to happen but
if EVERYTHING happens then how can the concept make sense? I guess it
must be two different concepts, then?
No, not necessarily.
There are two ways that probability can play a real role in MW.
This is no different from how
Hi
I haven't contributed to the list recently but probability is a topic
that interests me and which I discussed several years ago. I have a
relativist interpretation of the MW.
To apply Probabilities to the MW _every probability should be stated as
a conditional probability
Hi everyone, I am a complete layman but still got the illusion that
maybe one day I would be able to understand the probability part of MW
if explained in a simple way. I know it's the most controversal part
of MW and that there are several competing understandings of
probability in MW, but still
Hi everyone, I am a complete layman but still got the illusion that
maybe one day I would be able to understand the probability part of MW
if explained in a simple way. I know it's the most controversal part
of MW and that there are several competing understandings of
probability in MW
not necessarily surprise us. For example, the probability that a
particular person wins first prize in a lottery may be one in a million, but
the probability that SOMEONE wins first prize is usually greater than 50%
for most lotteries. We can avoid confusion by being clear on what the
desired
[Tim May, in another thread]
Any finite system, which of course all systems are, can have all of its
quantum mechanics calculations done with finite-dimensional vector
spaces. The full-blown machinery of an infinite-dimensional Hilbert
space is nice to have, in the same way that Fourier analysis
[Joao Leao]
What we lack is a genuinely quantum model of
computation that could be mathematically tractable as the Turing or Post
models and can account for entanglement in all its glory.
As far as I know you can describe certain classes of entanglement
by means of Borromean rings, which are
[scerir]
As far as I know you can describe certain classes of entanglement
by means of Borromean rings, which are beautiful and sometimes
also unpredictable.
I realize that Kauffman already wrote something ...
http://www.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/QETE.pdf
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