Chuck Swiger wrote:
On Mar 13, 2007, at 8:37 PM, Chad Leigh -- Shire.Net LLC wrote:
Address verification callbacks take various forms, but the way exim
does it by default is to attempt to start a DSN delivery to the
address and if the RCPT TO is accepted it is affirmative. It is not
usually u
On Mar 13, 2007, at 8:37 PM, Chad Leigh -- Shire.Net LLC wrote:
Address verification callbacks take various forms, but the way
exim does it by default is to attempt to start a DSN delivery to
the address and if the RCPT TO is accepted it is affirmative. It
is not usually use VRFY. Most add
On Mar 13, 2007, at 9:30 PM, Christopher Sean Hilton wrote:
Chad Leigh -- Shire.Net LLC wrote:
On Mar 13, 2007, at 6:00 PM, Christopher Sean Hilton wrote:
On Mon, 2007-03-12 at 12:00 -0400, Marcelo Maraboli wrote:
I agree. callbacks are not enough, you can reach a
false conclusion, tha
Chad Leigh -- Shire.Net LLC wrote:
On Mar 13, 2007, at 6:00 PM, Christopher Sean Hilton wrote:
On Mon, 2007-03-12 at 12:00 -0400, Marcelo Maraboli wrote:
I agree. callbacks are not enough, you can reach a
false conclusion, that´s why I use SPF along with callbacks...
on the same messag
On Mar 13, 2007, at 6:00 PM, Christopher Sean Hilton wrote:
On Mon, 2007-03-12 at 12:00 -0400, Marcelo Maraboli wrote:
I agree. callbacks are not enough, you can reach a
false conclusion, that´s why I use SPF along with callbacks...
on the same message, my MX concludes:
"you are sendin
On Mon, 2007-03-12 at 12:00 -0400, Marcelo Maraboli wrote:
>
> I agree. callbacks are not enough, you can reach a
> false conclusion, that´s why I use SPF along with callbacks...
>
> on the same message, my MX concludes:
>
> "you are sending email "from [EMAIL PROTECTED]", but shire.net
> s
John L wrote:
I phrased it wrong. You are not responsible for the content, but you
are responsible for the mail domain and that includes verifying that
mail is validly from your domain you are responsible for.
Oh, OK. So if someone sends pump and dump with a [EMAIL PROTECTED] return
addre
On Mar 11, 2007, at 5:11 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg wrote:
In this case the counter counter measures available to spammers is
so much easier and cheaper than the verification system itself,
that it's not really a good idea to try such verification.
that is always true, at least with existing
[mailed and posted]
On Mar 10, 2007, at 1:27 PM, Kelly Jones wrote:
To fight spam, I want to validate the address (not necessarily in
real-time) of the a given email sender. Is there a Unix tool that does
this?
The basics are simple: to validate "[EMAIL PROTECTED]", I connect to
the MX record
onfirmed that the mail is from you, after all
No. His MX has only verified his email address, which does not say
he sent the msg.
Then what was the point?
"His MX has only verified his email address"
Len
___
freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mail
onfirmed that the mail is from you, after all
No. His MX has only verified his email address, which does not say he
sent the msg.
Len
___
freebsd-questions@freebsd.org mailing list
http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-questions
To
On Mar 11, 2007, at 2:55 PM, John L wrote:
I phrased it wrong. You are not responsible for the content, but
you are responsible for the mail domain and that includes
verifying that mail is validly from your domain you are
responsible for.
Oh, OK. So if someone sends pump and dump with
I phrased it wrong. You are not responsible for the content, but you are
responsible for the mail domain and that includes verifying that mail is
validly from your domain you are responsible for.
Oh, OK. So if someone sends pump and dump with a [EMAIL PROTECTED] return
address, and I do a ca
On Mar 11, 2007, at 2:08 PM, John Levine wrote:
I have some fairly heavily forged domains, and on a bad day I see
upwards of 300,000 connections from bounces, "validation", and the
like attacking the little BSD box under my desk where the MTA is.
Gee, thanks a lot.
Verification has nothing to
>Sender verification works and works well.
I suppose that if you define "works" to include mailbombing innocent
third parties, then that might be true.
I have some fairly heavily forged domains, and on a bad day I see
upwards of 300,000 connections from bounces, "validation", and the
like attacki
>> I have some fairly heavily forged domains, and on a bad day I see
>> upwards of 300,000 connections from bounces, "validation", and the
>> like attacking the little BSD box under my desk where the MTA is.
>> Gee, thanks a lot.
>
>Verification has nothing to do with bounces and mail bombs. You m
On Mar 11, 2007, at 1:46 PM, Kris Kennaway wrote:
On Sun, Mar 11, 2007 at 01:43:22PM -0600, Chad Leigh -- Shire.Net
LLC wrote:
On Mar 11, 2007, at 1:36 PM, Kris Kennaway wrote:
On Sun, Mar 11, 2007 at 12:41:48PM -0600, Chad Leigh -- Shire.Net
LLC wrote:
On Mar 11, 2007, at 6:31 AM, Justi
On Mar 11, 2007, at 1:44 PM, John Levine wrote:
Sender verification works and works well.
I suppose that if you define "works" to include mailbombing innocent
third parties, then that might be true.
I have some fairly heavily forged domains, and on a bad day I see
upwards of 300,000 connecti
Perhaps we are talking about different things, I am talking about
systems which send me an email back requiring me to do steps a, b or c
in order to complete delivery of the email.
that's challenge/response, which has been widely discredited for years.
SAV is a receiving MX probing the MX of
On Sun, Mar 11, 2007 at 01:43:22PM -0600, Chad Leigh -- Shire.Net LLC wrote:
>
> On Mar 11, 2007, at 1:36 PM, Kris Kennaway wrote:
>
> >On Sun, Mar 11, 2007 at 12:41:48PM -0600, Chad Leigh -- Shire.Net
> >LLC wrote:
> >>
> >>On Mar 11, 2007, at 6:31 AM, Justin Mason wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>>for w
On Mar 11, 2007, at 1:36 PM, Kris Kennaway wrote:
On Sun, Mar 11, 2007 at 12:41:48PM -0600, Chad Leigh -- Shire.Net
LLC wrote:
On Mar 11, 2007, at 6:31 AM, Justin Mason wrote:
for what it's worth, I would suggest *not* adopting this
as an anti-spam technique.
Sender-address verification
On Sun, Mar 11, 2007 at 12:41:48PM -0600, Chad Leigh -- Shire.Net LLC wrote:
>
> On Mar 11, 2007, at 6:31 AM, Justin Mason wrote:
>
> >
> >for what it's worth, I would suggest *not* adopting this
> >as an anti-spam technique.
> >
> >Sender-address verification is _bad_ as an anti-spam technique,
On Mar 11, 2007, at 6:31 AM, Justin Mason wrote:
for what it's worth, I would suggest *not* adopting this
as an anti-spam technique.
Sender-address verification is _bad_ as an anti-spam technique, in my
opinion. Basically, there's one obvious response for spammers
looking to
evade it -- u
for what it's worth, I would suggest *not* adopting this
as an anti-spam technique.
Sender-address verification is _bad_ as an anti-spam technique, in my
opinion. Basically, there's one obvious response for spammers looking to
evade it -- use "real" sender addresses. Where's an easy place to fin
smf-sav is one sendmail milter which does this:
http://smfs.sourceforge.net/smf-sav.html
SAV v1.3.0 - console utility for e-Mail Sender Address Verification
(also at http://smfs.sf.net/ )
Cheers,
Phil
-Original Message-
From: Kelly Jones [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: 10 March 20
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