to the GPG project (basically only the people
that would have the means, knowledge and time to bisect the issue).
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the metadata very carefully.
I'd suggest to make a habit of not trusting PDF files with currently invalid
timestamps... Or files without cryptographic timestamps with currently invalid
signatures...
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QBS - Quality Business Software
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the traffic from the offline machine can be one-way
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smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
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to their
service. gmail can do just as much. I'd say if the other person signing a
contract is also using gmail it's just as secure and trustworthy.
But maybe it's just my bias against crypto that doesn't use DSA/RSA/ECC...
Regards,
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of thousands of documents with it, an attacker can
recover substantial portion of the key and speed up the key recovery.
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On Tuesday 04 of December 2012 14:14:34 Hauke Laging wrote:
Am Di 04.12.2012, 13:19:11 schrieb Hubert Kario:
Keys can become used up so it entirely depends on how often you use it.
What I mean by that, is that any signing operation leaks some information
about the key used for signing
On Tuesday 04 of December 2012 16:07:26 Nicholas Cole wrote:
On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Hubert Kario h...@qbs.com.pl wrote:
On Monday 03 of December 2012 12:41:10 Hauke Laging wrote:
Hello,
are there arguments for preferring either
a) having one RSA subkey for decryption only
On Tuesday 04 of December 2012 16:07:26 Nicholas Cole wrote:
On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Hubert Kario h...@qbs.com.pl wrote:
On Monday 03 of December 2012 12:41:10 Hauke Laging wrote:
Do any problems arise with the smartcard if the same key shall do
different
tasks?
Keys can
not make it more or less so.
Just shut it and stop making a fool out of yourself.
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to
know.
There is some support for PGP in Bouncy Castle, so if is possible you should
look at their API.
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tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24
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On Friday 05 of October 2012 01:13:54 Hauke Laging wrote:
Am Do 04.10.2012, 22:09:27 schrieb Hubert Kario:
won't the answer to that depend on the hash in question?
Probably. So the question could be changed to: For which hashes does the
value change and for which not? Limited to the hashes
be usable as long as the user knows what
he's doing.
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Hubert Kario
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http
(in linux:
diff (hexdump -C original.txt) (hexdump -C copy-from-website.txt)
I'd guess have a problem with line endings
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QBS - Quality Business Software
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tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24
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,
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QBS - Quality Business Software
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it personally though. We've got plenty of tinfoil hatted
individuals, shills or plain misinformers on this list in the past. *Because*
it's a cryptography list. Whatever your ID looks like a real name or not has
nothing to do for it.
Over and out.
Regards,
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Hubert Kario
QBS - Quality Business Software
they won't be verifable anyway.
Regards,
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QBS - Quality Business Software
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,
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it, let alone use.
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in the first place. It
is no different than changing the data inside the entry...
It requires usage of cryptographic primitives, not simple wrapers aroung gpg
but it's completely doable.
Regards,
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Hubert Kario
QBS - Quality Business Software
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of fingerprint.
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2012 09:31:15 -0400
From: shavi...@gmail.com
To: gnupg-users@gnupg.org
Subject: Re: can someone verify the gnupg Fingerprint for pubkey?
Sam Smith snt123-w473749522376a8d4b7b6eac2...@phx.gbl June 6, 2012
9:25:37 AM wrote:
Sam Smith
if the planting is uncoordinated.
As a thought experiment, what happens when all the real protesters
have gone on to something else and plants from various agencies make
up 100%?
Ahh, the Memoirs Found in a Bathtub! Well written book, quite captivating.
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Hubert Kario
QBS - Quality Business Software
02
any form of crypto is hard enough. We
don't need to show them that it doesn't fix all problems...
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for asymetric crypto, I'd say you're
probably right.
But that's just speculation, we will know in 30 - 40 years... :)
Regards.
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QBS - Quality Business Software
02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawerów 30/85
tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24
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...
Regards,
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QBS - Quality Business Software
02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawerów 30/85
tel. +48 (22) 646-61-51, 646-74-24
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memo?
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would be to invest in a
sturdy steel codpiece and a long passphrase.
David
everything that could be invented has been invented
640k ought to be enough for anybody
Do we really have to repeat the history?
Regards,
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Hubert Kario
QBS - Quality Business Software
02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawerów 30
RSA or (which is unmaintainable) manually force use of
8k DH.
Regards,
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Hubert Kario
QBS - Quality Business Software
02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawerów 30/85
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On Friday 04 of May 2012 08:40:31 Robert J. Hansen wrote:
On 05/04/2012 06:07 AM, Hubert Kario wrote:
It still doesn't change the overall picture:
1. migrating to ECC is hard and complicated
2. using 8k RSA is easy
Nor does it change
3. using 8K RSA gives a modest increase
On Saturday 05 of May 2012 20:03:04 Peter Lebbing wrote:
On 05/05/12 15:49, Hubert Kario wrote:
As far as I know, OpenSSH uses DH parameters of the same size as the RSA
keys: for 8k DH you need 8k RSA or (which is unmaintainable) manually
force use of 8k DH.
Okay, going out on a limb
passed over secure links are passwords and http
cookies. Which basically never have validity of over 10 years and 1 year
respecitvely.
Thing is, that is not the only use-case of crypto systems.
Regards,
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QBS - Quality Business Software
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tel. +48
in comparision.
Using large keys would be stupid only if you need low latency/high IOPS system
that can't use long lasting secure channels: web servers. But that's not our
use case.
Regards,
Hubert Kario
[1]: http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/RGS_B_1.pdf
[2]: Practical Cryptography, Chapter: RSA Defined
The truecrypt-7.1a-linux-x64.tar.gz.sig file is only 72 bytes long.
It may be because of long keys used by Arch developers, but all signature
files I see are 287 bytes long.
I'd go and ask the developers directly.
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Hubert Kario
hub...@kario.pl ka...@wit.edu.plhttps://hubert.kario.pl
.
they can be made useless with only a little bit of know-how and few simple
tools.
The only known working attacks on cryptography use brute force: similar to
going through the wall, when the doors with a lock are too big of an
obstacle.
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QBS - Quality Business Software
On Monday 23 of January 2012 18:18:35 Robert J. Hansen wrote:
On 1/23/12 11:34 AM, Hubert Kario wrote:
And there's a very good reson why you shouldn't be a fan of such
comparisions: Unlike physical security, properly implemented
cryptography is unbreakable at this time.
This, of course
use is funny. But then, what can they do
when people forget their passwords 5 minutes after they set them or use the
same password on facebook and their bank...
If only the horse battery staple correct method was taught as *the* method
for creating and remembering passwords...
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On Tuesday 20 of December 2011 17:34:24 Johan Wevers wrote:
On 20-12-2011 16:49, Hubert Kario wrote:
Yeah, the kind of protections banks use is funny. But then, what can
they do when people forget their passwords 5 minutes after they set them
or use the same password on facebook
hands-on experience with them or other suggestions?
The gemalto reader is actually a USB card reader, so any experience with USB
readers should also apply.
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QBS - Quality Business Software
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On Friday 21 of October 2011 11:21:59 Roland Siemons (P) wrote:
Therefore I need to be able to execute Kleopatra or GPA. Unfortunately
Kleopatra does not work.
Kleopatra is part of KDE, so you may have more luck with asking on the KDE
mailinglist.
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if you know
the person) and the full can be verified just as easily.
The problem is that people don't feel the need for authentication and privacy
in e-mail. They feel that e-mail is secure (after all I use encryption to my
e-mail server).
Regards,
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Hubert Kario
On Sunday 14 August 2011 14:05:02 Peter Lebbing wrote:
On 14/08/11 13:41, Hubert Kario wrote:
From what I learned, RSA cracking is basically an exaustive search.
If your prime is composite, it is at most half as long as a real prime
would be.
So, instead of a ~1024 bit prime you have
On Monday 25 of July 2011 17:45:16 Werner Koch wrote:
As it is not
possible to secretly read out the key you will almost always have the
opportunity to revoke the key before a damage is possible.
The key is also useful for decrypting past communication...
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QBS
of thousand of dollars. Not to mention that you have only one try at
it...
It's at the point that any real attacker would perform rubber hose
cryptanalysis. Even before trying to break the card.
Regards,
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Hubert Kario
QBS - Quality Business Software
02-656 Warszawa, ul. Ksawerów 30/85
tel. +48 (22
: Unknown
system error
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smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
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