What are some threats against which OpenPGP smartcards are useful?

2020-01-07 Thread Christoph Groth
Hello, Through an article [1] in LWN, I stumbled across a thread [2] on this list that dealt with the usefulness of smartcards for storing OpenPGP keys. I understand that OpenPGP smartcards do not protect from a compromise of the computer system that they are used with. As Peter Lebbing puts it

Re: What are some threats against which OpenPGP smartcards are useful?

2020-01-07 Thread Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users
Hi Christoph, There is one feature of smartcards that's hard to reproduce otherwise: once you pull the smartcard out of the port the attacker can't use it. If they steal your private keys they can do as they please with it (until you revoke keys and users refresh your key... that can take some

Re: What are some threats against which OpenPGP smartcards are useful?

2020-01-07 Thread Andrew Gallagher
On 07/01/2020 13:09, Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users wrote: > These two things are really useful when using the same token on multiple > devices (e.g. I use the same card on my laptop and phone). This is also a very good argument for smartcards - transferring a private key between devices is e

Fwd: Re: What are some threats against which OpenPGP smartcards are useful? [ ref:_00D58dJQM._5004Iy476n:ref ]

2020-01-07 Thread Andrew Gallagher
Could one of the admins please twit this subscriber? Their autoreply has been firing since November. A --- Begin Message --- Exmos. Senhores, Recebemos a informação que tiveram hoje a amabilidade de nos transmitir e que muito agradecemos. Vamos imediatamente analisar o caso e responderemos com

Re: What are some threats against which OpenPGP smartcards are useful?

2020-01-07 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 2020-01-06 18:26, Christoph Groth wrote: Robert J. Hansen justifies [4] his use of a smartcard as follows: Why don't I want to store the private key on multiple computers? Because a good rule of thumb in a forensics lab is "store the minimum personal data possible on your systems". But the

Re: What are some threats against which OpenPGP smartcards are useful?

2020-01-07 Thread Robert J. Hansen
Few of them will have a 128-bit secure passphrase like RJH. :-) Dude, the lab I worked in *required* me to use 128-bit secure passphrases. It was *awful*. And a 180-day change policy. But the good news is that once you prove to yourself you can do that, the idea of keeping a 128-bit passph

Re: What are some threats against which OpenPGP smartcards are useful?

2020-01-07 Thread Mike Gerwitz
On Tue, Jan 07, 2020 at 00:26:14 +0100, Christoph Groth wrote: > Through an article [1] in LWN, I stumbled across a thread [2] on this > list that dealt with the usefulness of smartcards for storing > OpenPGP keys. I don't have time to read what I already wrote in that thread, so I'm sorry if I re

Re: What are some threats against which OpenPGP smartcards are useful?

2020-01-07 Thread Mike Gerwitz
On Tue, Jan 07, 2020 at 14:09:50 +0100, Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users wrote: > Additionally smartcards require PINs and lock the card after several > tries. This is not possible with keys on USB drives. PINs can also be changed confidently. The passphrase of the _copy_ of a key on disk can