On 17 Jan 2012, at 20:06, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/17/2012 5:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
SNIP
- I disagree that set theory might be more primitive than
arithmetic. Why? First because arithmetic has been proved more
primitive than set theory, and less primitive than logic. With
logi
On 17 January 2012 20:02, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> The consciousness is the same, but with different input bits. It *is* the
> relative indeterminacy, intrinsic to all computational state rich enough to
> code a relatively universal number.
>
> The question "why here and now" is a constant on all s
On 1/17/2012 5:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
SNIP
- I disagree that set theory might be more primitive than arithmetic.
Why? First because arithmetic has been proved more primitive than set
theory, and less primitive than logic. With logic we cannot define
numbers. with set, we can define numb
On 17 January 2012 14:51, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I think we are very close. And very close to Schroedinger intuition indeed.
I think we are. However, I'm still uncomfortable about the "single
glance". I can see how one can talk about points of view in a 3p
sense by, in effect, pointing to 3p e
On 17 January 2012 09:43, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Now the 1p are related, not on any particular computations in the UD (or in
> arithmetic), but to all of them, making both matter and consciousness not
> Turing emulable, but still recoverable from the entire work of the UD (UD*)
> or from the whol
On 16 Jan 2012, at 20:42, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 January 2012 18:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I do not need an extra God or observer of arithmetical truth, to
interpret
some number relation as computations, because the numbers,
relatively to
each other, already do that task. From their view
On 16 January 2012 18:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I do not need an extra God or observer of arithmetical truth, to interpret
> some number relation as computations, because the numbers, relatively to
> each other, already do that task. From their view, to believe that we need
> some extra-interpre
On 16 Jan 2012, at 15:32, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 January 2012 10:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by
using only
addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in
elementary
arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence o
On 16 January 2012 10:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using only
> addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary
> arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number.
That may be, but we were discus
On 14 Jan 2012, at 18:51, David Nyman wrote:
On 14 January 2012 16:50, Stephen P. King
wrote:
The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than by
invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter.
Sure, but do you mean to say that the interpreter must be physi
On 1/14/2012 10:32 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/15/2012 1:07 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 6:21 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/14/2012 4:05 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 10:41 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I suppose that that is the case, but how do mathematical entities implement
On 1/15/2012 1:07 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 6:21 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/14/2012 4:05 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 10:41 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I suppose that that is the case, but how do mathematical
entities implement themselves other than via physical processes? W
On 1/14/2012 6:21 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/14/2012 4:05 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 10:41 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I suppose that that is the case, but how do mathematical entities implement
themselves other than via physical processes? We seem to be thinking that this is a
s
On 1/14/2012 4:05 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 10:41 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I suppose that that is the case, but how do mathematical entities
implement themselves other than via physical processes? We seem to be
thinking that this is a solvable "Chicken and Egg" problem and I
argue
On 1/14/2012 10:41 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I suppose that that is the case, but how do mathematical entities implement
themselves other than via physical processes? We seem to be thinking that this is a
solvable "Chicken and Egg" problem and I argue that we cannot use the argument of
red
Hi David,
On 1/14/2012 12:51 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 14 January 2012 16:50, Stephen P. King wrote:
The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than by
invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter.
Sure, but do you mean to say that the interpreter must be ph
On 14 January 2012 16:50, Stephen P. King wrote:
> The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than by
> invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter.
Sure, but do you mean to say that the interpreter must be physical? I
don't see why. And yet, as you say, the
Hi Bruno,
You seem to not understand the role that the physical plays at all!
This reminds me of an inversion of how most people cannot understand the
way that math is "abstract" and have to work very hard to understand
notions like "in principle a coffee cup is the same as a doughnut".
On 1/13/2012 7:29 PM, David Nyman wrote:
Hi Stephen
Thanks for responding to my post in such detail. I'll need some time
to digest your points, although I'm not at all sure I have the
necessary background to grasp all of what you are saying. However, I
would just like to remark at this point t
Hi Stephen
Thanks for responding to my post in such detail. I'll need some time
to digest your points, although I'm not at all sure I have the
necessary background to grasp all of what you are saying. However, I
would just like to remark at this point that my characterisation of
the sought-for o
Hi David,
I do appreciate your remarks and thank you for writing them up and
posting them. Let me interleave some comments in reply.
On 1/13/2012 1:43 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 13 January 2012 17:24, Stephen P. King wrote:
I submit to you that you cannot just ignore the
universals vs.
On 1/11/2012 19:22, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
I have a question. Does not the Tennenbaum Theorem prevent the concept
of first person plural from having a coherent meaning, since it seems to
makes PA unique and singular? In other words, how can multiple copies of
PA generate a plurality of first
On 13 January 2012 17:24, Stephen P. King wrote:
> I submit to you that you cannot just ignore the
> universals vs. nominal problem and posit by fiat that just because one can
> proof the truth of some statement that that statement's existence determines
> its properties. Our ability to communica
Hi Stephen,
On 13 Jan 2012, at 00:58, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Bruno,
On 1/12/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Jan 2012, at 19:35, acw wrote:
On 1/11/2012 19:22, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
I have a question. Does not the Tennenbaum Theorem prevent the
concept
of first person p
Hi Bruno,
On 1/12/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Jan 2012, at 19:35, acw wrote:
On 1/11/2012 19:22, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
I have a question. Does not the Tennenbaum Theorem prevent the concept
of first person plural from having a coherent meaning, since it
seems to
makes PA
On 11 Jan 2012, at 19:35, acw wrote:
On 1/11/2012 19:22, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
I have a question. Does not the Tennenbaum Theorem prevent the
concept
of first person plural from having a coherent meaning, since it
seems to
makes PA unique and singular? In other words, how can multipl
Hi Acw,
On 1/11/2012 1:35 PM, acw wrote:
On 1/11/2012 19:22, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
I have a question. Does not the Tennenbaum Theorem prevent the concept
of first person plural from having a coherent meaning, since it seems to
makes PA unique and singular? In other words, how can multiple
On 1/11/2012 19:22, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,
I have a question. Does not the Tennenbaum Theorem prevent the concept
of first person plural from having a coherent meaning, since it seems to
makes PA unique and singular? In other words, how can multiple copies of
PA generate a plurality of first
Hi,
I have a question. Does not the Tennenbaum Theorem prevent the
concept of first person plural from having a coherent meaning, since it
seems to makes PA unique and singular? In other words, how can multiple
copies of PA generate a plurality of first person since they would be an
equiv
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