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El 13-12-2010 22:30, Robert J. Hansen escribió:
> On 12/13/2010 5:48 PM, Faramir wrote:
>> But supposedly, even with all these botnets, RSA-1024 has not been
>> broken yet. I don't know if there is some r...@home
>
> The Berkeley BOINC framework can
On Dec 14, 2010, at 6:43 PM, Faramir wrote:
> I know I asked before, but I can't remember if I saw an answer. Is
> TwoFish implementation the 256 bit key version?
Yes it is.
David
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El 14-12-2010 15:23, David Shaw escribió:
...
> There is a weak safety factor argument, too. If it turns out that (for
> example) AES-256 isn't as strong as expected, it may well be that AES-256 is
> actually a good match to RSA-2048, and you were
On 12/14/2010 6:43 PM, Faramir wrote:
> I know I asked before, but I can't remember if I saw an answer. Is
> TwoFish implementation the 256 bit key version?
Yes.
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On 12/14/2010 6:37 PM, Faramir wrote:
> Well, somebody could think "if they made a 256 bits symmetric algo,
> there should be a reason for that. And since if the asymmetric key is
> broken, the message is decrypted, no matter how strong is the symmetric
> algo, then it makes sense to use somethin
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El 14-12-2010 15:12, Robert J. Hansen escribió:
> On 12/14/10 12:42 PM, Ben McGinnes wrote:
>> They could be a result of using the old Cyber Knights Templar versions
>> of PGP that cropped up in the mid-'90s which allowed creating 16Kb keys.
>
> Wha
Ingo Klöcker wrote:
> On Tuesday 14 December 2010, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Off by about a factor of 100 there. RSA-2048 is roughly equivalent
>> to a 112-bit symmetric key; RSA-1024 is roughly equivalent to an
>> 80-bit key. 32 bits of difference equals a factor of four billion.
>> It's way ha
Hi,
I just bought a few OpenPGP cards V2.0 0005 xxx. I was hoping that I
could use them within minutes. That is not the case.
I'm running Windows 7 - 64Bit combined with Thunderbird/Enigmail (latest
versions) combined with gpg4win 2.0.4. (GnuPG 2.0.14).
Info about proper usage of card with
On 12/14/10 1:12 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 12/14/10 12:42 PM, Ben McGinnes wrote:
>> They could be a result of using the old Cyber Knights Templar versions
>> of PGP that cropped up in the mid-'90s which allowed creating 16Kb keys.
>
> What tool was used really doesn't interest me very much
On 12/14/10 1:23 PM, David Shaw wrote:
> You sort of need a crystal ball to make that argument though...
To underline and agree with what David said -- the entire field of
communications security requires crystal balls. It sounds neat and
simple to say, "the weakest part of the system must be str
On 15/12/10 5:12 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>
> What tool was used really doesn't interest me very much -- you can
> create them with GnuPG, too, if you're willing to tweak the source a
> little bit.
True, that one just made it a lot easier for people who did not
realise how easy it is to tweak
On Dec 14, 2010, at 10:08 AM, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
> Robert J. Hansen rjh at sixdemonbag.org wrote on
> Tue Dec 14 15:47:08 CET 2010 :
>
>>
> http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57-Part1-
> revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf
>
> Page 63.
>>
>
> Thanks.
>
> Always wondered abou
On 12/14/10 12:42 PM, Ben McGinnes wrote:
> They could be a result of using the old Cyber Knights Templar versions
> of PGP that cropped up in the mid-'90s which allowed creating 16Kb keys.
What tool was used really doesn't interest me very much -- you can
create them with GnuPG, too, if you're wi
On 15/12/10 4:11 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>
> There are a few of them on the keyservers, IIRC. Whether this is the
> result of a deliberate and carefully chosen policy, or rampant paranoid
> schizophrenia, is an open question...
They could be a result of using the old Cyber Knights Templar ve
On 12/14/10 10:08 AM, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
> Does anybody who is careful about using a 256 symmetric cipher
> actually use a 15k rsa key??
There are a few of them on the keyservers, IIRC. Whether this is the
result of a deliberate and carefully chosen policy, or rampant paranoid
schizophre
Robert J. Hansen rjh at sixdemonbag.org wrote on
Tue Dec 14 15:47:08 CET 2010 :
>
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57-Part1-
revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf
Page 63.
>
Thanks.
Always wondered about that. The table says:
AES-256 ... RSA k = 15360
Does anybody who is careful abou
On 12/14/2010 4:11 AM, Ingo Klöcker wrote:
> Those equivalences have been mentioned a few times. Is there a good
> (freely available) reference for this? Thanks in advance!
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57-Part1-revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf
Page 63.
smime.p7s
Description
Ingo Klöcker kloecker at kde.org wrote on
Tue Dec 14 10:11:54 CET 2010 :
>>RSA-2048 is roughly equivalent
>> to a 112-bit symmetric key; RSA-1024 is roughly equivalent to an
>> 80-bit key.
>Those equivalences have been mentioned a few times. Is there a
good
>(freely available) reference for th
On Tuesday 14 December 2010, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Off by about a factor of 100 there. RSA-2048 is roughly equivalent
> to a 112-bit symmetric key; RSA-1024 is roughly equivalent to an
> 80-bit key. 32 bits of difference equals a factor of four billion.
> It's way harder than you think.
Thos
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