Le 01-juin-05, à 17:24, scerir a écrit :
Bruno Marchal:
To be clear I have only proved that IF COMP is taken seriously enough
THEN the appearance of a pre-existing physical world, including its
stability, lawfulness ... MUST BE derivable from the relation between
numbers. This is done. Then I
Dear Stephen,
With your permission, I answer an offlist post you sended to me and some others,
Bruno, you claim that I assume a physical world. While I would agree with that claim to some degree, it misses the point that I am trying to make, just as Lee's interpretation of my idea as being
Bruno Marchal:
To be clear I have only proved that IF COMP is taken seriously enough
THEN the appearance of a pre-existing physical world, including its
stability, lawfulness ... MUST BE derivable from the relation between
numbers. This is done. Then I got results confirming in part that comp
can
Le 19-mai-05, à 21:18, John M a écrit :
Without trying to defend Robert Rosen, his (unlimited) natural systems
(maximum models = the THING itself, not a model) are (in his words)
not
Turing -computable, I think that is different from Bruno's unlimited
'comp'.
I would like to insist on this key
Le 19-mai-05, à 21:51, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Hi,
Le Jeudi 19 Mai 2005 21:18, John M a écrit :
Without trying to defend Robert Rosen, his (unlimited) natural systems
(maximum models = the THING itself, not a model) are (in his words)
not
Turing -computable, I think that is different from
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
- Original Message -
Subject: Re: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can
bruise you?
Hi,
Le Jeudi 19 Mai 2005 21:18, John M a écrit :
SNIP
I think that is what Bruno explains (rather my understanding of it),
that consciousness
Jonathan writes
Lee writes:
No, the important claims that Bruno makes go far beyond. He
attempts to derive physics from the theory of computation
(i.e., recursive functions, effective computability,
incompleteness, and unsolvability).
His is also one set of the claims, hypotheses,
Subject: Re: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can
bruise you?
Hi,
Le Jeudi 19 Mai 2005 21:18, John M a écrit :
Without trying to defend Robert Rosen, his (unlimited) natural systems
(maximum models = the THING itself, not a model) are (in his words) not
Turing -computable, I think that is different from Bruno's unlimited
'comp'.
I think that is what
Lee: No, the important claims that Bruno makes go far beyond.
He attempts
to derive physics from the theory of computation (i.e., recursive
functions, effective computability, incompleteness, and
unsolvability).
His is also one set of the claims, hypotheses, and
conjectures
Hi Stephen,
Le 17-mai-05, à 22:39, Stephen Paul King a écrit :
There is still one question that needs to be answered: what is it
that gives rise to the differentiation necessary for one description
to bruise (or cause any kind of change) in another description if
we disallow for some thing
Well, ...
Le 18-mai-05, à 08:53, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
I think you assume at the start a physical world. I don't need that
hypothesis.
I should have said: I can't use that hypothesis, because the physical
world is what I would like to explain.
(Let us not exaggerate the partial success I got)
and there always may be much more to it.
Respectfully
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2005 5:33 PM
Subject: RE: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can
bruise you
Lee writes:
Jonathan: Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence of Strong AI;
that a
simulated mind would behave in an identical way to a real one, and
would experience the same qualia. There's no special interface
required here; the simulated mind and the simulated billiard
ball are
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2005 5:33 PM
Subject: RE: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can
bruise you?
Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence
Dear Bruno,
Your claim reminds me of the scene in the movie Matrix: Reloaded where
Neo deactivates some Sentinels all the while believing that he is Unplugged.
This leads to speculations about matrix in a matrix, etc.
http://www.thematrix101.com/reloaded/meaning.php#mwam
There is still
Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence of Strong AI; that a
simulated mind would behave in an identical way to a real one, and would
experience the same qualia. There's no special interface required here;
the simulated mind and the simulated billiard ball are in the same world,
ie. at the
assume abstract perpetual motion machines to
power our abstract machines, or can we?
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2005 5:33 PM
Subject: RE: a description of you + a description of billiard ball
18 matches
Mail list logo
