Le 01-juin-05, à 17:24, scerir a écrit :
Bruno Marchal:
To be clear I have only proved that IF COMP is taken seriously enough
THEN the appearance of a "pre-existing physical world", including its
stability, lawfulness ... MUST BE derivable from the relation between
numbers. This is done. Then I
Bruno Marchal:
To be clear I have only proved that IF COMP is taken seriously enough
THEN the appearance of a "pre-existing physical world", including its
stability, lawfulness ... MUST BE derivable from the relation between
numbers. This is done. Then I got results confirming in part that comp
can
Dear Stephen,
With your permission, I answer an offlist post you sended to me and some others,
Bruno, you claim that I assume a physical world. While I would agree with that claim to some degree, it misses the point that I am trying to make, just as Lee's interpretation of my idea as being ab
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
- Original Message -
Subject: Re: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can
bruise you?
> > Hi,
> >
> > Le Jeudi 19 Mai 2005 21:18, John M a écrit :
> >>SNIP
> >
> > I think that is what Bruno explains (r
Le 19-mai-05, à 21:51, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Hi,
Le Jeudi 19 Mai 2005 21:18, John M a écrit :
Without trying to defend Robert Rosen, his (unlimited) natural systems
(maximum models = the THING itself, not a model) are (in his words)
"not
Turing -computable", I think that is different from Brun
Le 19-mai-05, à 21:18, John M a écrit :
Without trying to defend Robert Rosen, his (unlimited) natural systems
(maximum models = the THING itself, not a model) are (in his words)
"not
Turing -computable", I think that is different from Bruno's unlimited
'comp'.
I would like to insist on this key
> > >Lee: No, the important claims that Bruno makes go far beyond.
> He attempts
> > > to derive physics from the theory of computation (i.e., recursive
> > > functions, effective computability, incompleteness, and
> > > unsolvability).
> > > His is also one set of the claims, hypotheses, an
Hi,
Le Jeudi 19 Mai 2005 21:18, John M a écrit :
>
> Without trying to defend Robert Rosen, his (unlimited) natural systems
> (maximum models = the THING itself, not a model) are (in his words) "not
> Turing -computable", I think that is different from Bruno's unlimited
> 'comp'.
I think that is
he wrong bootstraps.
Cheers
John
----- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 12:20 AM
Subject: Re: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can
bruise you?
Jonathan writes
> Lee writes:
>
> > No, the important claims that Bruno makes go far beyond. He
> > attempts to derive physics from the theory of computation
> > (i.e., recursive functions, effective computability,
> > incompleteness, and unsolvability).
> > His is also one set of the claims,
st advamced thinking, just apply always
> the notion of a humble insecurity: that's all I can think of with my limited
> means and there always may be much more to it.
>
> Respectfully
>
> John Mikes
>
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From:
Lee writes:
>> Jonathan: Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence of Strong AI;
that a
>> simulated mind would behave in an identical way to a "real" one, and
>> would experience the same "qualia". There's no special "interface"
>> required here; the simulated mind and the simulated billi
can think of with my limited
means and there always may be much more to it.
Respectfully
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2005 5:33 PM
Subject: RE: a description of you + a description of b
Well, ...
Le 18-mai-05, à 08:53, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
I think you assume at the start a physical world. I don't need that
hypothesis.
I should have said: I can't use that hypothesis, because the "physical
world" is what I would like to explain.
(Let us not exaggerate the partial success I got)
Hi Stephen,
Le 17-mai-05, à 22:39, Stephen Paul King a écrit :
There is still one question that needs to be answered: what is it
that gives rise to the differentiation necessary for one "description"
to "bruise" (or cause any kind of change) in another "description" if
we disallow for some th
Jonathan writes
> Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence of Strong AI; that a
> simulated mind would behave in an identical way to a "real" one, and would
> experience the same "qualia". There's no special "interface" required here;
> the simulated mind and the simulated billiard ball are
n resources
associated. We can not tacitly assume abstract perpetual motion machines to
power our abstract machines, or can we?
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2005 5:33 PM
Subject: RE: a description of y
Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence of Strong AI; that a
simulated mind would behave in an identical way to a "real" one, and would
experience the same "qualia". There's no special "interface" required here;
the simulated mind and the simulated billiard ball are in the same "world",
ie.
Dear Bruno,
Your claim reminds me of the scene in the movie Matrix: Reloaded where
Neo deactivates some Sentinels all the while believing that he is Unplugged.
This leads to speculations about "matrix in a matrix", etc.
http://www.thematrix101.com/reloaded/meaning.php#mwam
There is still o
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