Re: UDA query

2010-01-15 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 15 Jan 2010, at 03:52, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 14-janv.-10, à 09:01, Brent Meeker a écrit : I think there may be different kinds of consciousness, so a look- up-table (like Searle's Chinese Room) may be conscious but in a different way. In a way distinguishable by

Re: UDA query

2010-01-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 14-janv.-10, à 09:01, Brent Meeker a écrit : I think there may be different kinds of consciousness, so a look-up-table (like Searle's Chinese Room) may be conscious but in a different way. In a way distinguishable by the person? From its own (first person) perspecti

Re: UDA query

2010-01-14 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 14-janv.-10, à 09:01, Brent Meeker a écrit : I think there may be different kinds of consciousness, so a look-up-table (like Searle's Chinese Room) may be conscious but in a different way. In a way distinguishable by the person? From its own (first person) perspective? Also, I don't t

Re: UDA query

2010-01-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/14 Brent Meeker : >> I think it would be enough for the AI to reproduce the I/O of the >> whole brain in aggregate. That would involve computing a function >> controlling each efferent nerve, accepting as data input from the >> afferent nerves. The behaviour would have to be the same as the

Re: UDA query

2010-01-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/14 Brent Meeker : Yes, I can see that. By aggregating the brain into one computation do you mean replacing it with a synchronous digital computer whose program would not only reproduce the I/O of individual neurons, but also the instantaneous state on signa

Re: UDA query

2010-01-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/14 Brent Meeker : > Yes, I can see that.  By aggregating the brain into one computation do you > mean replacing it with a synchronous digital computer whose program would > not only reproduce the I/O of individual neurons, but also the instantaneous > state on signals which were traveling b

Re: UDA query

2010-01-13 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/13 Brent Meeker : You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the "appropriate level" to make "brain behavior" the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular algorithm; one more

Re: UDA query

2010-01-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/13 Brent Meeker : > You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the "appropriate level" to > make "brain behavior" the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient > (though perhaps not necessary).  But that's preserving a particular > algorithm; one more specific than the Platoni

Re: UDA query

2010-01-12 Thread m.a.
Interesting how the repeated copying and recopying of emails ends up resembling the typography of modern poetry. m.a. I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the

Re: UDA query

2010-01-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker > Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com> >> Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Re: UDA query

2010-01-12 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> >> >> 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker > meeke...@dslextreme.com>> >> >>Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >>2010/1/12 Brent Meeker > >>> >>

Re: UDA query

2010-01-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker > Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com> >> Stathis Papaioannou wrot

Re: UDA query

2010-01-12 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> >> >> 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker > meeke...@dslextreme.com>> >> >> >>Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>2010/1/12 Brent Meeker >>: >> >> >> >>I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is be

Re: UDA query

2010-01-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>: I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the

Re: UDA query

2010-01-12 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker : >> >> >> >>> I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the >>> computation being "the same". Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it >>> one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN,

Re: UDA query

2010-01-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker : I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the computation being "the same". Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP? Is it just one that ha

Re: UDA query

2010-01-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker : > I know.  I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the > computation being "the same".  Is it the same Platonic algorithm?   Is it > one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP? >  Is it just one that has the same input-output?

Re: UDA query

2010-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>: But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract

Re: UDA query

2010-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker : No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness is produced by the physical process. We can assume for simplicity that the two machines M1 and M2 have similar architecture and similar operating systems. Once the program is loaded int

Re: UDA query

2010-01-11 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker : >> >> >> >>> But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract >>> Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which >>> is >>> not the same) - in other words assuming the

Re: UDA query

2010-01-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker : >> No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness is produced by >> the physical process. We can assume for simplicity that the two >> machines M1 and M2 have similar architecture and similar operating >> systems. Once the program is loaded into M2 from the disc, S

Re: UDA query

2010-01-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker : But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which is not the same) - in other words assuming the thing being argued? No, I'm at this point

Re: UDA query

2010-01-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker : > But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract > Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which is > not the same) - in other words assuming the thing being argued? No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness

Re: UDA query

2010-01-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker : S1 and S2 can be precisely delimited as machine states but only more loosely as mental states. This is because, as you say, there may be a thought that spans S1 and S2, and is therefore partly generated by M1 and partly by M2. I don't see t

Re: UDA query

2010-01-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker : >> S1 and S2 can be precisely delimited as machine states but only more >> loosely as mental states. This is because, as you say, there may be a >> thought that spans S1 and S2, and is therefore partly generated by M1 >> and partly by M2. I don't see this as an issue since

Re: UDA query

2010-01-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker : It seems that you're saying the observer would notice that something odd had happened if his program were paused and restarted in the way described, but how is that possible when S1 and S2 are identical whether generated continuously or dis

Re: UDA query

2010-01-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/11 Brent Meeker : >> It seems that you're saying the observer would notice that something >> odd had happened if his program were paused and restarted in the way >> described, but how is that possible when S1 and S2 are identical >> whether generated continuously or discontinuously? >> >> >

Re: UDA query

2010-01-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/10 Brent Meeker : Suppose S1 is being generated by a virtual reality program on machine M1, then after a minute the human operator saves the program and data to disc and shuts down M1, walks over to machine M2, loads the data from the disc and runs the progr

Re: UDA query

2010-01-09 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/10 Brent Meeker : >> Suppose S1 is being generated by a virtual reality program on machine >> M1, then after a minute the human operator saves the program and data >> to disc and shuts down M1, walks over to machine M2, loads the data >> from the disc and runs the program, which then genera

Re: UDA query

2010-01-09 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker : You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be experience them as consecutive if they

Re: UDA query

2010-01-09 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker : >> You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If >> S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your >> brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be >> experience them as consecutive if they were generated by ch

Re: UDA query

2010-01-08 Thread russell standish
On Fri, Jan 08, 2010 at 11:00:19AM -0800, Johnathan Corgan wrote: > > It's plausible that "observer moments" correspond to what are called > "chaotic attractors" in complex systems theory. > Well attractors in general - they don't have to be chaotic (or strange as the terminology actually is). M

Re: UDA query

2010-01-08 Thread Brent Meeker
Johnathan Corgan wrote: On Fri, Jan 8, 2010 at 10:03 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: Isn't it? Bruno presents "comp" as equivalent to betting that replacing your brain with a digitial device at the appropriate level of substitution will leave your stream of consciousness unaffected. From this peo

Re: UDA query

2010-01-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker > >> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker >> >>> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker >>> meeke...@dslextreme.com>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>

Re: UDA query

2010-01-08 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker

Re: UDA query

2010-01-08 Thread Johnathan Corgan
On Fri, Jan 8, 2010 at 10:03 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: > Isn't it?  Bruno presents "comp" as equivalent to betting that replacing > your brain with a digitial device at the appropriate level of substitution > will leave your stream of consciousness unaffected.  From this people are > inferring that

Re: UDA query

2010-01-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker > >> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker >> meeke...@dslextreme.com>> >>> >>> >>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>>2010/1/7 Brent Meeker >> >:

Re: UDA query

2010-01-08 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker >    Stathis Papaioannou wrote:        2010/1/7 Brent Meeker

Re: UDA query

2010-01-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> >> >> 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker > meeke...@dslextreme.com>> >> >> >>Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>2010/1/7 Brent Meeker >>: >> >> >> >>A program that generates S2 as it were out o

Re: UDA query

2010-01-07 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>: A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false

Re: UDA query

2010-01-07 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2010/1/8 Brent Meeker > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker : >> >> >> >>> A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it a

Re: UDA query

2010-01-07 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker : A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with all the others. If the UD is allowed

Re: UDA query

2010-01-07 Thread Nick Prince
On Jan 7, 12:09 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Hi Nick, > > On 07 Jan 2010, at 01:39, Nick Prince wrote: > > > > > Hi Bruno > > OK so there is a good deal of the technical stuff that I've got to > > catch up on yet before I can interpret what you are saying  (although > > I think I can understand wh

Re: UDA query

2010-01-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/7 Brent Meeker : > I think what I asked about is different from simply assuming idealism.  It > is carrying your thread of reasoning a few steps further. Suppose Platonic > objects exist.  Suppose computations, as Platonic objects, are enough to > instantiate consciousness.  Suppose conscio

Re: UDA query

2010-01-07 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Nick, On 07 Jan 2010, at 01:39, Nick Prince wrote: Hi Bruno OK so there is a good deal of the technical stuff that I've got to catch up on yet before I can interpret what you are saying (although I think I can understand why the everettian imperative based on comp + UDA is there). Nice.

Re: UDA query

2010-01-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/7 Brent Meeker : >> A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false >> memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a >> perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with >> all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this

Re: UDA query

2010-01-07 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Jan 2010, at 20:18, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:59, Brent Meeker wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid o

Re: UDA query

2010-01-07 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Jan 2010, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote: Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/S2/S3 than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand what is a computation if not

Re: UDA query

2010-01-07 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/6 Brent Meeker : I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them computations? Why not just suppose all states of your consciousness (and even other parts of the world) exist. If they can be

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Nick Prince
Hi Bruno OK so there is a good deal of the technical stuff that I've got to catch up on yet before I can interpret what you are saying (although I think I can understand why the everettian imperative based on comp + UDA is there). However if I could for the moment get an intuitive understanding

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Jan 2010, at 01:21, Nick Prince wrote: Hi Brent Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this: "So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner experience only to the typ

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:59, Brent Meeker wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always t

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote: Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/S2/S3 than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order. Quentin It

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/6 Brent Meeker : I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them computations?  Why not just suppose all states of your consciousness (and even other parts of the world) exist.  If they can be glued together by inherent features or

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/6 Nick Prince : As I understand it the UD generates all possible programs and as it generates each one it runs one step of it before generating the next. Does that not mean that eventually it will generate the program which is generating what we understand to

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Jan 2010, at 03:34, Brent Meeker wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Hi Brent Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this: "So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner experience only to the typ

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Jan 2010, at 01:21, Nick Prince wrote: Hi Brent Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this: "So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner experience only to the type of computation invol

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 05 Jan 2010, at 23:44, Brent Meeker wrote: Nick Prince wrote: OOps sorry I sent an empty post by accident. I agree with you here. But I am new to this field so I am uncertain about so many things. However, I don't understand why it is that a UD would know how to generate these law like

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 05 Jan 2010, at 21:18, Nick Prince wrote: It feels a bit lie a chicken and egg situation - do we pick out the laws or do they pick us?. But I am still working my way through this and and loads of other stuff, so I don't understand it yet. The computable laws (definable in elementary arit

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:59, Brent Meeker wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always there. I can understan

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote: Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/ S2/S3 than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order. Quentin It seems strange that

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/6 Brent Meeker : > I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them > computations?  Why not just suppose all states of your consciousness (and > even other parts of the world) exist.  If they can be glued together by > inherent features or simply experienced without even an i

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/6 Nick Prince : > As I understand it the UD generates all possible programs and as it > generates each one it runs one step of it before generating the next. > Does that not mean that eventually it will generate the program which > is generating what we understand to be some observer moments

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Nick Prince wrote: Hi Brent Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this: "So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner experience only to the type of computation involved. The reason is that

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Nick Prince
Hi Brent Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this: "So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner experience only to the type of computation involved. The reason is that only those types are univ

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Nick Prince wrote: OOps sorry I sent an empty post by accident. I agree with you here. But I am new to this field so I am uncertain about so many things. However, I don't understand why it is that a UD would know how to generate these law like sequences of states. It may well generate all pos

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Nick Prince
OOps sorry I sent an empty post by accident. I agree with you here. But I am new to this field so I am uncertain about so many things. However, I don't understand why it is that a UD would know how to generate these law like sequences of states. It may well generate all possible programs that g

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Nick Prince
On Jan 5, 6:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: > Nick Prince wrote: > > Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow > > like a reel of film?  All the individual pictures could be cut from > > the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always > > there.  I can

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal relationsh

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/4 Brent Meeker : I think you give an excellent explication of the problem, Stathis. However, one thing about it that still worries me is the role of time. You say the mapping need not be consistent even moment to moment, and yet the mapping is a timeless Pl

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le mercredi 06 janvier 2010 à 00:29 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : 2010/1/5 Quentin Anciaux : Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2, S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap or intervening experienc

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 05 Jan 2010, at 15:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/6 Quentin Anciaux : It seems to me that it depends if the computation is iterative or not... in other words, to compute step N you must have computed step N-1 before that. If you can directly compute step N without computing pri

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Nick Prince
As I understand it the UD generates all possible programs and as it generates each one it runs one step of it before generating the next. Does that not mean that eventually it will generate the program which is generating what we understand to be some observer moments for us at this particular time

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Nick Prince
Thank you Stathis, That does make sense to me. On Jan 5, 12:22 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2010/1/5 Nick Prince : > > > Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow > > like a reel of film?  All the individual pictures could be cut from > > the reel and laid out any

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/6 Quentin Anciaux : >> > It seems to me that it depends if the computation is iterative or not... in >> > other words, to compute step N you must have computed step N-1 before that. >> > >> > If you can directly compute step N without computing prior step, S2/S1/S3 >> > is >> > possible. I

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le mercredi 06 janvier 2010 à 00:29 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > 2010/1/5 Quentin Anciaux : > > >> Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2, > >> S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap > >> or intervening experiences between S2 an

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/5 Quentin Anciaux : >> Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2, >> S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap >> or intervening experiences between S2 and S1; S3 remembers S1 and S2 >> and remembers that S1 preceded S2; and S3 also reme

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2010/1/5 Stathis Papaioannou > 2010/1/5 Nick Prince : > > Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow > > like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from > > the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always > > there. I can underst

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/5 Nick Prince : > Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow > like a reel of film?  All the individual pictures could be cut from > the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always > there.  I can understand this because all the spatio temporal

Re: UDA query

2010-01-04 Thread Nick Prince
Thanks Bruno. I'll look this up and also I want to scan through your seven steps series for November. The later posts in these I think will help me make contact with the concepts.I want to be able to understand your Sane paper - especially the later parts. Is there any english translation of

Re: UDA query

2010-01-04 Thread Nick Prince
Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal relationships for the actors in

Re: UDA query

2010-01-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/4 Brent Meeker : > I think you give an excellent explication of the problem, Stathis.  However, > one thing about it that still worries me is the role of time. You say the > mapping need not be consistent even moment to moment, and yet the mapping is > a timeless Platonic object.  To be a t

Re: UDA query

2010-01-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Nick, Oops, soory. I sent an empty answer. Actually I agree with all you say here, so an empty comment was a good comment! I think all this becomes simpler once you grasp that a computation, in the math sense, is a very well defined object. If a computation exists, it can be proved to exi

Re: UDA query

2010-01-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 03 Jan 2010, at 14:55, Nick Prince wrote: > Thank you Stathis > This has helped move me on a bit. “The hardwareless computer” has been > giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of what > you said back just to check it is on the right lines. > As a possible example of one

Re: UDA query

2010-01-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 03 Jan 2010, at 12:05, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2010/1/3 Nick Prince : >> HI Bruno >> Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far. I really >> need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far and >> to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real phy

Re: UDA query

2010-01-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 02 Jan 2010, at 17:06, Nick Prince wrote: > HI Bruno > Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far. I really > need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far and > to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real physical > universal machine existing in

Re: UDA query

2010-01-03 Thread Brent Meeker
nday, January 03, 2010 4:30 PM Subject: Re: UDA query Stathis wrote Yes, but a critic could still say that no conscious observer could be conjured up by a computation unless the computation is physically implemented. At least at first glance that seems to be the case: the brain is requir

Re: UDA query

2010-01-03 Thread Stephen Paul King
List" Sent: Sunday, January 03, 2010 4:30 PM Subject: Re: UDA query Stathis wrote >Yes, but a critic could still say that no conscious observer could be >conjured up by a computation unless the computation is physically >implemented. At least at first glance that seems to be th

Re: UDA query

2010-01-03 Thread Nick Prince
Stathis wrote >Yes, but a critic could still say that no conscious observer could be >conjured up by a computation unless the computation is physically >implemented. At least at first glance that seems to be the case: the >brain is required for consciousness, since if the brain is destroyed >consc

Re: UDA query

2010-01-03 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/4 Nick Prince : Thank you Stathis This has helped move me on a bit. “The hardwareless computer” has been giving me some real problems.  Let me replay my understanding of what you said back just to check it is on the right lines. As a possible examp

Re: UDA query

2010-01-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/4 Nick Prince : > Thank you Stathis > This has helped move me on a bit. “The hardwareless computer” has been > giving me some real problems.  Let me replay my understanding of what > you said back just to check it is on the right lines. > As a possible example of one of these “lurking comput

Re: UDA query

2010-01-03 Thread Nick Prince
Thank you Stathis This has helped move me on a bit. “The hardwareless computer” has been giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of what you said back just to check it is on the right lines. As a possible example of one of these “lurking computations” we could consider the one

Re: UDA query

2010-01-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2010/1/3 Nick Prince : > HI Bruno > Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far.  I really > need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far and > to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real physical > universal machine existing in the future (like Tipler

Re: UDA query

2010-01-02 Thread Nick Prince
HI Bruno Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far. I really need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far and to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real physical universal machine existing in the future (like Tipler suggests) or a great programmer

Re: UDA query

2009-12-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Dec 2009, at 17:51, Nick Prince wrote: > Hi Bruno > >>> If the UD was a concrete one like you ran then it would start to >>> generate all programs and execute them all by one step etc. But are >>> you saying that because the UD exists platonically all these >>> programs >>> and each of

Re: UDA query

2009-12-31 Thread ronaldheld
Bruno: yes that is unfortunately true. Ronald On Dec 30, 10:25 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 30 Dec 2009, at 03:29, ronaldheld wrote: > > > Bruno: > >   Is there a UD that is implemented in Fortran? > > I don't know. If you know Fortran, it should be a relatively easy

Re: UDA query

2009-12-30 Thread Nick Prince
Hi Bruno >> If the UD was a concrete one like you ran then it would start to >> generate all programs and execute them all by one step etc. But are >> you saying that because the UD exists platonically all these programs >> and each of their steps exist also and hence, by the existence of a >> s

Re: UDA query

2009-12-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Dec 2009, at 03:29, ronaldheld wrote: > Bruno: > Is there a UD that is implemented in Fortran? I don't know. If you know Fortran, it should be a relatively easy task to implement one. Note that you have still the choice between a fortran program dovetailing on all computations by com

Re: UDA query

2009-12-29 Thread ronaldheld
Bruno: Is there a UD that is implemented in Fortran? Ronald On Dec 29, 4:55 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 28 Dec 2009, at 21:24, Nick Prince wrote: > > > > >> Well, it is better to assume just the axiom of, say, Robinson > >> arithmetic. You assume 0, the successors,

Re: UDA query

2009-12-29 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 28 Dec 2009, at 21:24, Nick Prince wrote: > > >> Well, it is better to assume just the axiom of, say, Robinson >> arithmetic. You assume 0, the successors, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. >> You assume some laws, like s(x) = s(y) -> x = y, 0 ≠ s(x), the laws >> of addition, and multiplication. Then the ex

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