starwars <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> to Curt Purdy:
> > Methinks you misunderstand. Only the proprietary extension, i.e. .inc or
> > .xyz or .whatever, would be allowed through, and since virus writers would
> > never use this extension, it would eliminate ALL viruses at the gateway.
> > The nice thing a
I recently read somewhere that mydoom.c included the source code for the a
variant. Being the curious type, I wanted to see it. During my research,
I came across a post from a professor in the same situation as I was,
bascially looking for sync-src-1.00.tbz. That message was posted to this
list,
On Thu, 4 Mar 2004, Larry Seltzer wrote:
> >>SMTP auth does not help at all. A virus that delivers email via it's own SMTP
> >>engine
> completely bypasses the end users ISP server(s). And if the recipient server does not
> allow incoming mail from wherever it is presented from, then incoming m
On Thu, 4 Mar 2004, Larry Seltzer wrote:
>
> I've never heard this before. What law?
TCPA, the Telecommunications Communications Privacy Act.
At least the ordinary English meaning of parts of that
act prohibit 'intercepting' electronic mail, and define
intercepting as to include deleting.
I
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http://www.insecure.ws/article.php?story=2004021918172533
A problem exists in the way Safari Javascript engine allocates Arrays.
For example, allocating a too big array and writing into it, will
segfault Safari. There is no known way to execute remote
Curt's suggestion works. With only 35 email accounts at work, I farm out our email to
our web host (FutureQuest) so I don't have to mess with running a server.
I have had the executable attachments filter turned on from day one (day one == 3
years ago). You send an exe attachment to someone in
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Saturday, March 06, 2004
The seems to be a lot of excitement at the moment regarding .zip
files and emails. What if the actual .zip file is the email or
the email is the actual .zip file:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: application/x-zip-compressed
Con
- Original Message -
From: "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Saturday, March 06, 2004 10:31 AM
Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Z***ING EMAILS !
>
> The seems to be a lot of excitement at the moment regarding .zip
> files and emails. What if the actual .zip fi
docco wrote:
> What Curt Purdy is saying looks to me like a
> great_pain_in_the_ass_solution.
> In case the "supersecret" extension would get leaked or
> compromised, which I
> beleive would be absolutely not hard to achieve (by means of social
> engineering, sniffing or just brute force - combinat
>http://www.geocities.com/visitbipin/test_nav.zip
Kaspersky AV says: Bat/Delwin trojan
___
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
Saturday, March 06, 2004
The seems to be a lot of excitement at the moment regarding .zip
files and emails. What if the actual .zip file is the email or
the email is the actual .zip file:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: application/x-zip-compressed
Content-Transfer-Encoding:
Chris,
The grammar of this alert has left me somewhat curious, and I was wondering if you
could take a moment to clarify a few quick questions from a fan of the l0pht, such as
myself.
The vulnerability assessment of this is listed as MEDIUM. Also, the word may is used,
instead of will. So my
> >
> > Now... drag/drop a trojan named 1.exe (that NAV
> > recognises as a hostile program) to the 93'rd
> > sub-folder and execute the program from
> there
> > NAV-AUTO PROTECT is unable to scan/block the
> program &
> > the trojan gets executed.
> >
drag/dro
I still think teaching users to handle attachments correctly would be by far
easier, as this would be a one_time_lesson, while otherwise you would have
to expect all users to keep all_the_time up to date to the last extension
used.
What would happen if some forget their current (now old) extension
Curt's idea could be more effective in a client/server environment that used
extensions that changed periodically (fast enough to thwart virus attacks, etc). The
extension transformations could be length/format. How this updated extension exchange
would be implemented would be another kettle of
> Although I appriciate ideas to enhance security concerning buffer
> overflows or format string bugs, i cannot understand why to find
> the following lines in etc_db_new.c including your package:
>
>
> char pwd[MAX_PATH_LEN];
> ...
> i = 0;
> while((ch = fgetc(strace_file)) != '\0') {
>pwd
Hi all,
>>"The nice thing about this approach is that it completely
>>eliminates the need for any anti-virus on the mail server
>>since all virus attachments are automatically dropped
>>without the need for scanning [...]"
What Curt Purdy is saying looks to me like a great_pain_in_the_ass_soluti
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Debian Security Advisory DSA 456-1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze
March 6th, 2004
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