Re: Looking to invoke abend in IBM PC call Service

2024-01-18 Thread Binyamin Dissen
On Thu, 18 Jan 2024 18:34:43 -0500 Joseph Reichman wrote: :>I am looking to cause an abend in IBM Service that is invoked by a PC call :>(bad parameters) so as to test out Estate Type Recovery for CBT file 192 :>If anyone has an example would appreciate it One would think placing x''

Re: I hate to be a pain (Cross-Posted)

2024-01-18 Thread Lennie Dymoke-Bradshaw
Radoslaw, The "cracking exercise" is not so difficult. Those private keys in RACF are not encrypted. They are stored in field CERTPRVK. I think they are BER encoded. Details are in the RACF Macros and Interfaces manual. It's easy to display them using zSecure if you know how. Good reason to

Looking to invoke abend in IBM PC call Service

2024-01-18 Thread Joseph Reichman
Hi I am looking to cause an abend in IBM Service that is invoked by a PC call (bad parameters) so as to test out Estate Type Recovery for CBT file 192 If anyone has an example would appreciate it Thanks -- For IBM-MAIN

Re: I hate to be a pain (Cross-Posted)

2024-01-18 Thread Radoslaw Skorupka
Is ICSF xKDS file a VSAM? Yes. So, why to keep the keys in CKDS/PKDS instead of RACFdb? 1. Because the keys in CKDS/PKDS are *well encrypted* using secret key (CryptoExpress MK). Assumed you have CEX. 2. Because any key kept in RACF is kept along with the encryption key for that key. 3. Because

Re: I hate to be a pain (Cross-Posted)

2024-01-18 Thread Bob Bridges
I gotta plead guilty to this. I know the basickest of basics about Unix security, mostly from reading "The Cuckoo's Egg" multiple times; I've also hit the manuals occasionally, but I'm woefully ignorant and I know it. I guess it helps that I know it, but it'll be better still to learn more.

Re: I hate to be a pain (Cross-Posted)

2024-01-18 Thread Rick Troth
> Files in Unix are pretty unsecure.   ... That's the popular wisdom. I could argue that the evidence is circumstantial, even coincidental. (Bad rap because of bad practice by OTHER PEOPLE.) But I'll back down. What Itschak said about USS/Unix being unfamiliar to mainframe security teams is

Re: VolCat - Reallocate ?

2024-01-18 Thread Shaffer, Terri
Thanks, That link didn't work for me as looked for it before this post. Ms Terri E Shaffer Senior Systems Engineer, z/OS Support: ACIWorldwide - Telecommuter H(412-766-2697) C(412-519-2592) terri.shaf...@aciworldwide.com -Original Message- From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List On Behalf

Re: I hate to be a pain (Cross-Posted)

2024-01-18 Thread Colin Paice
My H'penth Files in Unix are pretty unsecure. I feel that any keystore in Unix is an exposure. With ICSF you can define a public/private key pair, and protect them with a SAF profile such as RDEFINE CSFKEYS label... You then give people access to the label, and hence to the key(s). I think

Re: I hate to be a pain (Cross-Posted)

2024-01-18 Thread ITschak Mugzach
Rick, You blond the messenger. STIGs are developed by DISA. We only automate the process. This is why I am very familiar with the STIG rules. Btw, unix file system is less understood and maintained by the mainframe security teams, so the risk is built in uss security (if you do not use external

Re: I hate to be a pain (Cross-Posted)

2024-01-18 Thread Rick Troth
On 1/18/24 02:53, ITschak Mugzach wrote: see below the relevant STIG (V8r11)- TSS0-ES-000100: IBM z/OS for PKI-based authentication must use ICSF or the ESM to store keys. Why? (And I realize that YOU are not making this up, so don't take any challenge personally.) Any keys or